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Summary 
This thesis examines the development of representation in typically developing children 
and in young children with Down's Syndrome. The focus on representation allows us to 
adopt a general approach to development in infancy spanning domains such as motor 
development, language, object permanence, imitation, and symbolic play. 
Theoretical approaches to children with Down's Syndrome have been dominated by the 
`delay versus difference' controversy. This perspective suggests that development in 
children with Down's Syndrome should proceed with a sequence and structure similar to 
that observed in typically developing children. In this thesis it is argued, in contrast, that 
children with Down's Syndrome present a number of challenges to the organisational 
perspective. This thesis examines the strengths and weaknesses in the development of 
children with Down's Syndrome and attempts to identify the structural links between 
domains which are threatened by such a profile. 
These results of empirical studies detailed in this thesis suggest that development across 
domains such as language, motor development and object permanence appears to be 
relatively coherent. However, children with Down's Syndrome show subtle differences 
in their performance on object permanence and symbolic play tasks which suggests 
deviation from the typical pattern of structural coherence. Specifically, children with 
Down's Syndrome appear to adopt a more imitative strategy in solving object permanence 
tasks and in their symbolic play. The prevalence of imitation as a strategy may be 
indicative of a shallow level of processing. Alternatively, it may also be argued that 
children with Down's Syndrome adopt a different representational style in performing 
tasks. These subtle difference in the style with which children approach task suggest that 
the learning and consolidation process may differ between children with Down's 
Syndrome and the typically developing population. Such findings may have important 
consequences for intervention. 
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Chapter 1 
The Development of Representation 
1.1 Aims of this thesis 
This thesis is motivated by two considerations: to demonstrate how an understanding of 
representational processes in children with Down's Syndrome can enhance an 
understanding of developmental theory in general and to inform strategies for 
interventions targeted at children with Down's Syndrome. The focus on representation is 
an attempt to identify ways in which developmental processes are similar to, and different 
from, those of typically developing children. The study of representation provides us with 
a means of linking domains of development which may traditionally be regarded as 
separate and conversely, identifying as separate, domains which appear be linked. 
Furthermore, a theoretically driven account of representational development serves as a 
basis in identifying areas worthy of empirical investigation. 
In this chapter, and the five introductory chapters which follow, the development of 
representation in children with Down's Syndrome is introduced in relation to models of 
typical development. In this first chapter, models of representational development are 
discussed in general terms as they apply to typically developing children and with specific 
reference to development within atypical populations. The focus on `representation' is 
warranted in allowing us to identify particular theoretical constraints which may be 
respected or violated in atypical populations. The following chapter, chapter two, 
discusses the development of children with Down's Syndrome with respect to typically 
developing children. The subsequent four chapters look at traditional domains of 
development which, it is argued, are pertinent to the development of representation in 
infants with Down's Syndrome. 
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1.2 Aim of this chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to contrast our understanding of the way in which development 
occurs in typical children with the developmental processes implicated in atypical 
populations. A focus on representations is first justified from the standpoint of typical 
development. It is argued that representations form the common currency of children's 
thought processes across a variety of developmental domains. It is clear, however, that 
the particular definition of `representation' is crucial to a discussion of its ontogenesis. In 
the subsequent sections, definitions of representation are introduced and subsequently 
discussed in relation to global theories of development. The implications of such theories 
are subsequently discussed in terms of constraints on representational development with a 
view to interpreting atypical development. The notion of representational development, 
either as a domain general process or a domain specific process occurring within 
circumscribed modules, is implicit in many global theories of development. Several such 
meta-developmentaltheories are introduced in this chapter. Such theoretical views make 
predictions about the possible courses which development may take and the ways in 
which strengths and weaknesses may develop. This perspective is therefore particularly 
pertinent to our concluding discussion of atypical development 
1.3 The nature of representation and thought 
From the point of view of contemporary philosophy, representations comprise the 
elements of our thought which may be evaluated semantically. It is the existence of 
representations, therefore, that allows our thought processes to be justified or corrected. 
For example, the mediation of mental representations distinguishes between the act of 
solving a problem and a patella reflex. Without representations our thoughts would, by 
definition, be without content, or meaning. As Russell (1996, p. 4) argues, we would be 
`crazy' to do cognitive and developmental psychology without being concerned with a 
theory of representation, to do so would be to accept the doctrine of behaviourism. The 
behaviourist denies the existence of mental and cognitive processes and accounts for 
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mental states simply as dispositions to behaviour. The behaviourist school of thought has 
failed, largely as a result of its inability to explain how identical behaviours could be 
driven by different mental states 
Given this compelling argument for the role of representation in developmental 
psychology, albeit due to the failure of behaviourism, boundaries for our discussion need 
to be established. Developmental psychologists are primarily concerned with the 
ontogenesis of representational thought and the consequent representational status of the 
child's mental processes. However, there is an identifiable tendency in developmental 
psychology to be concerned solely with the empirical demonstration of emergent 
representational capacities without sufficient concern for a definition (McShane, 1991). 
Many of the discrepancies between empirical results concerned with early representational 
capacities amount to little more than the semantics of their competing definitions. Defining 
exactly what is meant by a representation is therefore a central, and much neglected, 
problem in studying the development of representational systems. 
1.3.1 What is representation? 
The classical definition of a representation, according to Pierce (see Tereja, 1988), is as 
one element in the pair comprising sign-and-signified or form-and-meaning. For example, 
a picture can represent something, its referent, as being a certain way (sense). 
Representations can comprise pictures, models, sentences and mental states but, some 
would argue that the representations should be restricted to either arbitrary, or purely 
conventional, relationships between the representation and the represented. Some forms 
of `representation' do bear some resemblance to their referents, for example an aerial 
photograph of a town or a child's picture of her mother both, to a varying extent, 
resemble that which they depict. Other `representations' have a causal connection to the 
signified, such as clouds representing rain. Language, in contrast, provides a clear 
example of an arbitrary relationship between the representation itself, a word, and its 
referent. These linguistic relationships are established solely through social conventions 
and hence there is no similarity between the word dog and the dog itself. 
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Clearly, any definition of representation must specify the degree of similarity and causal 
connection between the hypothesised representation and that which it represents. Perner 
(1991) argues in this respect for a distinction between primary representations, in which 
there is close causal contact between the representation and the world, and secondary 
representations which are purposefully `decoupled' from reality. In order to qualify as 
secondary representations, these must go beyond direct copies of reality to `evoke 
something else' (Perner, 1991). A secondary representation therefore represents 
something as `being a certain way' (Perner, 1991). The distinction between that which is 
represented and the meaning which is afforded by the particular representation is 
sometimes referred to as the distinction between sense and referent, or between object and 
content. Gottlieb Frege (1892/1960) commented that although people refer to the 
`Morning Star' and the `Evening Star', both expressions refer to the planet Venus. Here 
both expressions refer to the same object (referent) but differ in their content (sense), i. e. 
meaning. Perrier's model allows us to ascribe a truly representational status only to 
secondary representations, and to dismiss primary representations as being mere 
reflections of reality. Such a distinction is similar to a distinction drawn between 
representations of actual (primary) and hypothetical (secondary) states of affairs, which 
was central to Piaget's account of the development of representations (Piaget, 
1953/1970). 
The philosophical issues here focus on the similarity of our internal representations to our 
perception of external reality. It was Hume's belief that mental representations comprise 
both ideas and impressions, and that these differ only in terms of the `force and violence' 
with which they reflect reality (Bricke, 1980). Hume's impressions are essentially direct 
copies of perceptual elements and it is from these impressions that fainter ideas could be 
derived. Hume's ideas, being derived from perceptual input, would fall into Perner's 
category of primary representations - by virtue of their similarity and causal connections 
with reality. Given that thoughts proceed on the basis of hypothetical states of affairs 
which may not be derived from perceptual input, the Humean position leaves only a 
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limited role for representation in thinking. In this sense, the relationship between internal 
and external representations itself dictates the role for representation in thinking. 
If representations are no more than primary derivations of external reality, as Hume 
suggests, then the role for representation in thinking is indeed limited. An alternative 
view, such as that proposed by Perner (1991), is that our internal representations are, by 
definition, divorced from reality and therefore assume a central role in thinking. Questions 
surrounding the relationship between internal representations and external reality can 
therefore be seen as constraints on the relationship between representation and thought. In 
order to establish a theory of representation which is pertinent to typical development one 
first needs to establish its role in adult-like thought processes. We will now turn our 
attention to the precise relationship between definitions of representation and the nature of 
thought in adults. 
1.3.2 How does thought relate to representation? 
Mental representations were introduced as central to understanding behaviours driven by 
mental states. Thus, an adult may look into a biscuit tin driven by the belief that it contains 
desirable biscuits, but one would not seek to explain a patella reflex similarly in terms of 
beliefs and desires. The adult's problem solving behaviour can be justified with reference 
to mental states while the reflex action cannot. It is the very nature of cognitive processes 
which permits such semantic evaluation and this is often referred to as having content. 
The relationship between representations and thought processes hinges upon whether 
representations have inherent content or whether this content must be extracted or 
interpreted by some higher order process. Cognitive processes no doubt involve the use 
of representations but the driving force behind these processes, beliefs, desires, hopes, 
etc., so called propositional attitudes, are difficult to account for in purely representational 
terms. In terms of searching for a biscuit, behaviour is driven by the belief that the tin 
contains desirable biscuits. A representational account of propositional attitudes is 
particularly problematic if we accept Hume's narrow and primary view of representation 
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which would only stretch as far as a perceptual impression e. g. the tin contains desirable 
biscuits. We are therefore left with a choice, either to broaden our definition of 
representations to encompass propositional attitudes or to draw a clear distinction between 
representing something and thinking something. 
If a narrow definition of representations is accepted, such as that proposed by Hume, then 
we are left with a homunculus problem. Such representations do not have content, i. e. do 
not `mean', and therefore require an interpretant (Pierce, see Tereja, 1988). This 
homunculus problem invariably crops up whenever we require the semantic content of 
representations to be extracted or interpreted. One possible solution to this problem is to 
establish a model of thinking which proceeds without the need for semantic evaluation. If 
representations have inherent content they do not therefore require interpretation. Such a 
solution was proposed by Fodor (1987). Fodor argued by analogy with computers that 
representation and meaning are integrated in the formal symbolic properties of thought. 
This symbolic language is termed the Language of Thought (LOT) and thinking is 
therefore reducible to symbolic processing (Pylyshyn, 1984). These symbolic processes 
require no more interpretation than that expected of a computer 'interpreting' a binary 
code. Propositional attitudes are nothing more than boxes, a 'belief' box, an 'intention' 
box, etc., and actions are driven by the contents of these boxes. According to this view 
the mind essentially becomes a syntactic engine rather than a semantic one. The main 
problem with this account is it reduces semantics to syntax of thought and this does not 
reflect our folk psychological view of how we go about the business of thinking. 
It would appear that the adoption of a particular view of representation dictates the role for 
such a system in adult thought processes. However, the impetus behind the current 
discussion is to develop an understanding of theoretical constraints which may be applied 
to the development of thought in children. The following discussion focuses on 
theoretical issues surrounding representational development in typically developing 
children. 
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1.4 The development of representation in typically 
developing children 
Whether we believe that internal representations take the form of computational symbols 
(e. g. Fodor) or mental pictures (e. g. Hume) we are left with a problem of how 
representations, whatever their form, come to exist for the child. It is clear, however, that 
the process by which representations develop must itself depend on the nature of 
representation. The adequacy of the child's initial, a priori representations and the 
subsequent developmental processes are the subject of much theoretical speculation 
ranging from wholly empiricist to wholly nativist accounts. 
1.4.1 The ontogenesis of representation: nativism vs. empiricism 
William James characterised the young infant's mind as a `blooming, buzzing confusion' 
suggesting the absence of any native representational organisation (Myers, 1986). Locke 
took a similar view of the initial state of the human mind as an empty room waiting to be 
furnished or a tabula rasa (blank slate) awaiting experience (Lowe, 1995). Locke's view 
of the mind as a tabula rasa epitomises the empiricist sentiment that `there is nothing in the 
intellect which was not first in the senses'. However, to many developmental 
psychologists and philosophers, such an absolute denial of native knowledge is 
untenable. Kant argued from a philosophical standpoint that we need some constraints on 
our experience in order to explain our subjective conceptions of time, space, and causality 
(White, 1996). However, Kant's position is often, wrongly, attributed to nativism. On 
the contrary Kant argued that knowledge of the properties of space and time was a form 
of rational intuition, integral to perception, and not endowed by native structures. 
Somewhere between the empiricism of Locke and James and a strong nativist view lies 
Piaget's constructivist account of development(Piaget, 1953/1970). Piaget believed that 
representation was neitheran innate property of children's minds nor could it be derived 
wholly from experience. Piaget's central thesis is that children are endowed with a 
number of simple schema which are essentially reflex actions, such as the suckling or 
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grasping reflexes. These schema are subsequently modified and reorganised in the light of 
experience and environmental feedback. Development thereby occurs as a result of 
successive internal reorganisations of existing action schema. What distinguishes Piaget's 
account of development from an empiricist view is that experience is invariably interpreted 
according to pre-existing schemata and thereby represented internally. However, Piaget 
did not attribute representational status, even in its narrow form, to the child's early 
schemata. The earliest schemata are nothing more than reflex actions. Representations, 
according to Piaget, arise as a result of the internalisation of action, a process which does 
not begin to occur until around 18 months of age. Before the internalisation process is 
complete the child's thought processes occur, to some extent, through the medium of 
motoractivity. 
Piaget saw subsequent development as a series of stagewise transitions during which the 
child's understanding would undergo a dramatic transformation across a number of 
domains. Infancy is dominated by the sensorimotor stage which occupies the period from 
birth to 18 months. The child's thought develops as a capacity to internalise actions in the 
form of symbolic representations. Development progressed from the sensorimotor stage, 
through the preoperational stage, concrete operational stage and finally the stage of formal 
operations. 
Fundamental to Piaget's view of sensorimotor development is that thought is an 
internalised representation of action. The adequacy of a child's thought processes are 
reflected in their structure. Structural reorganisation occurs through the co-ordinated 
processes of assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation is the process by which 
currently existing schemata are applied to experience and is seen as the motivating force 
behind development. Accommodation is a failure-driven process which results in the 
modification of schemes and addition of new schemes into the child's repertoire. This 
process of development is often referred to in terms of a dynamic equilibrium between 
assimilation and accommodation or between the desire to impose an existing framework 
on experience and to construct a new framework. 
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Central to Piaget's constructivist account is the denial of native knowledge. Piaget 
attributed to the new born child only a limited number of reflex actions and some 
constraints on the restructuring process. Piaget believed that the child's psychological 
starting point was with inadequate representations of space, time, objects, and causality. 
However, many criticisms of Piaget focus on his denial of adequate native 
representational structure (Russell, 1996). For example, Piaget believed that the world of 
the new-born child was one characterised by egocentricism in which the child fails to 
distinguish between herself and the world. Piaget postulated that the child acquired an 
allocentric, or world-centred, view through cumulative experience of action. Many 
philosophers regard the notion of allocentricismarising from egocentricism as untenable 
(Hopkins, 1987; Campbell, 1993). Technically the philosophical argument centres on 
what must be known `a priori' and what can be constructed on the basis of experience and 
reason. While Piaget acknowledges some `a priori' knowledge in the form of native 
structures, many would argue that Piaget in this respect, did not go far enough (Russell, 
1996; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992/1995). 
A second fundamental problem with the Piagetian account of representational 
development is its insistence on general stagewise representational changes reflected in 
children's success on particular tasks. Such a model has been challenged by a weight of 
empirical evidence showing that children's success on such tasks is sensitive to minor 
modifications (Donaldson, 1984; Baillargeon, 1991). Furthermore, discrepancies 
between domains of development which have been observed demonstrate the absence of 
coherent general stagewise development (Cromer, 1994; Fodor, 1983). 
More recent neo-Piagetian accounts of development have modified some of Piaget's less 
celebrated views, particularly his denial of native structure and the notion of domain- 
general representational change. A more prominent role for innately specified knowledge 
is suggested by Karmiloff-Smith (1992/1995). Karmiloff-Smith posits native structure in 
the form of attentional biases or predispositions towards particular types of environmental 
input. Like Piaget, Karmiloff-Smith believes that the child adds new representations on 
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the basis of interactions with the world and modifies existing representations to reflect 
new acquisitions. However, while Piaget argues that representational development is 
driven by the inadequacy of existing representations, Karmiloff-Smith argues that the 
child is motivated by the successful application of such representations. Thus, Karmiloff- 
Smith's account of developmental progress is success rather than failure-driven. In this 
sense representational change is preceded by behavioural mastery rather than as a process 
fuelled by conflict as proposed by Piaget. 
Karmiloff-Smith's (1979,1992/1995) neo-Piagetian account of the development process 
is termed representationalredescription. The process of representational redescription 
takes place within microdomains, or circumscribed areas of representational development. 
Domains such as the child's understanding of physics are made up of microdomains such 
as an understanding of gravity. Her account of representational change involves a `phase 
transition' within each microdomain. Information is initially encoded at the implicit level 
and is transformed, after achievementof behavioural mastery, to three subsequent levels 
of explicit understanding. Prior to establishing behavioural mastery, information is 
encoded only at the implicit level and a number of constraints are applied to links between 
representational domains. Karmiloff-Smith illustrates her theoretical perspective with an 
example of learning to solve a Rubik's cube puzzle. It is initially possible through many 
hours of practice to achieve behavioural mastery of the Rubik's cube task and thereby 
develop a `proprioceptive solution' which can be performed rapidly but not at a slower 
rate. Eventually this implicit solution is redescribed and thereby transcends the implicit, 
procedural representation to an explicit representation which is accessible to 
consciousness. Once the process of representational redescription has transformed the 
implicit representations into explicit levels, information is accessible to verbal report and 
open to intra-domain and inter-domain representational links. 
Thus, Karmiloff-Smith's account of development recognises the fundamental need to 
posit innately specified knowledge and furthermore proposes that representational shifts 
occur within microdomains rather than as domain general processes. 
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Piagetian models aside, there are a number of developmental meta-theories which seek to 
explain developmental trends in representational development. Fodor's LOT model of 
representation, in contrast to Piagetian theory, postulates an innate capacity for the use of 
mental symbols. This innate symbolic capacity reflects a common representational 
language, or language of thought. The processing of symbols is carried out by a number 
of input systems and is regulated by a central processor. Input systems, or modules, with 
fixed neural architecture provide the translation of sensory input into a common format 
suitable for central processing. Input modules include a number of dedicated perceptual 
and linguistic processors. Fodor hypothesised that processing within these modules is 
both fast, automatic, and insensitive to top down demands of the central system. 
Additionally, input modules encapsulate information beyond the reach of other modules 
and provide `shallow output' only for the central system. Fodor's model accounts for 
development as an ever increasing processing power of the central system. This process 
allows the central system to generate top-down hypotheses about the world on the basis 
of information received from input modules. 
Beyond arguments about nativism, what distinguishes Fodor's view from the views of 
Piaget is his insistence on a modular structure to the mental processes. Karmiloff-Smith 
also proposes some processing limitations to mental communication between domains of 
understanding. The extent to which thought can be seen as a modular or domain specific 
process is pertinent to an understanding of development within typical and atypical 
populations. This issue will now be addressed. 
1.4.2 Modularity, domain specificity and atypical development 
The relationship between domains of development is implicit in many views of 
representational processes in typically developing children. Karmiloff-Smith describes a 
process of representational change based on representational redescription within micro- 
domains while Fodor argues for hardwired modules of which only the central system 
`develops'. Central to this debate is whether representational development occurs in 
relative independence within circumscribed domains or occurs as some coherent domain 
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general change as a result of an increase in processing capacity. At the beginning of this 
chapter it was argued that representation might form the common currency which binds 
thought processes across domains of development. The extent to which this is true 
depends on the theoretical position which is adopted. 
These unresolved philosophical issues serve to illustrate how representational theories 
work from the `inside-out' (Russell, 1996) approaching developmental trends within an 
established developmental framework and with fixed ideas about the nature of 
representations. Such a problem is exacerbated by empirical preoccupations in which 
support for particular theoretical perspectives is often based on studies of typically 
developing children and carried out exclusively within particular domains such as face- 
perception and language development. Despite this preoccupation, there are no strong 
theoretical grounds for treating such domains either as distinct or coherent in 
representational terms. Empirical evidence from studies of typical development is 
implicitly conservative. Similarly, studies carried out within domains of development do 
not contribute to an understanding of relationships between domains of development such 
as language development or perceptual processing. 
Russell (1996) suggests an alternative approach in which we acknowledge that children 
possess representational forms of some kind but reserve judgement about the nature of 
representations until we obtain empirical evidence which forces us to constrain our views. 
This is to argue from the `outside in' and address the question in the form `we could not 
know X unless our experiences had a particular form Y, therefore our experiences have 
form Y'. Pursuit of such arguments leads to empirical constraints upon the nature of our 
experiences which may support one or other view of representation. 
Recently, a greater emphasis has been placed on the value of extending theories to 
encompass developmental psychopathology. It is a fundamental premise of developmental 
psychopathology that, `we can understand more about the normal functioning of an 
organism by studying its pathology, and, likewise, more about its pathology by studying 
its normal condition' (Cicchetti, 1984, p. 1). Although not universally accepted, this 
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premise establishes a reciprocity between our understanding of typical and atypical 
populations. What this means is that studying developmental processes in atypical 
populations may reveal continuity or discontinuity which is not readily apparent in 
typically developing children. The existence of such continuity, or discontinuity, may 
support or conflict with theoretical accounts of representational development. 
A fundamental problem in studying typically developing children is that development may 
proceed in a rapid and coherent way relative to atypical populations. The chances of 
establishing precisely which facets of development are genuinely related and which facets 
merely coincide is therefore more difficult than where development occurs more slowly. 
Thus when development occurs in an atypical manner or relatively slowly, it becomes 
easier to distinguish between coincident and necessary developmental relationships. 
Furthermore, the very nature of disorders such as William's Syndrome, Fragile-X 
Syndrome and autism are such that children appear to have characteristic, and theoretically 
informative, strengths and weaknesses. 
Much of the recent interest in the development of children's understanding of mental 
states has been driven by the desire to interpret the apparent lack of such understanding in 
children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Hobson, 1993). Theoretical perspectives on 
the development of children's understanding of mental states are now judged on their 
ability to encompass evidence from the field of autism. Similarly, children with William's 
Syndrome who often exhibit stark contrasts between their strengths in language and face 
perception and weaknesses in number and spatial cognition, are provoking a rush of 
interest from developmental psychologists interested in theoretical implications of such 
dissociations (Bellugi, Marks, Bihrle & Sabo, 1988; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992/1995). 
The pattern of particular strengths or weaknesses and their developmental characteristics 
provide evidence which informs our knowledge of both typical and atypical 
developmental processes. Likewise any fundamental perspective on the nature of 
representational development must encompass a number of perspectives from 
developmental psychopathology. In the following section, consideration will be given to 
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the particular ways in which global theories of representational development may 
encompass evidence from atypical populations. 
1.4.3 Developmental meta-theories and the organisation of 
development in atypical populations 
Meta-developmentaltheories, such as those described by Piaget, Fodor and Karmiloff- 
Smith, specify not only the relationships within domains of development but the common 
structural characteristics or processes which may bind particular domains together. In 
specifying either a global or modular structure to developmental processes such theoretical 
perspectives constrain the variation which may occur between facets of development. An 
account of such variation within the typically developing population and indeed the 
variation which characterises atypical development must therefore be encompassed within 
the constraints applied by theories of meta-development. In this section, the extent to 
which meta-developmental theories can account for atypical developmental processes will 
be discussed. 
The `orthogenetic principle' proposed by Werner and Kaplan (1963) suggested a 
developmental progression from a state of globality and undifferentiation to increasing 
articulation, complexity, differentiation and hierarchical organisation. Cicchetti, Beeghly 
and Weiss-Perry (1994) claim to be guided by Werner and Kaplan's organismic- 
developmental approach in studying children with Down's Syndrome. The organisational 
approach proposed by Werner and Kaplan suggests that development proceeds via a 
series of qualitative reorganisations which lead to increasing differentiation and 
hierarchical organisation of biological and behavioural systems. Hierarchical integration 
takes place both within and between systems the cognitive, affective and social domains. 
In typically developing children it is hypothesised that cognitive, affective and social 
domains of development become increasingly organised and integrated. Normal 
development is characterised as a successful negotiation of `a series of interlocking social, 
emotional and cognitive competencies' (Cicchetti and Beeghly, 1990; p. 32). In contrast, 
developmental psychopathology may arise whenever the development of one system lags 
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behind the other two and therefore precludes higher level integration. The implication here 
is that early adaptation leads to later successful integration while early developmental 
perturbations or deviations may be exaggerated in later development 
A number of developmental meta-theories were previously introduced in respect of typical 
developmental processes. These theories, enunciated by Piaget, Fodor and Karmiloff- 
Smith, are prevalent in the developmental literature and influential in contemporary 
approaches to developmental psychology. Historically, much of the empirical work with 
atypical populations has adopted a Piagetian perspective, while contemporary theories 
such as those of Fodor and Karmiloff-Smith present new challenges in studying atypical 
development. The extent to which each of these theoretical approaches can encompass 
findings from atypical populations will now be discussed. 
All development during the sensorimotor period was domain general according to Piaget 
thus development of language and social relations are fused with the developing 
conceptions of space, time and causality. Piaget viewed linguistic development as a 
product of the emerging symbolic function which develops around 18 months. A delay in 
sensorimotor development is therefore matched to a delay in the linguistic domain. 
Piaget's view of development as a domain general process therefore makes it difficult to 
account for the domains of strength and weaknesses encountered in atypical populations. 
Piagetian traditions, with an emphasis on domain general development, are arguably 
responsible for much of the historical, and somewhat unhelpful, insistence that Down's 
Syndrome entailed a slowing down of mental development. Classification of children and 
adults according to sensorimotor stages or mental ages owes much to an insistence on a 
Piagetian framework for development. In contrast to Piaget's domain general emphasis, 
Fodor's account of development postulates a number of discrete and independent 
modules. 
Fodor (1989) viewed cognitive development as comprising the development of a number 
of innately specified input modules each linked to a central system. Recall that input 
systems have dedicated functional roles, for example within vision at the level of colour 
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perception, shape analysis, face recognition, and in audition, for melody or rhythm 
detection. It is thus entirely consistent with Fodor's view that advances may occur in one 
domain, say language, relatively independently of other domains. Furthermore, modules 
such as grammar could develop independently of lexical, and phonological modules. 
Fodor's modular view of development neatly accounts for atypical profiles both across 
and within domains. 
Fodor's account of the modularisation of processing tasks does not draw explicitly on 
data from atypical populations but his suggestions regarding the ontogenesis of input 
systems implies that input systems could be regarded as deficient in neural architecture 
and hence function. Fodor does suggest that some functional disorders such as aphasiac 
and anosias occur as a result of the failure of particular input systems and occur 
independently of the central system. These breakdown patterns are characteristic of the 
underlying architecture of input systems according to Fodor. Furthermore, Fodor's view 
that such systems develop under endogenous determination implies that any such deficits 
are hard wired and innate. While acknowledging that strengths and weaknesses could 
reflect the relatively poor and relatively superior functioning of particular input systems 
Fodor also suggests that global deficits in memory or attention processes are possible, 
presumably as a result of innate central deficits or damage. However, input modules are 
hypothesised to develop relatively independently under the control of brain maturation and 
are therefore insensitive to environmental deprivation. Furthermore, Fodor does not 
specify how development of the central system might proceed in the absence of input 
from a particular module, say vision or hearing. Fodor's model could certainly account 
for any domain specific or domain general characteristics of children with Down's 
Syndrome by appealing to a combined breakdown of input systems and/or central system. 
However, Fodor's model makes explicit predictions regarding innate specification of 
input systems and the maturational processes which govern their development - such 
claims may prove vulnerable to evidence from atypical populations 
including children 
with Down's Syndrome. 
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Karmiloff-Smith's model of representational redescription, or RR, postulates the 
existence of separable domains of development and some native structure which serves to 
specify information biases within these domains. The incorporation of domain specificity 
in the RR model allows for the possibility of uneven cognitive profile in atypical 
populations. However, Karmiloff-Smith wishes to emphasise the distinction between 
domain specific information biases and the specification of domains. Fodor's 
specification of innate modules may only, and only with difficulty, account for 
development in the absence of a particular module, say in visually impaired children. In 
contrast, Karmiloff-Smith's model allows for a great deal of plasticity in accounting for 
atypical populations. 
In terms of innate specification of developmental structure and limitations, Karmiloff- 
Smith's model sits between Piaget's, domain general constructivism and Fodor's nativist 
and domain specific view of development. Deficits within particular modules are 
accounted for in Karmiloff-Smith's model as a failure to achieve behavioural mastery and 
representational redescription within that domain. 
1.5 Conclusions 
The preceding discussion outlined the central importance of representation as a means of 
understanding developmental processes and indeed the nature of thought. It is clear that 
the adoption of a particular view of representation entails fixing its role in thought 
processes and defining its developmental characteristics. A number of distinct views of 
representation and the process of representational development in typically developing 
children have been introduced. Furthermore, theoretical perspectives on representational 
development have been considered in relation to the development of atypical populations. 
Global meta-developmental theories differ widely in their capacity to encompass atypical 
developmental profiles. Furthermore, these theories make specific predictions about the 
ways in which anomalies may arise. The striking anomalies present in William's 
syndrome or in autism are exciting to developmental psychologists wishing to explore 
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representational processes, particularly those involved in the development of language or 
theory of mind. However, in contrast, children with Down's Syndrome are often 
characterised as having a coherent, typical developmental profile which is simply a 
slowed down version of typical development. For this very reason, children with Down's 
Syndrome have often formed the control group in studies of other atypical populations. In 
the following chapter, it is argued that development in children with Down's Syndrome 
challenges our view of typical development in two fundamental ways. First, the 
characteristic slowing down of development observed in children with Down's Syndrome 
itself demands an explanation. Second, we argue that children with Down's Syndrome 
possess a number of characteristic strengths and weaknesses which suggest a departure 
from the expected developmental coherence. 
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Development in Children with Down's Syndrome 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the theoretical approaches which are adopted when 
studying development in children with Down's Syndrome. In the previous chapter, the 
development of representation was introduced as a way of identifying structural 
constraints which should, in theory, be applied to typically developing children. In this 
chapter the development of children with Down's Syndrome is considered in relation to 
these constraints. 
This chapter begins by asking how psychological and developmental processes in 
children with Down's Syndrome may be similar and different to such processes in 
typically developing children. One of the traditional arguments surrounds the so called 
`delay vs. difference' controversy, i. e. is development in Down's Syndrome delayed or 
different in comparison to typical development? Evidence is presented both for and 
against this view of children with Down's Syndrome. The subsequent discussion 
introduces an alternative view of children with Down's Syndrome and postulates areas of 
coherence in development, referred to as `local homologies', while allowing for an 
uneven developmental profile. This chapter is concluded by drawing the model of local 
homologies into line with developmental meta-theories some of which incorporate the 
existence of modules which comprise independent developmental facets. 
2.1 Why study children with Down's Syndrome? 
Studying children with Down's Syndrome has benefits in terms of an understanding of 
both children with Down's Syndrome and children without Down's Syndrome. From the 
viewpoint of children with Down's Syndrome, the intervention process is likely to be 
more successful if based on a detailed understanding of the atypical developmental 
processes which are implicated in Down's Syndrome. Furthermore a comprehensive 
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understanding of psychological development would necessarily include an account of 
development of both typical and atypical populations, thus including children with 
Down's Syndrome. 
Much of the debate surrounding the development of children with Down's Syndrome has 
focused on what has become known as the `delay vs. difference controversy' (Hodapp & 
Zigler, 1990). The controversy concerns the extent to which the development of children 
with Down's Syndrome can be characterised as different, or simply delayed, with respect 
to typically developing children. In this section it is argued that both views of children 
with Down's Syndrome would present challenges for developmental theorists. 
To the extent that development in children with Down's Syndrome is uniformly `delayed' 
it provides us with a means of carrying out a temporally fine-grained analysis of typical 
development. A slower rate of development also has a number of implications for 
examining the contribution of maturational and experiential processes to the timing of 
developmental transitions. Alternatively, if children with Down's Syndrome can be 
characterised as being different, they may possess a unique developmental profile. 
Therefore, just as children with autism provide a means of understanding the relationship 
between social perception and pretend play, the development of children with Down's 
Syndrome may also prove to be uniquely informative. 
The following discussion considers the global organisation of development in children 
with Down's Syndrome in comparison to that which is apparent in typically developing 
children. Subsequently attempts to account for the slower developmental rate in children 
with Down's Syndrome are considered in contrast to evidence for characteristic strengths, 
weaknesses, and structural anomalies within this population. 
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2.2 The organisation of development in children with 
Down's Syndrome 
One dominant theoretical view of children with Down's Syndrome is that development 
can be broadly summarised as a slowed down version of typical development (e. g. 
Hodapp & Zigler, 1990). Such a view makes a number of empirical predictions 
concerning the sequence and structural characteristics which should be conserved in 
Down's Syndrome as in typical development. In this section we consider the assumptions 
and predictions which are inherent in this view of children with Down's Syndrome in 
relation toempirical evidence. 
Early views of developmental psychopathology proposed that mental retardation' 
occurred as a result of cognitive `defects' such as a defect in selective attention (Zeeman & 
House, 1962), or increased rigidity in general cognition (Lewin, 1935; Kounin, 1948). 
Zigler's (1969) `developmental formulation' arose as a reaction to views which proposed 
defective thinking as a cause of mental retardation. Zigler's view was that retarded 
children were globally delayed in terms of intellectualdevelopmentjust as someone with 
an IQ of 100 could be seen as globally delayed in comparison to someone with an IQ of 
130. However Zigler's formulation was intended to be applied only to those children who 
exhibited some form of intellectual impairment without apparent organic aetiology' and 
thus excluding children with Down's Syndrome. Zigler's reasoning was that children 
without organic aetiology comprised the lower end of the normal distribution of 
intelligence. Zigler also believed that those individuals at this end of the distribution 
would follow the same `universal' pattern in cognitive development as in those of higher 
IQ but would reach a lower intellectual ceiling. More recently, Zigler's model of delayed 
' The notion of a slowing down in development is implicit in the terms `mental retardation' 
or `developmental delay'. However, the use of these terms is not intended to imply 
acceptance of such views. 
2 These children are termed 'familial retarded' by Zigler (1969) as opposed to those with 
identifiable organic aetiology, 
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development has been modified and extended to children with Down's Syndrome 
(Hodapp & Zigler, 1990; Cicchetti & Beeghly, 1990). 
This notion of developmental delay is implicit in the concept of mental age. If ascribing a 
mental age to an individual is to be meaningful then children of similar mental ages should 
perform similarly on a wide variety of tests of intellectual ability. Underpinning such a 
conceptual framework is the premise that there exists a universal sequence and structural 
properties to development which should be obeyed in children with Down's Syndrome 
and in typical children. These assumptions are termed the `similar sequence' and `similar 
structure' hypotheses. Such hypotheses are central to the `organisational perspective' 
adopted by Cicchetti and Beeghly (1990) and support for these hypotheses is crucial to 
the view of development in children with Down's Syndrome as globally delayed. In the 
following section, the evidence for each hypothesis is considered in turn. 
2.2.1 The similar sequence and similar structure hypotheses 
Children's development has traditionally been considered to comprise a number of 
discrete developmental domains. It is often implied, for example, that linguistic, 
sensorimotor, and affective development occur within circumscribed domains. This 
implication is pervasive in empirical work reported in developmental literature. 
Development within such domains has consequently been a prevalent focus for attention 
in studying children with Down's Syndrome. The similar sequence hypothesis implies 
that children with Down's Syndrome should show the same developmental progression 
within each domain as that which characterises typically developing children. 
There is widespread evidence that the sequential developmental chronology witnessed in 
typically developing children is broadly maintained within developmental domains in 
children with Down's Syndrome (Cicchetti and Beeghly, 1990). Within the domain of 
sensorimotor development (Cicchetti & Mans-Wagener, 1987), the development of 
smiling and laughter (Cicchetti & Sroufe, 1976), and in the development of play (Hill & 
McCune-Nicholich, 1981), children with Down's Syndrome follow an apparently typical 
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sequential path. Krakow and Kopp (1983) also offer support for a global delay in 
cognitive progress within domains of development, `Delayed young children achieve 
major milestones in a similar order and with a similar organisation as their normally 
developing peers, the main reliable differences being that the rate of development is 
slower and the appearance of achievements is later. This general finding applies to socio- 
affective development, selective attention, sensorimotor development, language and 
symbol formation, pretend play, and attachment behaviours' (p. 1143). Krakow and 
Kopp's comments illustrate the widespread support for the similar sequence hypothesis. 
The similar sequence hypothesis is broadly supported by empirical evidence. However, 
sequential development may, by necessity, follow a typical pattern as, for example, 
children must learn to walk before they can run. Empirical investigations of the similar 
sequence hypothesis are therefore often implicitly conservative. Recall that the similar 
structure hypothesis predicts coherence in relationships between domains of development. 
The similar structure hypothesis provides a more crucial test for Cicchetti and Beeghly's 
`organisational approach' as there is arguably greater propensity for discrepancies in the 
structural relationships between domains. Cicchetti and Beeghly (1990) provide evidence 
for a typical relationship between affective and cognitive development in children with 
Down's Syndrome. Further evidence for structural coherence is provided by Lenneberg 
(1966,1967). Lenneberg reports a similar correspondence between motor and language 
development in children with Down's Syndrome as that observed in typical development. 
Lenneberg suggests that such close correspondences between these ostensibly distinct 
domains implies an underlying structure which is under the control of brain maturation. A 
study carried out by Butterworth and Cicchetti (1978) compared the development of 
postural motor control and visual proprioception in a group of children with Down's 
Syndrome alongside typically developing children. The authors remark that although both 
groups show similar levels of response to visual stimuli in terms of the frequency of 
postural adjustment, the magnitude of responses was different in the two groups. 
Cicchetti and Sroufe (1976,1978) demonstrated a coherent relationship between affective 
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and cognitive development in children with Down's Syndrome. Children with Down's 
Syndrome showed a typical pattern in the development of laughter, beginning with 
responses to simple auditory and visual stimuli, and developing increasing social 
characteristics. Cicchetti and Beeghly (1990) argue that such results testify to the 
`organisation and coherence of early development' (p. 55) in children with Down's 
Syndrome. 
Despite the apparent similarity in both structural and sequential aspects of development, 
developmental, children with Down's Syndrome would certainly appear to develop at a 
slower rate than typically developing children. It is therefore clear that development in 
children with Down's Syndrome is different, if only in terms of the rate at which it 
occurs. As Fowler, Gelman and Gleitman (1994) comment, `how is it that a child can be 
learning "normally" over a period of 12 years what is otherwise acquired in 30m. ' 
(p. 113). Proponents of the developmental similarity view of children with Down's 
Syndrome must therefore account for characteristic differences in developmental rate 
while respecting the global organisation of development. This is rather paradoxical as 
presumably structural anomalies are likely to be implicated in accounting for the 
developmental delay. There are many clues to the possible origins of cognitive or 
maturational limitations to development in its temporal pattern. Alternative views and 
explanations of this pattern in children with Down's Syndrome are considered in the 
following section. 
2.2.2 The rate of development in children with Down's Syndrome 
There is reliable empirical evidence that the developmental rate of children with Down's 
Syndrome is not only reduced but declines as children get older. Dicks-Mireaux (1972) 
quantifies this as a decline from an IQ of 75 at 4m to an IQ of 58 at 18m, and other 
authors have plotted the rate of deceleration well in to adulthood (Zeaman & House, 1962; 
Carr, 1992). This declining rate of development, while not exclusive to children with 
Down's Syndrome, is certainly not apparent in typically developing children, and 
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significantly not in `familial retarded children'3 (McCall, Appelbaum & Hoggarty, 1973). 
An explanation of children's failure to maintain a rate of development is therefore 
warranted. 
The temporal pattern of development may suggest particular structural anomalies which 
correspond either to particular maturational transitions, difficulties with specific levels of 
cognitive achievement, or simply difficulties with tasks which characterise IQ at particular 
ages. The subsequent discussion addresses a number of alternative accounts which may 
allow for a progressive deterioration in developmental rate while maintaining a broadly 
similardevelopmental structure. 
A number of explanations for the decline in IQ have been suggested, some positing 
motivational deficits which could have a cumulative effect in impeding learning (e. g. 
Wishart, 1995), some (e. g. Nadel, 1996) suggesting that differences in neuropathology 
may constrain the efficacy of children's learning and memory performance, and others 
(e. g. McCall, Eichorn & Hoggarty, 1977; Kopp & McCall, 1982) suggesting structural 
limitations which mark the passing of critical periods in development. 
A number of authors have pointed to the transitions in typical developmental trajectories 
which may hold an explanation of the deterioration in the performance of children with 
Down's Syndrome. McCall, Eichorn and Hoggarty (1977) suggest that children with 
Down's Syndrome fall behind their peers at a number of transition points, at 2,8,13 and 
21 months. The authors suggest that these transitions correspond to changes in the 
characteristics of IQ tasks. Kopp and McCall (1982) argue that children with organic 
impairments, such as Down's Syndrome have deficits which are founded in the central 
nervous system and differ qualitatively `in respect to the density, richness and adaptability 
of sensorimotor repertoire' (p. 55). The authors suspect the prevalence of immature forms 
of behaviour in preference to more mature patterns is a result of the organic aetiology and 
these deficits are particularly noticeable at transition points. Evidence that such transitions 
McCall, Appelbaum & Hoggarty, (1973) use the term `familial retarded children' to refer 
to children with low IQ in the absence of apparent organic aetiology (cf. Zigler, 1969). 
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occur is apparent in some large scale growth studies, where each transition is marked by a 
qualitative change in `intelligent behaviour'. Kopp and McCall (1982) suggest that it is a 
limitation in these qualitative shifts which serve to progressively compound the 
impairment in intellectual development. Kopp and McCall hypothesise that developmental 
transitions have their roots in neurophysiological organisation. Therefore any anomalies at 
transition points are interpreted by Kopp and McCall as having a neurophysiological 
basis. 
The neuropathological nature of the learning deficit in children with Down's Syndrome is 
similarly emphasised by Nadel (1996). Nadel catalogues a number of studies of the early 
psychological development which may plausibly be linked to neuropathology of the 
hippocampus and cerebellum such as that found in children with Down's Syndrome from 
about six months of age. Although many studies of the learning and memory abilities of 
children with Down's Syndrome show no differences from typically developing infants, 
Nadel claims that this is a reflection of the limited capacities of all children at this age. As 
Nadel outlines, structures such as the hippocampus are not fully developed until 16 to 18 
months and hence differences would not be evident much before this. This view appears 
similar to the account of deterioration given by Kopp and McCall (1982). Evidence to 
support the view that types of learning and memory problems are related to the 
hippocampus should demonstrate cumulative differences over this period of development. 
Nadel cites studies carried out by Ohr and Fagen (1993,1994) which show three-month- 
olds with Down's Syndrome to have typical learning patterns when leg kicks were 
reinforced. However, at nine months, children with Down's Syndrome as a group were 
relatively impaired. Nadel claims that this relative deterioration in children with Down's 
syndrome is consistent with a hippocampal deficit which develops over the first 18 
months of a child's life. 
Where such research is useful, as Nadel emphasises, is in identifying how differences in 
learning and memory may be related to underlying neural dysfunction. Nadel claims that 
organic aetiology may be responsible for apparent difference in the learning style adopted 
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by children with Down's Syndrome (Wishart, 1993a, 1993b). Wishart (1996a, 1996b) 
suggests a failure on the part of children with Down's Syndrome to consolidate learned 
skills, which distinguishes them from typically developing children. Much of this 
evidence stems from a low test-retest reliability on task performance, a characteristic 
which has an apparent motivational component. Instability may be seen as a fundamental 
part of structural reorganisation which is therefore more likely to be in evidence where 
transitions are made more slowly. However, the instability which has been observed in 
children with Down's Syndrome appears to exceed the rates one would expect given a 
protracted transitional period (Dunst, 1990; Shapiro, 1975). 
Wishart's view is that instability is characteristic of a general `approach to learning' in 
children with Down's Syndrome which acts to shape and limit their learning experiences 
(Wishart, 1996a, 1996b). Younger children with Down's Syndrome appear to be more 
passive than typically developing children in a contingency learning paradigm, while older 
children avoid difficult tasks by `misusing' social skills (Wishart, 1996a, 1996b; Pitcairn 
& Wishart, 1994). Pitcairn and Wishart (1994) offer support for this view of children 
with Down's Syndrome with evidence based on the attempts of children to solve an 
impossible task. Children with Down's Syndrome appear characteristicallyavoidant and 
make use of `party tricks' to distract attention from such tasks. 
Differences in the approach to learning adopted by children with Down's Syndrome are 
also cited by Rast and Meltzoff(1995). Rast and Meltzoff suggest that a `dampening of 
epistemic curiosity' is characteristic of the task performance of children with Down's 
Syndrome. The authors argue that it is `epistemic curiosity' which drives children to test 
hypotheses in the absence of external reinforcement. Rast and Meltzoff comment that it is 
difficult to find tasks which have sufficient `cognitive capture' to draw in children with 
Down's Syndrome for cognitive work. Ganniban, Wagner and Cicchetti (1990) also 
point to motivational differences in addition to attentional patterns which appear to be 
characteristic of children with Down's Syndrome. 
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While neurobiological factors such as those identified by Nadel (1996) may correspond to 
the differences in learning and motivation observed in children with Down's Syndrome 
few authors explicitly account for motivational differences in these terms. Hodapp and 
Burack (1990) argue that the declining developmental rate observed in children with 
Down's Syndrome may arise either from maturational constraints or from a change in task 
requirements corresponding to attainment of a particular developmental level. These 
alternatives are illustrated in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2. Figure 2-1 represents a decline in 
rate of development at a specific developmental age. Such a pattern might reflect a 
limitation in the child's sensorimotor or cognitive repertoire and would be consistent with 
Kopp and McCall's (1982) account of development in children with Down's Syndrome. 
Figure 2-2 illustrates a decline in developmental rate at a specific chronological age which 
would be consistent with a failure of neurobiological maturation if such maturation was 
mapped onto chronological age. Such maturation constraints at a particular chronological 
age therefore operate independently of cognitive level. 
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Figure 2-1: Effects of changes in task type 
on developmental rate 
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Figure 2-2: Effects of neurobiological 
structure on developmental rate 
Hodapp and Burack distinguish between these distinct developmental growth patterns by 
appealing to evidence from atypical populations. While children with Down's Syndrome 
may exhibit rate changes associated with specific developmental ages or stages (Kopp & 
McCall, 1982), children with Fragile-X syndrome appear to show a decline in 
developmental rate at puberty, a transition dependent on chronological age. Hodapp and 
Burack may be right to suggest that the age dependent decline in rate observed in Fragile- 
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X may be best explained by changes in neurobiological structure, Figure 2-2, but cannot 
exclude the possibility that similar neurobiological factors might underpin stage dependent 
changes illustrated Figure 2-1. Evidence for such stage dependent deteriorations may 
merely indicate that the particular task which delimits IQ at any particular stage requires a 
neurological feature which is poorly developed. 
While it is sometimes assumed that neuropathology is synonymous with an innately 
specified or purely maturational account, the preceding discussion suggests this is not the 
case (e. g. Nadel, 1996). Evidence from studies of identical twins with Down's Syndrome 
suggests a number of phenotypic differences which must be attributed to environmental 
effects (Shapiro, 1994). Nadel (1996), despite finding evidence for specific cumulative 
neuropathology in children with Down's Syndrome, is keen to emphasise the possibility 
that environmental mediation could ameliorate the deficit. Indeed Nadel views his account 
of development as entirely consistent with the motivational account proposed by Wishart 
(1993b). 
A number of global differences in both motivation and learning in children with Down's 
Syndrome have been outlined in this section. Such evidence serves as a means of 
resolving the paradox inherent in the delay account of development. The paradox is 
essentially that the delay is itself a structural difference and cannot be accounted for within 
the `delay' standpoint. Resolution of this paradox may require nothing more than a shift 
of emphasis or change of terminology. Cicchetti and Beeghly (1990) resolve the problem 
of terminology by using the term `organisational' perspective to refer to the broadly 
typical pattern of development of children with Down's Syndrome. The organisational 
perspective therefore maintains that children with Down's Syndrome develop in a similar 
structural and sequential manner to that observed in typically developing children. 
Furthermore, the existence of anomalies serves to illustrate alternative ontogenetic 
pathways. Thus, according to Cicchetti and Beeghly (1990), accounts of global deficit in 
learning and motivation do not threaten the structural integrity and organisation of 
development in children with Down's Syndrome. 
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However, in the following section, the evidence for this `organisational' view and 
complementary accounts for a global delay are contrasted with evidence for the emergence 
of particular developmental strengths and weaknesses in children with Down's 
Syndrome. The question which needs to be addressed is whether such strengths and 
weakness can be reconciled with the view of children with Down's Syndrome as 
organisational lycoherent? 
2.2.3 Developmental differences: strengths and weaknesses 
The evidence presented above (section 2.2.1) suggests a broad correspondence between 
development in children with Down's Syndrome and typically developing children. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that the organisation of development is similar in terms of 
sequential progress within domains and structural relationships between domains. 
However, there is widespread evidence to suggest that children with Down's Syndrome 
do have characteristic strengths and weaknesses when compared to typically developing 
children at a similar level of cognitive development. Such strengths and weaknesses 
challenge the view of children with Down's Syndrome as globally delayed and 
structurally coherent in developmental terms. One notable weakness is in language 
development (Fowler, Gelman & Gleitman, 1994) whist social development appears to be 
a relative strength (e. g. Gibbs & Thorpe, 1983; Centerwell & Centerwell, 1960). The 
methodology of the studies underlying these claims is based upon the premise that 
children of similar mental age should perform similarly on a number of specific tasks. 
Typically developing children certainly have strengths and weaknesses relative to each 
other, but researchers in the field of Down's Syndrome are seeking to identify consistent 
strengths and weakness which may be attributed to the syndrome itself. 
A number of studies report a delay in linguistic development in children with Down's 
Syndrome relative to other skills (e. g. Mahoney, Glover & Finger, 1981; Leifer & Lewis, 
1984; Cardoso-Martins, Mervis & Mervis, 1985). Mahoney, Glover and Finger (1981) 
report a delay in linguistic development relative to sensorimotor development with lexical 
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acquisition lagging behind performance on means-ends and object permanence tasks. 
Cardoso-Martins et al. (1985) report similar findings. Within the domain of language 
development, children with Down's Syndrome appear to be particularly delayed in 
grammatical development (Leifer & Lewis, 1984). Leifer and Lewis compared children 
with Down's Syndrome matched with typically developing children on the basis of mean 
length of utterance, or MLU, a measure of the grammatical complexity of children's 
speech. The pattern of results suggests that children with Down's Syndrome were more 
advanced than the typical group on `social' aspects of conversations, turn-taking and 
responding appropriately to questions. In contrast, the levels of grammatical complexity 
of children's spontaneous utterances were well behind typically developing children 
matched for developmental age. 
Children with Down's Syndrome have been characterised, somewhat stereotypically, as 
being sociable (Gibbs & Thorpe, 1983) and the performance of children with Down's 
Syndrome on a number of social measures is relatively advanced. The strength of social 
development in children with Down's Syndrome was the focus of a study carried out by 
Centerwell and Centerwell (1960) who reported a wide discrepancy between IQ scores as 
measured by the Stanford Binet test, and Social Quotient scores, SQ, as measured by the 
Vineland adaptive behaviour scales. A number of other studies also report that children 
with Down's Syndrome have relatively advanced social skills evident in play (Landry & 
Chapieski, 1990) and pragmatic skills (Leifer & Lewis, 1984). 
Despite the evidence for particular strengths and weaknesses within social and linguistic 
domains respectively, it would not be fair to conclude that development within children 
with Down's Syndrome is structurally disorganised. Evidence presented earlier suggests 
a surprising degree of structural coherence between particular domains. Mundy, Seibert 
and Hogan (1984) suggest that a model of development based on the existence of local 
homologies may provide a means of reconciling potentially conflicting empirical evidence 
regarding the structural integrity of development in children with Down's Syndrome. The 
model suggested by Mundy, Seibert and Hogan, groups together skills which show 
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strong inter-correlations into distinct homologies while skills which are not inter- 
correlated reside in distinct structural domains. The model is represented pictorially in 
Figure 2-3. 
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Figure 2-3: Model of local homologies for Down's Syndrome and typically developing 
children (adapted from Hodapp & Zigler, 1990) 
The model provides a clear descriptive account of empirical evidence from children with 
Down's Syndrome in relation to evidence from typically developing children. For 
example, skills I and 2 are seen as causally related in typically developing children and 
form components of a local homology, A. In the model of children with Down's 
Syndrome, homology A is globally delayed preserving the structural relationship between 
component skills 1 and 2. In contrast, skills I and 4, while correlated in typically 
developing children, do not share a causal structural basis and are represented as 
components in separate homologies, A and B. The discrepancy between these skills in 
children with Down's Syndrome merely illustrates a structural independence which is 
present, but not apparent in typically developing children. 
The model of development suggested by Hodapp and Zigler is consistent with Cicchetti 
and Beeghly's view of development in children with Down's Syndrome but also 
illustrates the same circularity in its approach. Both Hodapp and Zigler (1990), and 
Cicchetti and Beeghly's (1990) organisational perspective, suggest that violations of the 
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structural integrity observed in typically developing children merely serve to illustrate 
ontogenic possibilities which are not apparent in typically developing children. This 
`organisational' perspective does not imply that there are no discrepancies between 
domains of development, as Cicchetti and Beeghly are keen to emphasise. However, the 
authors argue that where discrepancies exist one might also expect to find discrepancies 
within the typically developing population. Indeed, a fundamental justification for the 
empirical study of children with Down's Syndrome, according to Cicchetti and Beeghly, 
is to elucidate where structural relationships are logically necessary and where alternative 
pathways of ontogenesis are possible. Cicchetti and Beeghly argue that the delayed pace 
of development, prolonged developmental transitions and variability between 
developmental domains make the elucidation of sensitive periods in ontogenesis possible. 
It is in this respect that Cicchetti and Beeghly's argument seems rather circular. When 
children with Down's Syndrome observe typical structural patterns this is seen as 
reinforcing the typical view of developmental organisation. In contrast, deviations are 
seen as illustrating alternative ontogenetic pathways which are prevalent in, but not 
evident in, the typically developing population. 
It is possible that Cicchetti and Beeghly may be right, however it is also possible, indeed 
plausible, that the ontogenetic pathway followed by children with Down's Syndrome is 
atypical. Deviations from typically developmental pathway may or may not be within the 
bounds of typical variation, but in either case may correspond with developmental 
psychopathology. It is clear, therefore, that any structural anomalies which appear to be 
exclusive to, or more prevalent in, children with Down's Syndrome warrant 
investigation. 
The importance of considering potentially pathological developmental processes reflects 
the need to account for apparent developmental limitations in children with Down's 
Syndrome. A discrepancy between skills could thus serve to illustrate a violation of 
typical structural integrity in children with Down's Syndrome where such skills are 
structurally linked in typically developing children. For example, in the model illustrated 
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in Figure 2-3, skills 5 and 8 are components of a single structural homology in typically 
developing children but are distinguished in children with Down's Syndrome as a result 
of a breach in the structural homogeneity of homology B. While Cicchetti and Beeghly 
argue that this discrepancy serves to illustrate the existence of two homologies which are 
indistinguishable in typically developing children, it is argued here that a structural 
violation within a homology is also worthy of consideration. 
Evidence from a range of empirical studies thus demonstrates both a degree of structural 
integrity and potential structural anomalies in children with Down's Syndrome with 
respect to typically developing children. While evidence for structural integrity is based on 
a similar profile of development with respect to typical development, anomalies are 
outlined by strengths and weaknesses with respect to this population. The interpretation 
of anomalies in atypical populations is heavily dependent upon evidence for a structural 
relationship between domains existing within the typically developing population. 
However, evidence provided by inter-correlations between facets or domains of 
development is clearly insufficient as the sole basis for establishing the structural 
continuity in the typically developing population. The interpretation of anomalies in 
children with Down's Syndrome as either benign or pathological requires an 
understanding of causal relationships within the typically developing population. What is 
lacking here is a theoretical ly-dri ven approach to establish where causal relationships exist 
i. e. where the homologies should be, both in typically developing children, and in 
children with Down's Syndrome. 
2.3 Discussion 
This chapter began by stressing the mutual benefits to be gained from studying typical 
development in relation to atypical development and to Down's Syndrome in particular. It 
is by studying the development of children from atypical populations that one can 
distinguish true developmental convergences from coincidence in typical development. 
However it is clear that notwithstanding the inherent value of developmental data from 
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children with Down's Syndrome, advancing the model of typical development has 
implicit benefits for these children. Our current interventions serve to reinforce a 
developmental chronology based on typically developing children. If this chronology, in 
the light of comparative evidence from children with Down's Syndrome, turns out to be 
rather more coincidental than interdependent, then our intervention strategy can be 
radically reformed. 
Studying the development of children with Down's Syndrome allows us to investigate the 
constraints which innate predispositions, and environmental factors, place on children's 
development. The notion of children as subject to a developmental delay immediately 
implies a discrepancy between processes governed by maturation and processes 
dependent on learning. However, the `delay' approach to children with Down's 
Syndrome fails to address the discrepancies between domains of development, and not 
least, the progressive decline in developmental rate. It is argued that children with Down's 
Syndrome do have specific strengths and weaknesses which suggest either anomalous 
structural limitations or different ontogenetic pathways. However, the theoretical 
perspective adopted by Cicchetti and Beeghly (1990) fails to address the possibility that 
anomalies apparent in the development of children with Down's Syndrome may be 
atypical and/or pathological. 
Establishing the extent of continuity or discontinuity between the developmental processes 
evident in children with Down's Syndrome and typically developing children demands a 
theoretical framework to determine where causal relationships and developmental 
homologies should exist. A theoretical framework could therefore establish the basis for 
structural relationships between skills which can then be used to interpret empirical 
evidence from the Down's Syndrome population. Theoretical models of development, 
such as those of Piaget (1953/1970) and more recent views such as those of Karmiloff- 
Smith (1992/1995) and Fodor (1983) do make testable empirical predictions about 
development and the structural constraints which should apply. Furthermore, existing 
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data on the development of children with Down's Syndrome suggest particular areas in 
which theories of meta-developmental processes may be vulnerable. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, much of the emphasis in empirical studies of global 
development in children with Down's Syndrome have addressed a Piagetian framework. 
The extent to which children with Down's Syndrome traverse the developmental stages in 
the same sequence as typical development and respect the structural relationships between 
domains, as proposed by Piaget, is surprisingly supportive of a global delay across the 
board. Other studies carried out within circumscribed domains of development such as 
language, social development or cognitive development may provide evidence of 
structural integrity in the development of children with Down's Syndrome. Cicchetti and 
Beeghly offer support for a global delay in postulating the link between affective and 
sensorimotor development. However the empirical methodology adopted in such studies 
often presupposes a Piagetian framework for development, or that domains such as 
`language' have theoretical validity. In the light of such conservative empirical constraints 
it is not surprising therefore that results often support the existence of such domains. 
In the previous chapter it was argued that theories of representational development 
constrain the relationships between developmental domains, or modules, and predict the 
nature of the developmental process itself. Meta-developmental theories make claims 
regarding the role of innate constraints, maturational processes, and environmental 
influences in development. Such claims allow us to make testable empirical distinctions 
between competing theoretical approaches to development. 
Our theoretical views about the underlying global structure in developmental processes are 
changing. Our ideas about what may constitute a developmental `domain' are also in a 
state of flux. Therefore, if links are to be identified between domains of development they 
may as well be found between working memory and grammatical development as 
between lexical and syntactic domains. However, many of the domains which have been 
the focus of past efforts do not coincide with vulnerable fracture points in contemporary 
views of development. Contemporary alternatives to the Piagetian view of development 
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offer challenges which need to be met within studies of atypical populations as well as 
within typical development. Subsequent chapters set out the relationship between domains 
of representational development in the light of contemporary developmental theory and 
attempt to review evidence from existing literature with reference to such theoretical 
shifts. 
In summary, the following discussion and empirical work is aimed at understanding the 
processes implicated in the development of children with Down's Syndrome. In 
contrasting these processes with those at play in typically developing children, we hope to 
understand how the environment might be adapted to suit the particular needs of children 
with Down's Syndrome. 
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The Development of Representation: Object 
Permanence 
The previous two chapters outlined the importance of having a theoretical basis to guide 
the interpretation of empirical data from children with Down's Syndrome. Furthermore, it 
was argued that a representation-focused account of development in infancy is best placed 
to examine the constraints which guide development within and between domains. This 
chapter introduces one of the central theoretical concerns of developmental psychology, 
the representational status of object permanence. Object permanence is a central feature of 
the Piagetian view of development in infancy. As was argued in chapter two, much of the 
evidence on the development of children with Down's Syndrome stems from this 
Piagetian framework. A discussion of object permanence is therefore pertinent both to a 
representational view of development and the particularly the development of children 
with Down's Syndrome. 
The status of object permanence in determining the child's representational capability 
owes much to Piaget (1955/1976). Piaget believed that children's representational 
sophistication was reflected in their ability to search for objects. This chapter begins by 
presenting an overview of Piaget's account of representational development in typically 
developing children. Recent evidence which casts doubt on Piaget's unitary view of 
representational development and alternative views are also presented. This chapter 
concludes with evidence from children with Down's Syndrome. It is argued that the 
anomalous cognitive profile in children with Down's Syndrome may impinge upon object 
permanence development and performance on object permanence tasks. A representational 
account of the development of object permanence in children with Down's Syndrome is 
introduced. 
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3.1 The development of object permanence in typically 
developing children 
Piaget believed that the child's concept of object permanence reflects an emerging 
representational capacity. Consequently, children's search errors expose the immaturity of 
their representational systems. Piaget believed that children acquired adequate conceptions 
of reality through experience of their own actions and consequent structural reorganisation 
of internal representations. While initially, children's behaviour is based entirely on what 
Piaget referred to as `action schemes', later performance is mediated by internal, mental 
representation. It is the gradual transition from sensorimotor action to representational 
thought which is reflected in search and driven by the child's experience of action. 
Piaget suggested that the child's concept of the nature of objects, `object permanence', 
could be seen as comprising several facets which develop in parallel during the period of 
sensorimotor development (0-18m). Piaget considered working cognitive models of 
causality, space and time to be fundamental to children's understanding of objects. 
According to Piaget, children under nine months of age fail to search for hidden objects 
because they effectively cease to exist for them. When children do begin to search for 
hidden objects they will only do so in a restricted set of circumstances. Initially, at stage 
III (six to eight months of age), children will only successfully retrieve an object if they 
initiate a reaching action before the object is covered. Thus, children at stage III can only 
`represent' hidden objects having initiated a reaching action to a perceived object. 
Children who reach stage IV, at eight to nine months, are then able to represent hidden 
objects but again their representation is based on action and is essentially egocentric, 
`objects are where I look for them'. Having mastered searching for an object at a single 
location, the child fails to take account of a change of hiding place, returning instead to the 
previous location. This error pattern is characteristic of stage IV and is commonly referred 
to as the A-not-B error. `A-not-B' refers to the fact that a child, following successful 
search at location A, does not successfully retrieve the object from its second hiding 
place, location B. Children at this stage simply repeat their sensorimotor schema to 
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recover hidden objects and therefore fail to take account of a change in hiding place 
leading to the A-not-B error. 
The transition from stage IV to stage V marks a decline in egocentricity and allows the 
child to take account of a sequence of displacements in a multiple location search 
paradigm. Following success at this stage children have difficulty in searching for an 
object if they cannot see it being moved to its hidden location, an invisible displacement. 
Invisible displacement typically involves the experimenter hiding a small object in her 
hand and then leaving the object behind a cloth or screen such that the child does not see 
the object disappearing behind the occluder. It is not until late stage V that children appear 
able to infer the object's true location. Later, children's representational capacity allows 
them to draw inferences about an object's location which are free from action schema, so 
that, during stage V, children are able to solve invisible displacements by constructing a 
mental representation of the hidden object. However, Piaget argues that at this stage the 
child is unable to solve tasks involving invisible displacement through more than one 
location. The child therefore makes the A-not-B error when invisible displacements are 
involved. The child must therefore relearn a solution to sequential displacement on the 
plane of representation rather than sensorimotor action. The final stage of object 
permanence development involves mastery of serial invisible displacement in which the 
object, hidden in the adult's hand, is passed through a series of possible hiding places 
before finally being hidden. Prior to stage VI, children witnessing a serial invisible 
displacement tend only to search in the first location in the series rather than searching 
exhaustively through all possible locations. 
The empirical data on which Piaget based his views of representational development has 
proved to be surprisingly reliable and has been replicated in a number of studies (Uzgiris 
& Hunt, 1975; Corman & Escalona, 1969). Contemporary objections to Piaget's views 
are directed at his interpretation of the data in representational terms. Before presenting 
these objections, it is necessary to present a detailed description of the Piagetian account 
of representation and object permanence. 
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3.1.1 The Piagetian view of representation and object 
permanence 
Piaget discusses the child's developing construction of reality as comprising several 
components; object concept, spatial field (groups of displacements), causality, and the 
temporal field. While these components of understanding were seen as structurally 
interdependent, Piaget believed that search errors reveal particular features specific to each 
domain. 
In developing an object concept a child gains an increasing knowledge of an object's 
permanence as distinct from sensorimotor action. The end of the sensorimotor period 
marks the beginning of the capacity to represent objects mentally. The progression in a 
child's reaction to hidden objects reflects a stagewise emergence of representational 
capacity. 
Within the domain of spatial understanding, Piaget hypothesised that the child's 
sensorimotor experience was reflected in implicit understanding of an increasingly 
complex group of displacements. The notion of a developing spatial field has been 
characterised as the development of objectivity vs. subjectivity and the decline of 
egocentricism. The transition in terms of groups of displacements is therefore from a 
subjective to an objective sense of displacements, and finally to a representation of space. 
This progression allows the child to dissociate retrieval actions from ego-spatial locations. 
The development of causality is a further component to which Piaget attributes search 
errors. As late as stage III, according to Piaget, the child's understanding of causality is 
`magico-phenomenalist' and the child sees external causes and effects as distinct, 
unrelated elements. In relation to object search, external causes of disappearance remain 
subordinate to the child's own activity. Through stages IV and V the child's 
understanding of causality becomes increasingly objective, encompassing external causes, 
and a spatial component. 
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In terms of development within the temporal domain, the child's understanding of 
`before' and `after' is yoked to her own actions. `Before' and `after' are therefore 
subjective concepts which have no direct bearing on external events. The child makes the 
A-not-B error in temporal terms because of an inability to conceptualise the temporal 
sequence of displacements. On reaching stage V, children are able to arrange external 
events in temporal order and by stage VI they can evoke memories of such action. 
While Piaget discusses the emergent conceptualisation of objects, time, space, and 
causality as components, the understanding of each is mediated by the child's transition 
from subjective to objective viewpoint. The child therefore makes the A-not-B error on 
the basis of a number of interrelated physical misconceptions i. e. the child fails to 
understand the spatial and temporal components of the displacement caused by an external 
agent. 
3.1.2 Non-search studies of object permanence 
Over the past fifteen years accumulating evidence based on new paradigms for studying 
children's representational ability suggests that infants may have an early conception of 
physical properties and the behaviour of objects well before they begin to search for 
hidden objects. This evidence challenges the Piagetian view that the child's failure to 
search reflects a failure to maintain a representation of an object. 
3.1.2.1 Do children have representations of objects prior to searching for 
them? 
New-born infants appear to have a number of perceptual abilities relating to the form and 
spatial properties of objects prior to experience of reaching for objects at around 4.5 
months. Children appear to be able to detect changes in the shape and form of objects 
from as young as two days old (Slater & Morrison, 1985; Slater, Mattock & Brown, 
1990). Children also appear to detect changes in distance of a looming object (Ball & 
Tronick, 1971). However, the claim that infants are able to detect absolute `distance' is 
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controversial (Bremner, 1989). Such information is unlikely to be based on experience of 
reaching to distant objects which does not begin until around 4m. 
Additional evidence from Kellman and Spelke (1983) suggests that children of four 
months can use the properties of moving object to draw conclusions about the form of 
hidden elements. Spelke suggest that a child's perception of partially occluded moving 
objects is covered by principles of boundedness, cohesion, rigidity and no action at a 
distance' (Spelke, 1988; 1990). Further recent evidence has suggested that such 
principles are not operative at birth (Slater, Morrison, Somers, Mattock, Brown & 
Taylor, 1990) but the authors do not rule out the possibility that these principles are 
innately specified. 
Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, and Jacobson (1992) present evidence from a further 
dishabitutation study which suggests that children are sensitive to principles of gravity 
and solidity of surfaces. Children as young as four months dishabituated to the motion of 
an object through a surface and at six months to events which involved an object 
suspended without support. Spelke suggests that an infant's knowledge of physical 
principles such as these, while not present at birth, is guided by innately specified 
mechanisms which require minimal direct experience with objects. Spelke's views stand 
in contrast to those of Piaget. 
3.1.2.2 Do children have representations of hidden objects prior to 
searching for them? 
While Spelke's experiments suggest some knowledge about the properties of visible or 
partially occluded objects, much of the Piagetian framework is based on children's 
reactions to hidden objects. The use of search behaviour as a criterion for representation 
may be over conservative. Infant's failure to search may not indicate a lack of 
representation but a lack of motor ability or means-end abilities to effectively recover the 
object. The work of Baillargeon (1986,1987a, 1987b, 1991) suggests that infants at 
three to four months old do have some awareness of the properties of objects when 
hidden. Baillargeon's drawbridge experiment demonstrates that infants will dishabituate 
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to the movement of a rotating drawbridge through the path of a hidden object. Children 
dishabituate to this `impossible event' despite being unable to see the object which should 
impede the drawbridge's progress. Further evidence of a reaction to hidden objects comes 
from Baillargeon and DeVos (1991). Baillargeon and DeVos report that children anticipate 
the appearance of a tall carrot passing a window in a screen but not the appearance of a 
shorter object. This study therefore demonstrates that children are maintaining not only 
the representation of a hidden object but represent some of its physical properties, in this 
case its height. 
With regard to children's knowledge of retrieval actions, Baillargeon, Graber and DeVos 
(1990) showed that five month old infants distinguish between possible and impossible 
retrieval events. The evidence for this is based on infants' increased dishabituation to 
impossible retrieval actions in which an object is retrieved from behind a blocking barrier. 
Baillargeon et al. argue that these results imply that infants have knowledge of the 
properties of hidden objects despite failing a standard Piagetian search task. Given that 
children appear to have knowledge of hidden objects we need to ascertain the extent to 
which this knowledge constitutes representation. Furthermore, if children appear to 
recognise successful search strategies, how can we explain their failure to search? The 
extent to which children's `knowledge' is equivalent to representation is discussed later in 
this chapter (section 3.1.2.4). In the following section explanations for a failure to search 
are discussed. 
3.1.2.3 How do we account for failure to search? 
Evidence from Hood and Willatts (1986) suggests that children are able to successfully 
reach for objects `hidden' in the dark. How can this apparent capacity to execute the 
correct search behaviour in response to hiding be reconciled with children's failure to 
search under standard conditions. 
Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos and Black (1990) argue that before eight months of age, 
children have an executive difficulty which places limitations on their ability to plan. They 
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argue that retrieval of a hidden object involves non goal-directed action i. e. the removal of 
an occluder, in order to retrieve the object. The conflict between the goal of object 
retrieval and the action to remove the occluder are beyond the planning capacity of an 
infant before eight months of age. Baillargeon et al. therefore suggest an information 
processing deficit in which a lack of executive capacity masks infants knowledge about 
the objects location. 
In contrast to Baillargeon et al. 's account, a competence explanation for children's failure 
to search is offered by Russell (1996). Russell argues that infants fail to understand what 
they have to do. They cannot conceive of how `their visual experiences are a function of 
what they can do' and cannot therefore plan manipulations of the visual environment on 
the basis of their action. Russell's explanation is equivalent to a deficit in agency, in 
which the infant is not sufficiently aware of the capacity his actions have. Other 
researchers have pointed to the fact that most non-search studies require a response within 
the visual array to a visual event. Diamond (1985) argues that search actions are limited 
by a delay in myelination of the prefrontal cortex. Translations of visual information into 
motor action therefore require cortical mechanisms which are not available to children 
before nine months. This explanation is supported by data from rhesus monkeys and 
macaques which shows a peak of synaptogenesis coinciding with stagewise transitions in 
cognitive capacities (Fischer, 1987). Fischer suggests that a similar process may be 
observed in human synaptogenesis in infancy and is supported by evidence from 
physiological measurements. 
3.1.2.4 What remains of the `object permanence' concept? 
The identification of awareness of hidden objects prior to search also poses a problem of 
how to define the representation of an object. Baillargeon's experiments appear to suggest 
the existence of sophisticated representations of objects prior to search. Is an enduring 
representation of a hidden object a sufficient condition for 'object permanence'? 
Alternatively, is a more conservative, search dependent definition required? Russell 
(1996) makes the distinction between `representation permanence' in the case of the 
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dishabituation studies and `object permanence' for children who can execute effective 
object retrieval. Information theorists, according to Russell, argue that representation 
permanence = object permanence. However, Russell argues that maintaining a 
representation of an object does not mean `knowing it exists'. Knowing an object exists 
requires knowing the relationship between that object and oneself. The distinction which 
should be drawn, according to Russell, is one of externality. Externality requires 
knowing `something about the relation between oneself as a spatially located experiencer 
and the object as the cause or possible cause of one's experience' (p. 113). Russell 
(1996) draws support from studies of `transitional search' behaviour in which children at 
stage III appear to execute the appropriate retrieval action but appear not to understand 
what they have done (Willatts, 1984). Such children may lift a cloth under which a toy 
had been hidden but subsequently, ignore the toy and play with the cloth instead. Such 
behaviour supports the Piagetian view that children at stage III may have some 
representation of a hidden object but this representation is not equivalent to knowing 
where the object is. 
While Russell (1996) appears to be suggesting a clear distinction between maintaining a 
representation of a hidden object and executing a retrieval action, Munakata, McClelland, 
Johnson and Siegler (1994) suggest a gradualistic approach to children's representational 
development in this domain. Munakata et al. trained seven month olds to retrieve an object 
placed at a distance by either pulling a towel or pressing a button. Subsequently, either a 
transparent or an opaque screen was placed between the child and the object. Children 
were able to recover the object in the transparent condition but not with the opaque screen. 
Munakata et al. claim that these results support a graded view of representational 
development in which weaker representations are sufficient to drive simple output, such 
as eye movements, but stronger representations are required to initiate complex means- 
ends behaviour. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992/1995) offers a comparable synthesis of dishabituation and search 
data in terms of representational redescription. Responses in dishabituation studies may 
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be a reflection of `Level I' implicit representations. Such representations may not 
therefore be accessible to processes which govern retrieval. Later, children's manual 
search is based on higher order, explicit, representations. In these terms, children's early 
dishabituation responses, based on implicit representations, are not conceptual or theory 
like, but the child focuses on external data to create `representational adjunctions'. 
Representational adjunctions are simply added to children's existing stock of data and do 
not alter existing representations. 
Despite the controversial claims surrounding the nature of children's representations prior 
to searching for hidden objects, children at stage IV continue to make search errors which 
say something about the nature of emerging representations. While from 8 to 12 months 
the ability to search at a single location for a hidden object becomes well established, 
children make a characteristic mistake when the object is transferred to a second location, 
the A-not-B error. 
3.1.2.5 Explanations of the A-not-B error 
The A-not-B error is characteristic of children's search between 8 and 12 months which 
corresponds with stage N of sensorimotor development. The error arises when, 
following search at one location (A), the object is subsequently hidden at a second 
location (B). Children fail to redirect their search behaviour and tend to return to location 
A. The Piagetian explanation of the A-not-B error is that it is the result of an egocentric 
spatial code. In Piagetian terms, children at stage IV believe that an object's existence is 
dependent on action, and children believe that `objects are where I choose to look for 
them'. Bremner and Bryant's (1977) study demonstrated that infants do appear to use an 
egocentric or 'self-referential' code in performing the two location search task. Bremner 
and Bryant argue that the standard A-B task confounds both self-referential and external 
reference systems and carried out a study in which the infant was moved between 
successive hidings of the object. They report that performance on the AB task was 
consistent with a self-referential coding of spatial relationships. However, children did 
appear to use an allocentric code if the locations were made distinct using different 
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coloured covers (Bremner, 1989). These results suggest that the infants were only using 
egocentric references in the absence of salient allocentric cues. 
A number of modifications of the standard A-B task have led to alternative explanations of 
this particular error. Bjork and Cummings (1984) argued that the standard A-B task only 
allows one alternative to correct search and hence the only possible error is the 
perseverative or egocentric one. Bjork and Cummings used a series of five wells and 
found that 80% of errors were closest to the correct well rather than the well where the 
object was previously hidden. Bjork and Cummings argue that this error pattern is not 
consistent with an explanation of egocentric spatial coding but may be a memory effect. 
The memory explanation is supported by Bjork and Cummings' evidence that errors 
become increasingly likely with a longer delay between hiding and retrieval. However, an 
explanation based on poor memory is undermined by evidence that children will search at 
the wrong location even when the object is visible (Harris, 1974). Consistent with both 
Bjork and Cummings', and Harris' data, is Diamond's (1985) account of a failure to 
inhibit a previously successful search response. Failure to inhibit the previously 
successful response results in a reach towards location A when the object is transferred to 
location B (Diamond, 1985). While a memory explanation would require errors to 
deteriorate over time from correct responding to chance performance, Diamond's 
`memory+inhibition' account predicts a developmental progression from correct to 
incorrect, and subsequently to chance performance. Furthermore, errors due to a 
perseverative reaching should be closer to well A than to well B, while memory failures 
should be closer to well B. Diamond (1985) argues that the arrangement of the hiding 
locations in the Bjork and Cummings study cannot distinguish between memory and 
inhibition accounts of search failure. Diamond, Cruttenden, and Niederman (1994) 
present evidence from a multiple-well study in which errors due to memory would be 
either side of the B location while failure to inhibit a previous response should result in 
more frequent errors towards location A. Diamond et al. find precisely this pattern and 
suggest a memory and inhibition account of children's A-not-B errors. The suggestion 
that both memory and inhibition are involved in the A-not-B error is consistent with 
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neuropsychological models which implicate the frontal lobe in the inhibitory control of 
action. Diamond's view of the A-not-B error is supported with evidence from primates 
with frontal lesions and human patients with frontal lobe damage who make errors similar 
to children of nine to 12 months. Furthermore, developmental progression during this 
period correlates with development of the prefrontal cortex. 
In summary, studies suggest that performance on the A-B task is not limited by 
representational development. Such studies explain the A-not-B error as an information 
processing limitation rather than a representational competence deficit. Both memory and 
memory+inhibition accounts of failure suggest that it is a deficit in information processing 
rather than underlying representational problems which results in the error. Piaget's 
explanation of the A-not-B error, while offering similar empirical predictions to Diamond, 
is as a deficit of competence in which inadequately structured representations lead to 
error. However, just as was the case with children's errors at stage III, there is evidence 
to suggest that children hold a veridical representation of the object's location and have the 
means-ends capacity to solve the problem while making errors on the A-B task. 
Baillargeon and Grabber (1988) demonstrated that children at eight months dishabituated 
to visual displays showing an A-not-B error as compared to a correct retrieval in the two 
location task. Other studies have shown similar discrepancies between visual responses 
and manual search. Diamond (1991) presents evidence that children often look at the 
correct location B while searching at A and making the A-not-B error. Gilmore and 
Johnson (1995) found that children appear to respond correctly when making visual 
saccades to an object's location. Such findings, which show a preference for the visual 
modality in solving the AB problem, are reminiscent of children's performance at stage 
III. Similar explanations can be offered for this discrepancy. Firstly, the means-ends 
demands of manual action are likely to be greater in the manual response condition and 
information processing errors are exaggerated (Gilmore & Johnson, 1995). Secondly, 
maturational development of cortical structures may limit the capacity for a manual as 
49 
Object Permanence 
opposed to a visual response (Diamond, 1995). Both explanations, as was the case at 
stage III, cite the preference for a visual response over manual action. 
3.1.3 Summary 
The Piagetian view of developments cites inadequate representations as the primary cause 
of children's failure to search for objects prior to eight months of age. More recent 
evidence suggests however that children younger than eight months have sophisticated 
knowledge of hidden objects and forces us to re-examine traditional explanations of 
failure to search (Baillargeon et al., 1990; Spelke, 1988; 1990). Furthermore, the 
existence of some demonstrable knowledge of hidden objects requires a reinterpretation of 
the theoretical and empirical basis which defines representation. 
Explanations of failure to search at stage III and the A-not-B error at stage IV have cited 
some form of limitation on manual responses imposed by neurological structure or 
information processing capacity. However, there is growing evidence to suggest that 
these limitations can be ameliorated by increasing the salience of the initial representation. 
While the effect of a reduction in delay, and potentially a reduction in the salience of the 
prepotent response, would support memory and inhibition explanations respectively, 
other empirical findings lend themselves to a representational salience account. Wellman, 
Cross and Bartsch (1987) report advantages in increasing the distance between the 
successive hiding locations, and salience of the distinction between locations. Such 
evidence is in conflict with an all or nothing account of object representations but supports 
a gradualistic view of representational development. 
In relation to the A-not-B error, Harris (1974) showed that infants still make the error 
when transparent perspex covers are used and the object therefore remains visible at B. 
However, Yates and Bremner (1988) have argued that children's lack of familiarity with 
perspex may be impeding their performance in this task. Once familiarised with the 
perspex covers, children do not appear to make the A-not-B error. Prior experience with 
perspex could be seen as reducing its inherent salience and thereby increasing the relative 
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salience of the visible object. Despite the apparent conflict in these data it is clear that the 
salience of the object's locations can have an effect on children's ability to overcome the 
perseverative response. A similar explanation could explain Bremner's finding that 
children do appear able to use an allocentric code when hiding locations are 
distinguishable (Bremner, 1989). 
In recognition of the dual role of representational `strength' and means-ends demands, 
Munakata, McClelland, Johnson, and Siegler (1994) present a `gradualistic framework' 
for understanding infants successes and failures in object permanence tasks. Munakata et 
al. argue that in their task, the means-ends demand was identical with both transparent 
and opaque occluders but objects were only successfully retrieved in the transparent 
condition. Munakata et al. claim that this pattern of results is explained in terms of the 
relative strength of representation and demands of retrieval. The representational strength 
must be sufficient to exceed the threshold for retrieval. Lower level occular responses 
can, in contrast to motor solutions, be driven by weaker representations. Such a model 
could equally be applied to the contributions of representational strength and information 
processing limitations in infants' A-not-B errors. 
Further evidence suggests that the child's representation of the object may not be the sole 
cue to the object's location. Diamond et at (1994) note a difficulty in covering hiding 
locations in multiple-well conditions in that children can use the action of covering a well 
as a cue to the object's location. Harris (1973) found that infants are more likely to be 
successful if the last location to be concealed is also the correct location. Similarly 
children's ambivalent reactions to found objects suggest a low expectation of finding 
something. Willatts (1984) commented that it is the action of hiding which `calls out the 
familiar procedure of lifting' rather than a desire to recover the object. 
Infants may use other cues which are inherent in the hiding action as a means of guiding 
retrieval. Fischer and Jennings (1981) draw attention to the role of children's 
understanding of agency as a potential aid in solving object permanence tasks. Fischer 
and Jennings argue that Piaget's emphasis on the object has lead to `neglect of the agent' 
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in object permanence tasks (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1983). The authors argue that 
representations of the experimenter as an agent in hiding tasks could serve as a cue to the 
location of the object. Fischer and Jennings hypothesise that anomalous results on the 
performance of children on stage VI tasks could be explained by children's use of 
representations of the hiding action in addition to representations of the hidden object. 
Fischer and Jennings do not wish to imply that children do not represent the object in 
such tasks, merely that the representation of the experimenter as an independent agent 
could prove a valuable additional cue. In the case of the standard stage VI search task, 
infants may make use of the rule that the object is hidden at the last location touched by 
the experimenter. 
It is clear that search behaviour is neither limited by children's `all or nothing' 
representational capacity nor necessarily (i. e. not always) by limitations on processing 
capacity. Children's performance can be improved in a number of ways which increase 
the salience of the representation or reduce the information processing demands. Correct 
responses are more likely if the memory trace is stronger (via a reduction in search delay), 
or a prepotent response is more salient (object is visible at A). Information processing 
demands can be reduced by allowing occular responses as an indication of `knowledge'. 
Later, as children become aware of the agency of others, they are able to use cues 
provided by the action of hiding as a means of solving object permanence tasks. The tasks 
used to asses object permanence clearly span a number of cognitive and social 
components. If object permanence is to be defined by the tasks used to measure it, then 
`object permanence' may not be a unitary representational domain. Some children, 
particularly those with atypical developmental profiles, may have a unique blend of 
`object permanence' skills and may therefore proffer atypical solutions to object 
permanence tasks. 
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3.2 The development of object permanence in children 
with Down's Syndrome 
The centrality of object permanence as indicating the representational status of infants with 
respect to space, time and causality makes the study of object permanence a particularly 
important focus for research in atypical populations. While researchers argue over which 
particular tasks appropriately reflect children's representational status as opposed to 
information processing capacity, object permanence and its associated measures remain at 
the centre of the psychology of infant development if only as a consequence of the vast 
literature which has accumulated on the subject. 
As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, and previously in chapter two, research 
into the development of children with Down's Syndrome has stuck rather rigidly within a 
Piagetian framework. The predominance of this theoretical framework has led to 
constraints being applied in interpreting data from children with Down's Syndrome. In 
this section, the development of object permanence in children with Down's Syndrome is 
considered in the light of evidence from typically developing children. Evidence for an 
atypical cognitive profile in children with Down's Syndrome is also considered in relation 
to object permanence development. 
Piaget believed that object permanence would emerge as a stagewise progression from 
sensorimotor to truly representational functioning towards the end of the second year. In 
the spirit of the `organisational perspective' (Cicchetti and Beeghly, 1990) this implies 
that children with Down's Syndrome should follow a similar sequence in the development 
of the object concept and should show similar structural relationships between this and 
other skills. 
Cicchetti and Beeghly argue that children with Down's Syndrome provide us with an 
opportunity to study structural relationships between developmental domains. The general 
slowing down of development allows us to distinguish between true structural 
convergences and developmental synchrony. When applied to sensorimotor development, 
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these hypotheses imply that children should progress through sensorimotor stages in an 
invariant order observed in typically developing children. Secondly, relationships 
between domains of sensorimotor development should remain intact. Furthermore, where 
other domains of development are hypothesised to be structurally linked to sensorimotor 
development, say affective development, children with Down's Syndrome should also 
exhibit these links. 
The next section will consider evidence for a similar sequence within the object 
permanence domain in children with Down's Syndrome and subsequently the structural 
relationships between object permanence and other developmental domains. 
3.2.1 Children with Down's Syndrome, object permanence 
development and the similar sequence hypothesis 
The similar sequence hypothesis implies that children with Down's Syndrome should 
progress through an invariant order of development within the sensorimotor domain 
according to the benchmark of typical development. 
A study of the performance of children with Down's Syndrome on the Uzgiris and Hunt 
Scales (Uzgiris and Hunt, 1975) was carried out by Dunst (1990). The scales measure 
developmental progression in seven sensorimotor domains: object-permanence, means- 
ends abilities, vocal imitation, gestural imitation, operational causality, spatial 
relationships and sensorimotor schemes. Dunst claims that in terms of the sequential 
progression in performance within these domains, children with Down's Syndrome 
acquire sensorimotor competencies in a stagelike manner that is similar to typically 
developing infants. Dunst's claims are based on correlations between sensorimotor 
development and developmental age, similar to those reported for typically developing 
children (Uzgiris, 1987). Furthermore, Dunst reports finding only a few reversals in the 
typical ordinal pattern of development within domains. With regard to the progression 
through stages, Dunst examined both the transitional timing, i. e. the time taken to make 
progress to the next sensorimotor stage, and the stability of performance at a particular 
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stage. Dunst reports that children with Down's Syndrome take longer to make transitions 
between sensorimotor stages, even when the slower pace of development is accounted 
for. Furthermore, Dunst reports that children with Down's Syndrome appear to show 
more regressions in performance than children without Down's Syndrome, as reported by 
Uzgiris (1987). According to Dunst, regressions in development could simply indicate a 
protracted period of structural reorganisation. However, regressions appear to be more 
frequent than found for typically developing children even when reduced by a factor 
associated with rate of development, namely developmental quotient. However, despite 
the apparent slowing down of developmental rate, neither Dunst (1990) nor Mervis and 
Cardoso-Martins (1984) found evidence for a `developmental wall' at the transition stage 
V to stage VI which had been reported by Gibson (1978). 
Structural relationships between sensorimotor domains were the cornerstone in Piaget's 
view of development as a domain general process. A child at stage III with respect to 
object permanence should be at a congruent stage in means-ends skills. In terms of stage 
congruence between sensorimotor domains, Dunst reports only low levels of congruence 
for children with Down's Syndrome which are at least 10% below levels of congruence 
reported for typically developing children. However, levels of stage congruence are low 
in both typically developing and children with Down's Syndrome. Therefore, increased 
heterogeneity in terms of developmental congruence may not reflect a violation of typical 
structural relationships. 
In terms of sequential progression within the domain of object permanence and structural 
relationships with other domains it does not appear that children with Down's Syndrome 
exhibit striking irregularities in their performance. However, an examination of other 
evidence reveals anomalies in both the strategies and the error patterns in search behaviour 
which are not considered in Dunst's analysis. 
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3.2.2 Object permanence development and the similar structure 
hypothesis 
The similar structure hypothesis implies that where structural relationships between 
domains exist in typical development these should be adhered to by children with Down's 
Syndrome. In this section a number of anomalies which are apparent in the performance 
of children with Down's Syndrome on object permanence tasks are outlined. These 
anomalies are viewed with respect to the relative strengths and weaknesses of children 
with Down's Syndrome outlined in chapter one. 
Children with Down's Syndrome have been characterised as differing from normal 
children in the strategies which they use to solve object permanence tasks. Children are 
reported as using `lower level' search strategies in order to recover objects (Wishart & 
Duffy, 1990; Morss, 1983). Such strategies include searching randomly in all locations 
rather than systematically searching or identifying a particular target for search. Wishart 
and Duffy (1990) report that children with Down's Syndrome often used `sided' 
strategies in their search for an object hidden in one of two cups. A sided strategy entails 
the child searching in a specific location to left or right of herself when the object is 
hidden in one of two cups. When such a strategy failed (on average 50% of the trials) 
children showed little surprise and simply searched in the second cup. Morss (1983) also 
reports `transitory side preferences' and a tendency to search exhaustively in all possible 
locations. Lower level search patterns such as these lack efficiency, and, while often 
successful in retrieving the object, do not reach standard criteria for `passing' the task. 
Such apparent anomalies which characterise the performance of children with Down's 
Syndrome on object permanence tasks will now be considered in the light of 
developmental process which underpin performance in typically developing children. 
3.2.3 How might a divergent path develop? 
Theoretical arguments about the demands of object permanence tasks have focused on a 
number of domains of development and information processing requirements which 
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impinge on task performance. A limitation in any contributory sub-domain or deficit in 
information processing could result in a delay in sensorimotor development and 
anomalous stage-incongruent performance. The performance of young infants on non- 
search tasks is heavily loaded on these infants underlying representational capacity. 
Search at stage IV, i. e. a single location, requires that children have the additional capacity 
to retrieve the occluded object. Later manual search tasks such as the two-location, stage 
IV task may therefore require higher-level cortical control of action and demand planning 
and inhibition of responses in addition to working memory demands. Stage VI object 
permanence tasks which require systematic search for invisible displacement of objects 
may incorporate a social element in children's performance (Fischer & Jennings, 1981). It 
does appear, therefore, that object permanence is not a unitary developmental concept but 
impinges on may other representational and information processing requirements at 
different stages in development. A divergence in the path of object permanence 
development in children with Down's Syndrome could arise for any number of reasons as 
is discussed below. 
3.2.3.1 Early representational development 
The study of early representational development in typically developing children has 
adopted a number of paradigms which obviate the need for children to make motor 
responses. While there is a growing trend towards the use of new paradigms such as 
visual preference and habituation for studying the early representational capacities of 
typical infants, this has not been matched in studies of atypical populations. 
The experiments of Spelke (1988,1990), Kellman and Spelke (1983), and Baillargeon 
(1986,1987a, 1987b, 1991) inform us of sophisticated representational capacities in 
neonates and young infants which are pertinent to object permanence. While Miranda and 
Fantz (1973,1974) have suggested the value of visual preference studies in children with 
Down's Syndrome, such studies in children with Down's Syndrome are rare (e. g. Lewis 
& Bryant, 1982). Problems with matching are often cited as reasons for avoiding atypical 
populations (Ganiban, Wagner & Cicchetti, 1990). If the early representational capacity 
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evident in typical infants is indeed a precursor to performance on object permanence tasks 
then this is one area in which children with Down's Syndrome may be identified as 
divergent. However, children with Down's Syndrome show a relatively rapid 
progression in early sensorimotor performance followed by a gradual slowing down in 
pace (Dunst, 1990). These results do not, at face value, suggest either innate or early 
problems with object permanence per se. 
A delay or deficit in the development of crucial cortical structures might result in a global 
delay in the attainment of a particular sensorimotor stage. The development of specific 
neural structures correlates well with achievement of sensorimotor milestones (Fischer, 
1987; Goldman-Rakic, 1987). In children with Down's Syndrome a delay in myelination 
of the frontal cortex, as suggested by Nadel (1996), may have implications for planning 
and inhibitory control of action. Such a delay may be manifest as a delay or deficit in 
performance on higher level object permanence tasks which require increasing planning 
and control of action (Diamond, 1988). Mangan (1992) examined the performance of 
children with Down's Syndrome on cue learning, response learning, and place learning 
tasks. The particular deficit in place learning found in children with Down's Syndrome, in 
contrast to typically developing children, is consistent with hippocampal neuropathology. 
Dulaney, Raz and Devine (1995) argue that a deficit in an `innate' cognitive function such 
as spatial memory suggests a divergent neural structure. Dulaney et al. argue that those 
with learning disabilities may be forced to use strategies for place memory where 
automatic processes are sufficient in typically developing infants. As Dunst (1990) 
comments, children with Down's Syndrome do not appear to show a specific delay in 
particular stage transitions. Furthermore, error patterns in children with Down's 
Syndrome do not suggest a particular planning deficit or a tendency to search 
perseveratively (Morss, 1983). However, the gradual slowing down in sensorimotor 
progress with age may reflect the increasing planning demands of the tasks and an 
underlying neurological deficit. While this thesis does not consider this possibility 
directly, one would expect any divergence in neurology to be reflected in children's 
performance and errors on standard and modified versions of object permanence tasks. 
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There are a number of areas in which children with Down's Syndrome have apparent 
strengths and weaknesses which may be responsible for anomalies in performance on 
object permanence tasks. Our subsequent discussion gives an account of potential ways in 
which the development of object permanence may proceed differently in children with 
Down's Syndrome. 
3.2.3.2 Object permanence and motivation 
In addition to quantitative distinctions in the performance of children with Down's 
Syndrome on object permanence tasks, recent research has drawn attention to qualitative 
differences in the search patterns and general motivation to search in children with 
Down's Syndrome. Typically developing children are characterised as being driven by 
`competence motivation', and intrinsic desire to display competence (White, 1959; Harter, 
1974). In general terms, Rast and Meltzoff (1995) refer to a dampening of such 
`epistemic curiosity' in children with Down's Syndrome. This `dampening' is in contrast 
to normal children who appear cognitively motivated to attempt object permanence 
problems, being bored with easy hidings and gaining interest in more complex hiding 
schemes. A dampening of epistemic curiosity is also implied by Wishart (1991) who 
finds young infants with Down's Syndrome less willing to `explore' simple contingencies 
than a control group, and Wishart and Duffy (1990) who report a lower level of 
engagement in their sample of children with Down's Syndrome. In addition to a reduced 
willingness to participate in cognitive work, Wishart and Duffy report that children with 
Down's Syndrome appear to actively avoid engagement with the task and misuse social 
skills and employ `party tricks' as means of avoidance. 
There are two possible conclusions to be drawn from suggestions of a motivational 
deficit: either the deficit lies in underlying competence, or solely in performance. 
Furthermore it is clear that a performance deficit can readily become a deficit in 
competence via a `failure to consolidate' learning. Karmiloff-Smith comments on the 
actions of a boy with Down's Syndrome, M. G., who, when faced with a balance-beam 
task, appeared to relearn every time. Karmiloff-Smith (1992/1995) explicitly links the 
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achievement of behavioural mastery with attainment of representational status within 
domains, and this could equally be seen to apply to object permanence tasks. A general 
reduction in mastery motivation has been commented on by other researchers (Ruskin, 
Mundy, Kasari & Sigman, 1994) and could be seen as a limiting factor in the 
representational development of children with Down's Syndrome. 
3.2.3.3 Object permanence and motor development 
Children with Down's Syndrome are often hypotonic, or floppy at birth and exhibit a 
delay in achievement of gross and fine motor milestones. Some studies suggest that motor 
development may lag behind cognitive development by up to 10 months (LaVeck & 
LaVeck, 1977). Motor limitations may prevent typically developing children from 
recovering a hidden object until around six months despite possessing the requisite 
representational basis for a solution prior to this age. A specific motor delay in children 
with Down's Syndrome may detain solutions still further. Furthermore, motor experience 
may be crucial to children's development of more advanced object permanence skills. 
While many typically developing children are able to walk without support at around 12 
months (range, 9 to 17 months), children with Down's Syndrome often do not walk 
unaided before around 19 months (range, 13 to 48 months) (Henderson, 1985). Piaget 
claimed that the child's progression in spatial understanding, from an egocentric to an 
allocentric view of the world, was founded on experience of self-propelled movement. 
There is evidence to suggest that individual differences on object permanence tasks may 
be related to experience of crawling or moving around in a baby walker (Kermoian & 
Campos, 1988; Gustafson, 1984). Self-propelled movement may therefore be a precursor 
for developing an understanding of spatial relationships and agency in typically 
developing children. 
It is perhaps not surprising that typically developing children show some association 
between developmental milestones in both motor and cognitive performance. The 
domains may be linked by common maturational processes such as development of the 
prefrontal cortex (Diamond, 1991). Thus in typically developing children it may be 
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inherently difficult to elucidate the direction of cause and effect in linking motor and 
cognitive performance. However, stronger evidence to suggest a causal relationship 
between locomotor and cognitive development may be gleaned from populations that 
experience a specific motor impairment relative to other domains. Gouin-Decarie (1969) 
describes a child, Jup, whose mother's treatment with Thalidomide resulted in profound 
deformity of her upper and lower limbs. When assessed at age 3 years 8 months, Jup had 
an IQ of 85 and could solve a stage VI object permanence task. The consequent of this 
child's ability to crawl does not appear to have had a profound effect on her intellectual 
development. 
Could it be that children with Down's Syndrome exhibit a delay in spatial understanding, 
and consequently object permanence, which is due to earlier motor difficulties? The 
possibility that performance on object permanence tasks may be similarly linked to motor 
performance is examined in chapter nine. 
3.2.3.4 Object permanence and social development 
Recent research has shown that the developmental progression in object concept 
development may follow a distinct pathway in children with Down's Syndrome (Rast & 
Meltzoff, 1995). Rast and Meltzoff present evidence to suggest that deferred imitation 
skills emerge in children with Down's Syndrome prior to stage VI object permanence. 
From a Piagetian point of view the emergence of one form of representation, deferred 
imitation, before the emergence of representation in object permanence performance is 
contrary to the domain general view of sensorimotor development. Furthermore, the 
isolation of deferred imitation as a relative strength in children with Down's Syndrome, 
and object permanence as a corresponding weakness, may have implications for 
performance on object permanence tasks. Fischer and Jennings (1981) have identified a 
role for an understanding of external agency in high level object permanence tasks 
but 
limited such a role to children late in stage V of sensorimotor development. However, 
if 
an understanding of agency, as indicated by imitation, emerges earlier in children with 
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Down's Syndrome, it could be used as a cue in sensorimotor tasks much earlier than 
stage V. 
The disparity between social and object related representations may reflect a more general 
developmental trait in children with Down's Syndrome. Rast and Meltzoff (1995) 
distinguish between `empirical' and `hypothetical' solutions to object permanence tasks 
(Meltzoff, 1990; Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1989). The authors distinguish these solutions 
according to their representational demands. Empirical representations stand for what was 
seen, in contrast to hypothetical representations which are constructed using deductive 
reasoning. Empirical representations facilitate deferred imitation while hypothetical 
representations are required to solve high level object permanence tasks. Rast and 
Meltzoff argue that children with Down's Syndrome may have privileged access to 
empirical representation over hypothetical representation. The development of deferred 
imitation skills and `empirical representations' may therefore be reflected in somewhat 
atypical error patterns, especially on high level tasks which require hypothetical 
deductions to be made (Wishart & Duffy, 1990; Rast & Meltzoff, 1995; Morss, 1983). 
Furthermore, if children with Down's Syndrome have difficulty in inhibiting a tendency 
towards deferred imitation, as Krakow and Kopp (1983) suggest, then hypothetical 
judgements may not be readily apparent in their actions. In this case, the use of standard 
object permanence tasks may encourage the use of lower level strategies and consequent 
`failure'. 
3.3 Summary 
Typically developing children do not begin to solve standard object permanence tasks 
until around eight months. However, evidence has shown that children can indicate 
knowledge of the properties of hidden objects well before solving such tasks (Baillargeon 
et al., 1990; Spelke, 1988; 1990). This contrast between children's apparent knowledge 
and their failure to search challenges the traditional view of search as a purely 
representational milestone. Many accounts suggest that search performance may be 
limited by children's ability to plan and inhibit manual responses (Diamond, 1988). A 
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recent alternative account (Munakata et al., 1994) suggests that representation could be 
viewed as gradualistic, with stronger representations able to drive more complex search 
behaviour. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that limitations to performance may 
not be purely cognitive. Motivational and social factors may also have a bearing on 
children's performance (Wishart & Duffy, 1990; Bigelow, Macdonald & Macdonald, 
1995). It is clear that both typically developing children and children with Down's 
Syndrome are required to deploy a diverse variety of social, cognitive and representational 
resources in solving the demands of object permanence tasks. 
Children with Down's Syndrome develop differently from typically developing children 
in respect of a number of resources which are implicated in solutions to object 
permanence tasks. Children with Down's Syndrome may exhibit a particular delay in 
motor development which prevents them from searching despite underlying 
representational competence. Children with Down's Syndrome may also develop 
differently in neuropsychological terms and this may place limits on a number of cognitive 
capacities (Nadel, 1996; Mangan, 1992). Furthermore, a general tendency for children 
with Down's Syndrome to construct empirical representations in advance of hypothetical 
representations may impose limitations on solving object permanence tasks. 
Just as typically developing children betray their limitations in making errors on object 
permanence tasks, divergent development and use of divergent strategies in children with 
Down's Syndrome should be reflected in performance on such tasks. Subsequent 
introductory chapters discuss in detail the evidence for performance on object permanence 
tasks being affected both by weaknesses, in motivation, and by strengths, 
in the social 
domain. This possibility is investigated in an experiment detailed in chapter 11. As was 
discussed in the present chapter, early sensorimotor experience was seen by Piaget as a 
precursor to mental representation and necessitates an increasingly sophisticated mastery 
of fine and gross motor skills over the first 18m of life. Chapter 9 
describes a 
complementary experiment to examine the relationship between motor development and 
object permanence performance in children with Down's Syndrome. 
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The Development of Representation: Language and 
Conceptual Development 
The previous chapter considered the development of conceptual representations in 
children with and without Down's Syndrome. The current chapter examines the 
relationship between the development of representation in conceptual and linguistic 
domains. The boundary between representation in language and other cognitive domains 
is one of the most clearly drawn in psychology (e. g. Chomsky, 1965,1982; Fodor, 
1983) but few psychologists would deny that language is strongly dependent on 
representational development in general. This chapter focuses firstly on the evidence for 
the role of cognitive representations in the linguistic development of typically developing 
children. Having introduced the theoretical links between linguistic and cognitive 
representation in general terms, the relationship between specific cognitive and linguistic 
milestones are discussed. The pattern of language development in children with Down's 
Syndrome will subsequently be described with reference to the pattern observed in typical 
development. 
4.1 The role of general cognition in language development 
There is strong evidence to suggest that some aspects of language, particularly syntax, 
could not be derived from general, non-linguistic, representational capacity, or cognition. 
Such evidence supports constraints on representation which are exclusively applied to the 
process of language acquisition (Chomsky, 1965,1982; Tager-Flusberg, 1994). In this 
section the extent to which language may be regarded as a modular process is initially 
discussed in relation to its general dependence on cognitive processes. 
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4.1.1 The domain general view of language development 
Piaget regarded linguistic representation as subordinate to a more general representational 
capacity, the semiotic function. According to Piaget, language emerges as a consequence 
of the child's capacity for mental representation which develops at around 18 months 
(Piaget, 1959) . Thus language and non-linguistic cognitive representations, according to 
Piaget, are inextricably bound to the same representational system. 
Piaget argued that, prior to the 18 month transition, mental, and by implication pre- 
linguistic operations would be manifest in behavioural action schemes. Furthermore, the 
semiotic function, emerged as a result of the internalisation of action schemes. Thus 
Piaget argued for the primacy of sensorimotor development in the development of 
language, at least up until the end of the sensorimotor period. 
Some authors argue for a structural relationship between sensorimotor action schemes and 
language. For example, a child's tendency to place one container inside another could be 
viewed as a sensorimotor prerequisite to the embedding of clauses within a sentence 
structure (Greenfield, Nelson, & Saltzman, 1972). Cognitive concepts of agent, action 
and patient may also map onto equivalent syntactic concepts of subject, verb and object 
(Pinker, 1984). Thus, linguistic competence is constructed by the child on the basis of 
sensorimotor development (Sinclair, 1987; Anisfeld, 1984). 
However, many researchers argue that linguistic structures, and particularly syntax, could 
not possibly arise solely as a result of a general capacity for symbolic representation 
without specific linguistic constraints (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992/1995; Chomsky, 1965, 
1982; Pinker, 1984). There is evidence for a number of constraints on linguistic 
development which cannot be explained with sole reference to general cognitive 
processes. For example, children do not appear to make gross errors in their spontaneous 
utterances as would be predicted if governed by generalisations from a cognitive 
basis. In 
contrast, error patterns in children's spontaneous utterances suggest the application and 
overextension of linguistic rules (Goodluck, 1991). The regularity and consistency with 
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which children learn language implies the existence of specific linguistic constraints 
outside of the cognitive domain 
Further evidence for a clear dissociation between language and cognition comes from 
studies of atypical language development. Evidence from children with learning 
disabilities suggests that complex linguistic development can occur despite profound 
cognitive impairment (Cromer, 1994; Bellugi, Marks, Bihrle, & Sabo, 1988; Udwin, 
Yule, & Martin, 1987). Such a powerful dissociation between cognitive and linguistic 
performance indicates that the two domains may be governed by separable developmental 
processes. 
However, it is clear that if language is to be meaningful then it must to some extent 
engage with conceptual representation and general cognition. Chomsky's example of a 
grammatically well formed, but meaningless, sentence, `Colourless green ideas sleep 
furiously' clearly illustrates the contrast between syntax, and semantics. The area of 
semantics and pragmatics provide a clear role for cognitive factors in the acquisition of 
language. Pragmatics refer to the communicative function which language serves whilst 
semantics refer to the meaning which words and sentences convey. Many nativist views 
fail to address these crucial components in children's communicative competence 
(Chomsky, 1965). 
4.1.2 The relationship between semantic, pragmatic, and syntactic 
development 
Even a staunch nativist must acknowledge that the child's semantic-conceptual and 
pragmatic awareness must impinge on the language learning process at some level 
(Braine, 1994). During lexical development the child must use cognitive skills to develop 
an understanding of word meaning, or semantics. Furthermore, pragmatic skills must be 
deployed to understand the communicative process in general. The process by which 
semantic and pragmatic knowledge constrains children's language acquisition is central to 
the `cognition hypothesis' and will now be discussed. 
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Theoretical approaches to pragmatics tackle the problem of how children acquire, develop 
and understand communicative intent. Bruner (1978) suggests that this pragmatic side of 
language development occurs as a consequence of `social scaffolding' provided by the 
parent. This scaffolding subsequently acts in support of syntactic development for which 
Bruner concedes control to Chomsky's Language Acquisition Device. Tomasello (1992, 
1995) similarly emphasises the conceptual and pragmatic constraints which constrain 
children's understanding of adult reference. 
In order for children to understand referential communication, some constraints are 
certainly necessary. When an adults refers to an object or event, the child needs to 
understand precisely which event or object the adult is referring to, from an array of 
possibilities. The infant is also required to divide up the world into objects and events 
pertinent to linguistic representation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1989,1992/1995). For example, 
when an adult points to a cat, and says "look, a cat" the child must interpret whether the 
adult is referring to the cat's fur, or whiskers, or to the whole animal. 
Many researchers emphasise the importance of constraints derived from conceptual 
knowledge which govern successful understanding of adult references (Tomasello, 1992, 
1995; Mandler, 1992). Barton and Tomasello (1994), for example, find empirical 
evidence which suggests that children's awareness of an action as purposeful or 
accidental constrains the meaning which they attach to the corresponding adult reference. 
Mandler (1992) suggested that semantic constraints may act as an early guide for 
children's perceptual and conceptual processing of events and thereby constrain the 
possibilities for understanding adult reference. 
Further empirical evidence for semantic constraints on linguistic acquisition focuses on 
children's early `telegraphic' speech. At this stage, children tend to use words which map 
out semantic categories such as that of agent, action, and patient (Bowerman, 1973). This 
evidence suggests that these semantic categories could map directly onto syntactic 
categories of subject, verb, and object (Greenfield, Nelson & Saltzman, 1972). Pinker 
(1984,1989), whilst emphasising some language specific structural constraints, argues 
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that such early knowledge of semantic relations is the key to an acquisition of more 
complex grammatical structures. Tomasello's (1992) account of verb learning also 
emphasises the social-pragmatic cues which constrain the child's understanding of 
linguistic reference and allow semantic relations to prime the acquisition of syntax. 
While it seems intuitively reasonable to suppose that the child's knowledge of semantic 
relations will to some extent map onto developing language there are clear limitations to 
this mapping process. Certainly not all nouns are `things', and not all verbs are actions, 
so a child must at some stage come to represent abstract linguistic structures which do not 
have semantic equivalents. Gleitman (1990) argues that while semantic constraints 
certainly have a role to play in linguistic development, they alone cannot account for 
children's ability to understand the distinction between closely related verbs. Verbs such 
as "look" and "see" for example cannot be distinguished on a semantic basis. Gleitman 
argues that in such circumstances the child's knowledge of syntax facilitates 
understanding of an utterance. Landau and Gleituran (1985) argue that it is via this 
process that blind children are able to generate hypotheses about the meaning of "look" 
and "see" by appealing to evidence from the syntactic framing of such verbs. For example 
a child might hear "I saw the ball" and "I looked at the ball" but not "I looked the ball" or 
"I saw at the ball". Gleitman (1990) argues that the syntactic frame acts as a `mental zoom 
lens' and fixes the possible interpretations of such utterances. What is at issue here is the 
extent that the semantic process may support the acquisition of syntax and vice versa. The 
use of syntax to support semantic development is referred to as `syntactic bootstrapping' 
(Gleitman, 1990) whilst the converse process in which semantic constraints influence 
syntactic development is referred to as `semantic bootstrapping' (Pinker, 1984,1989). 
The relative extent to which these processes are implicated in the development of language 
mark out the battleground in the debate regarding links between language and cognition. 
It appears however, that regardless of its precise aetiology, the process of lexical 
acquisition may have implications for subsequent language development. Evidence 
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suggests that lexical acquisition, and particularly the acquisition of verbs, may be 
instrumental in priming a process for the development of syntax. 
Anisfeld (1984) suggests that the lexical `naming explosion' which typically occurs 
around 18 months may be a necessary prerequisite for the growth of early syntax. 
Anisfeld argues that the correlational patterns which emerge when comparing children's 
lexical development to increases in MLU are more than coincidental. Bates, Bretherton 
and Synder (1988/1991) also suggest that the grammatical complexity in a child's 
language at 28 months may be entirely predicted by lexical development at 20 months. 
The continuity between lexical and syntactic development, referred to as the 'critical- 
mass' hypothesis is supported by both connectionist models of language acquisition 
(Plunkett & Marchman, 1993) and naturalistic studies (Marchman & Bates, 1994). Bates 
et al. (1988/1991) conclude that lexical and grammatical development may be paced by the 
same mechanism. 
Furthermore, there may be something `special' about the acquisition of verbs which is 
implicated in children's grammatical development (Bates et al., 1988/1991). Bates et al. 
argue that the `verbiness' apparent in a child's lexical style may predict later grammatical 
complexity and act as a `booster rocket' for language development. 
Tomasello (1992) also suggests that verbs many provide essential building blocks around 
which early grammar is constructed. Tomasello claims that children's early multi-word 
speech is produced without explicit knowledge of `syntagmatic' categories such as 
`Direct-Object' or `Agent' and `Patient'. However, children construct verb-specific 
semantic relations such as `hitter' and `thing hit' which exist as islands of organisation. 
Tomasello refers to his claim as the `verb island' hypothesis in which verb by verb 
organisation is gradually generalised as a paradigmatic category. Tomasello proposes that 
later syntactic development may proceed with extension of known structures to new 
linguistic material as outlined by Pinker (1989). What is crucial to Tomasello's account is 
that it attributes to the initial acquisition of verbs a profound significance in the child's 
global syntactic development. 
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The evidence and theoretical arguments for some native constraints on children's multi- 
word speech is persuasive (e. g. Chomsky, 1982). However, regardless of these 
constraints, there is a growing consensus that early lexical acquisition may be strongly 
dependent on semantic-conceptual and pragmatic representations (Tomasello, 1992,1995; 
Bruner, 1978; Pinker, 1984,1989). Furthermore, a number of theoretical accounts 
suggest that syntax development may be founded on lexical acquisition and particularly 
the acquisition of verbs (Anisfeld, 1984; Bates et al., 1988/1991; Tomasello, 1992, 
1995). 
Despite dissociation between language and cognition observed in older children, these 
domains may be linked and interdependent at the single word stage. With reference to 
development in atypical populations, any discrepancy in cognitive representations may 
have its greatest impact during early as opposed to later linguistic development. In the 
following section, the discussion focuses on the evidence which links language and 
conceptual representations at the single word level in typically developing children. 
4.1.3 Language development and cognitive prerequisites at the 
single word level in typically developing children 
Piaget (1951/1967) argued for `cognitive prerequisites' in the sense that the `semiotic 
function' arose from cognitive development and was the sole basis for language 
development. Strong forms of the cognitive prerequisites view, such as that espoused by 
Piaget, and Werner and Kaplan (1963), are untenable in the light of the evidence for 
native structure (Chomsky, 1965,1982; Pinker, 1984). However, a weaker form of the 
cognitive prerequisites view is both theoretically defensible and is well supported by 
evidence (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1986). This view suggests that children's early linguistic 
reference may depend on specific cognitive structures at specific points 
in time. 
Brown (1973) and Bloom (1973) argue that before referring to objects linguistically, 
children must be aware that such objects exist. The authors therefore suggest that a 
high 
level of object permanence should be a cognitive prerequisite for linguistic reference to 
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objects. Problems with such general association are that there are numerous measures 
which reflect both the child's emergent language and object permanence. A number of 
studies reported by Corrigan (1979) have tested associations between various stages of 
object permanence, with a corresponding variety of linguistic measures including the 
onset of naming, measures of comprehension, productive vocabulary size and MLU. The 
results of such studies do not suggest a consistent relationship between these cognitive 
and linguistic domains. Furthermore children's linguistic reference to objects and events 
often precedes the transition from sensorimotor development (Gopnik, 1988; Harding & 
Golinkoff, 1979). 
Broad linguistic measures, such as those in the studies cited by Corrigan, are likely to be 
influenced by a range of pragmatic or social factors and hence the contribution of 
cognitive prerequisites may be overshadowed (McCune-Nicholich, 1981). McCune- 
Nicholich reports however that object permanence, and specifically the attainment of stage 
VI, is consistently followed by the emergence of relational words in children's 
vocabulary. Relational words are those referring particularly to the 'dynamic state of 
objects' such as up, more, and gone. 
Further evidence for a relationship between object permanence and the acquisition of 
relational verbs comes from Gopnik and Meltzoff (1984). Gopnik and Meltzoff present 
evidence for a relationship between the child's solution of invisible displacements in 
object permanence tasks and the acquisition of gone in the child's vocabulary. 
Furthermore, Gopnik and Meltzoff find a similar association between children's linguistic 
coding of success and failure, as indexed by acquisition of `no', `uh-oh' and `there' and 
solution of means-ends task requiring the use of string to retrieve an object. Gopnik and 
Meltzoff argue that these correspondences reflect both the development of a conceptual or 
semantic basis for the terms and the fact that particular cognitive advances motivate the 
child to acquire a linguistic means of reference. The authors comment that the child 
`invents a system that encodes the meanings that are important to him' (p. 512). Gopnik 
and Meltzoff (1986) find further evidence that cognitive advances in categorisation are 
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related to the onset of the naming explosion which often occurs around 18 months in 
typically developing children. Gopnik and Meltzoff claim that it is specifically 
categorisation rather that representation per se which drives children to code such 
categories with linguistic references. 
Gopnik and Meltzoff's claims are summarised as the `specificity hypothesis' (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1986) which proposes that the emergence of specific linguistic features will 
correspond to specific cognitive advances. Evidence for this hypothesis is presented in 
terms of the common representational basis for the emergence of linguistic and cognitive 
skills. However, the representational account offered by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986) is to 
be distinguished from Piaget's view, as will now be discussed. 
Meltzoff and Gopnik (1989) address the problem inherent in a Piagetian view of language 
development, that linguistic development must apparently await the emergence of the 
semiotic function corresponding to stage VI of sensorimotor development, around 18 
months. There is broad evidence against this, suggesting that linguistic reference may 
occur as early as stage V of sensorimotor development (Corrigan, 1979). Meltzoff and 
Gopnik argue that the transition which occurs at around 18 months is not the emergence 
of representations per se but a transition to hypothetical representation. 
The emergence of hypothetical representations appears to mark a global shift in children's 
linguistic references. Meltzoff and Gopnik claim that prior to 18 months children's 
language is comprised of mainly social, often reinforced, words, such as `hereyare' and 
`bye-bye', or words which refer to salient objects such as `dog', or `ball'. In contrast, 
following the shift towards hypothetical representations, children begin to use words 
which code for the distinction between actual and possible states of affairs. Such words, 
according to Gopnik and Meltzoff are those such as `gone' and `uh-oh'. 
The data on which Meltzoff and Gopnik base their broad claim is essentially correlational. 
Much of the evidence presented in favour of cognitive prerequisites is similarly based on 
correlations between measures (Bates et al., 1988/1991; Corrigan, 1979). Such evidence 
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does not therefore permit us to conclude that cognition causes linguistic development, or 
indeed that linguistic development is influencing cognition 
Tomasello and Farrar's (1984) 'Prerequisites model' suggests that cognitive skills are 
genuine causal precursors to the development of linguistic skills. Tomasello argue on 
theoretical grounds that relational words should be broadly subdivided into two 
categories, visible displacement (move, fall-down, etc. ) and invisible displacement (gone, 
find, more, etc. ). Tomasello and Farrar argue that whilst a concept of invisible 
displacement (stage VI) is required for correct use of 'gone', 'find' and 'more', such a 
concept is not necessarily required for relational words limited to the visible movement of 
objects (move, fall down, etc. ). 
Tomasello and Farrar (1986) tested the causal relationship between performance on object 
permanence tasks and the emergence of relational words. Children were trained to use 
nonsense words related to the visible and invisible displacement terms. While children at 
stage VI were able to learn both the visible and the invisible displacement terms, children 
at stage V were only able to learn the term related to visible displacement. This study 
suggests the primacy of cognitive advances over linguistic advances and stands in contrast 
to Bates et al. 's claim for the representational equity of the two domains. Tomasello 
accepts that there may be benefit from hearing adults use words which support cognitive 
advances but concludes that in particular instances conceptual development is a 
prerequisite to language comprehension and production. 
In summary, much of the evidence for links between cognitive and linguistic domains 
tends to rely on correlational data (Bates et al. 1988/1991; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1984, 
1986; Corrigan, 1979). Such studies are routinely criticised for failing to offer more than 
a description of development and for a lack of causal evidence. Alternative attempts to 
manipulate conceptual and linguistic development are rightly limited by ethical 
considerations. However, studies of populations with pre-existing conceptual or language 
problems allow an examination of the relationship which goes beyond that available 
within 'normal' populations. Children with Williams Syndrome show an uneven 
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cognitive profile in which lexical, semantic and phonological aspects of language are seen 
as relative strengths whilst general cognitive development is severely impaired (Bellugi et 
al., 1988). In contrast, children with Fragile-X syndrome show deficits in the 
phonological and syntactic subdomains while lexical acquisition is spared (Rondal, 
1996). 
It is clear that the pattern and style with which children from atypical populations learn 
language has much to offer in terms of elevating our understanding of the relationship 
between representation in the cognitive and linguistic domains. Data from atypical 
populations allows us to examine the coherence and relative independence of language 
development and thereby discriminate causal influence from coincidence. The following 
section will consider ways in which language development in children with Down's 
Syndrome both converges and diverges from typical developmental models. The ways in 
which evidence might help us to identify causal links between linguistic and cognitive 
domains is also examined. 
4.2 The development of language in children with Down's 
Syndrome 
Many claims have been made suggesting that the development of language in children 
with Down's Syndrome is `delayed without deviance' (Lenneberg, Nichols & 
Rosenberger, 1964). This suggestion assumes that language development in children with 
Down's Syndrome follows a similar sequence and structural organisation to that observed 
in typically developing children. 
However, despite this claim, the language development of children with Down's 
Syndrome is clearly different. Language development in children with Down's Syndrome 
appears to lag behind cognitive development in general (Mahoney, Glover & Finger, 
1981; Cardoso-Martins, Mervis & Mervis, 1985). There is further evidence to suggest 
that even during early lexical acquisition the language development of children with 
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Down's Syndrome fails to keep pace with cognition (Mahoney, Glover & Finger, 1981; 
Cardoso-Martins, Mervis & Mervis, 1985; Mervis, 1990). 
In the previous section it was argued that during the period of early lexical acquisition the 
relationship between the linguistic and cognitive domains should be at its strongest. The 
observed disparity between early language and cognitive development in children with 
Down's Syndrome is therefore particularly surprising. In this section the discussion will 
focus on evidence for correspondence between Down's Syndrome and typical 
development in respect of these links. Given theoretical arguments which support a 
modular view of language development the evidence for relative coherence within the 
linguistic domain is first discussed. Subsequently we address the question of apparent 
disparity between the development of language and cognitive skills in children with 
Down's Syndrome. 
4.2.1 Language development and the similar sequence 
hypothesis 
The coherence and regularity with which typically developing children develop language 
was the subject of our initial discussion. The sequential process of language acquisition in 
children with Down's Syndrome is of particularly theoretical significance with respect to 
argument for a domain specific or modular structure to language development. 
Furthermore, the similar sequence hypothesis (Cicchetti & Beeghly, 1990) implies that 
sequential development within domains should follow a typical pattern in children with 
Down's Syndrome. If a typical pattern of sequential development is to be found, one 
might expect language development to be an obvious focus. In this section the evidence 
for a similar sequence in language development is discussed. 
Linguistic development in children with Down's Syndrome rarely proceeds beyond the 
simple phrase-structure grammar characteristic of a typically developing 2-year-old 
(Fowler, 1990; Miller, 1988). Lenneberg (1967) suggested that this lower ceiling of 
linguistic development in children with Down's Syndrome was due to the end of a critical 
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period of brain plasticity which coincided with the onset of puberty. Such a view is 
consistent with theoretical perspectives which argue for native structure in language 
development. Furthermore, while it is certainly clear that language development lags 
behind chronological age, there is a substantial body of evidence which points to the 
relative coherence of development within the linguistic domain (Fowler, 1990; 
Cunningham, Glenn, Wilkinson & Sloper, 1985; Rondal, 1996). 
Studies which suggest the coherence of language development in children with Down's 
Syndrome have considered the structural components of language when compared to 
typically developing children matched for mean length of utterance, or MLU. Brown 
(1973) proposed a stagewise description of language development indexed by MLU. 
These stagewise divisions, according to MLU, provide a useful empirical tool for 
matching grammatical complexity. When children with Down's Syndrome and typically 
developing children are matched for MLU, any structural differences in grammatical 
development should be apparent as a discrepancy between characteristics of grammatical 
morphology used at this stage. Fowler, Gelman and Gleitman (1994) argue that when 
such matching procedures are adopted, children with Down's Syndrome fail to 
demonstrate any striking discrepancies in the structural aspects of production. The authors 
remark that these results serve to strengthen the notion of language as a `monolithic 
indissociable "normal" system proceeding at a slower pace' (p. 113). 
As Fowler et al. note, it is surprising that a child can learn `normally' over a period of 12 
years what is otherwise acquired in 30 months. The slower rate of linguistic development 
in children with Down's Syndrome and the lower developmental ceiling demand an 
explanation. Fowler et al. (1994) comment that the existence of a ceiling at a particular 
level of syntax does not have the properties of a simple innate, or maturational, limitation. 
The coherent but slower process which characterises development within the linguistic 
domain stands in contrast to structural incoherence between language and other domains. 
It may well be that explanations for both the slower rate and premature ceiling in language 
development lie outside the linguistic domain. The subsequent discussion considers in 
76 
Language and conceptual development 
particular the structural anomalies which characterise the relationship between language 
development and other domains. 
4.2.2 Language development and the similar structure hypothesis 
As we have noted, children with Down's Syndrome do appear to possess a characteristic 
profile of strengths and weaknesses. Children with Down's Syndrome are regarded as 
relatively advanced in the domain of social functioning whilst weak in the domain of 
language. Given the communicative function of language one might expect that pragmatic 
development would eclipse the relative weakness in language development. Furthermore, 
language development is characteristically delayed in comparison to general cognition. It 
therefore appears that within language development pragmatic and semantic-cognitive 
development should be relatively strong. There is substantial evidence for a mismatch 
between the pragmatic and semantic aspects of language in contrast to syntax development 
in children with Down's Syndrome. The structural relationships between language and 
each of these domain strengths will now be discussed. 
4.2.2.1 Language and social pragmatic development. 
The comparison of children's social-pragmatic skills also reveals a relative strength in 
communicative development which is not matched in linguistic sophistication. Bruner 
(1977) saw early pragmatic development as the `scaffolding' which facilitates later 
acquisition in typically developing children. Leifer and Lewis (1984) suggest that the 
grammatical weakness of spontaneous utterances may disguise strong pragmatic 
communicative skills of children with Down's Syndrome. Leifer and Lewis studied the 
ability of children with Down's Syndrome to respond appropriately to questions and 
prompts from their mothers in comparison to a group of typically developing children 
matched for linguistic complexity. Results indicated a set of response skills in children 
with Down's Syndrome which were in advance of the typically developing group. 
Beeghly, Weiss-Perry, and Cicchetti (1990) found the communicative abilities of children 
with Down's Syndrome to be more mature than typically developing children matched for 
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MLU, but similar to children matched for mental age. These studies point to a specific 
impairment in linguistic skills which stands in contrast to a relative strength in the non- 
verbal social-pragmatic domain. However, some recent research has shown that despite 
apparent independence, performance in the non-verbal pragmatic domain may predict later 
linguistic performance in children with Down's Syndrome (Mundy, Kasari, Sigman & 
Ruskin, 1995). Mundy et al. (1995) interpret their results as indicating the primacy of the 
social-pragmatic deficit as a causal influence in language development. 
The apparent contradiction between these results outlines a problem in comparing studies 
across a broad age range. Whilst in a sample of older children, matched for MLU, 
children with Down's Syndrome are clearly advanced in pragmatic skills (Leifer & Lewis, 
1984), in younger children a more coherent general deficit is reported spanning both 
pragmatic and linguistic skills (Mundy et al. 1995). 
Similar problems emerge in comparing children's linguistic performance to semantic- 
conceptual measures. Fowler et al. (1994) report evidence for a discrepancy between 
semantic and syntactic development in children with Down's Syndrome with syntax 
relatively delayed. This discrepancy is also supported by a number of other studies 
(Dunst, 1990; Beeghly, Weiss-Perry and Cicchetti, 1990; Mervis, 1990). It is clear 
therefore that in older children with Down's Syndrome semantic and pragmatic 
development appears relatively advanced with respect to syntax. This disparity may lead 
to the conclusion that syntactic development could not be limited by deficits in either 
pragmatic or semantic-conceptual domains. However, such studies are based on children 
spanning a broad range of development and on theoretical grounds, as was argued in the 
previous section, associations between linguistic and conceptual development may be 
restricted to the one word stage. Furthermore, it is at the early stages of language 
development that semantic and pragmatic skills may exert a causal influence on the 
development of syntax (Bates et al, 1988/1991; Tomasello, 1992,1995). 
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It therefore makes sense to restrict empirical investigation and our discussion to 
development at the one word stage. In the following section we consider the emergence of 
semantic and linguistic development focusing on this period. 
4.2.2.2 Language and cognitive-semantic development 
The dramatic delay in linguistic development of children with Down's Syndrome has 
prompted research into the links with general cognitive development. The motivation for 
such studies stems from the Piagetian notion that early lexical reference is parasitic upon 
sensorimotor development despite the fact that this view is relatively unsupported in 
studies of typically developing children (Corrigan, 1979). 
Greenwald and Leonard (1979) explored the relationship between communicative 
behaviour and sensorimotor development in children with Down's Syndrome. Two 
groups of children with Down's Syndrome at sensorimotor stages IV and V were 
compared to typically developing children matched for sensorimotor development. Whilst 
group differences in communicative behaviour as indicated by pre-linguistic `imperative' 
and `declarative' gestures were not evident at stage IV, by stage V some differences 
emerged. Greenwald and Leonard noted that while the typically developing children had 
begun to use verbal declaratives at stage V, children with Down's Syndrome had not. 
Cardoso-Martins, Mervis and Mervis (1985) investigated lexical acquisition compared to 
the rate of sensorimotor development in children with Down's Syndrome. The results 
show that the onset of referential communication may correspond quite closely to 
cognitive performance. 
Despite this early association between cognitive transitions and the onset of reference, the 
rate of lexical acquisition in children with Down's Syndrome fails to keep pace with 
sensorimotor development. Mahoney, Glover and Finger (1981) carried out a study 
comparing the performance of children with Down's Syndrome and typically developing 
children on sensorimotor performance and measures of language comprehension and 
production. The authors report that despite being well matched in terms of sensorimotor 
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development, children with Down's Syndrome scored significantly lower on linguistic 
measures. 
The evidence presented so far suggests that in children with Down's Syndrome the 
generally observed delay in linguistic development relative to cognition may extend to the 
onset of lexical reference (Greenwald & Leonard, 1979; Cardoso-Martins et al., 1985; 
Mahoney et al., 1981). These results suggest firstly that there is little evidence for strong 
links between language and cognitive skills in children with Down's Syndrome and 
furthermore that the linguistic deficit cannot therefore be attributed to a general cognitive 
delay. However, these studies are based on theoretical assumptions of a broad 
correspondence between linguistic and sensorimotor development for which there is weak 
evidence in the typically developing population (Corrigan, 1979). A recent study carried 
out by Hassan and Messer (1995) tested the relationship between linguistic and cognitive 
measures with some more precise indicators which do appear to be related in typically 
developing children. 
Hassan and Messer recorded the emergence of relational verbs such as `gone', `uh-oh', 
etc. in relation to the development of object permanence and means-ends skills in a 
longitudinal study of children with Down's Syndrome. The relationship between the 
emergence of linguistic terms and cognitive performance is outlined in the cognitive 
specificity hypothesis (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1986). To recap, Gopnik and Meltzoff 
hypothesised that the emergence of `gone' should be tied to performance at stage VI of 
object permanence, whilst terms which refer to success or failure such as `uh-oh' should 
be related to the attainment of stage VI on means-ends scales. 
Hassan and Messer report a counterintuitive pattern of results in relation to the cognitive 
specificity hypothesis. Many of the children studied acquired linguistic and signed 
referential terms prior to the corresponding cognitive transition. Although there is some 
doubt as to the equivalence of lexical and signed reference (Goodwyn & Acredolo, 1993). 
Miller, Sedley and Miolo (1995) argue that such measures should be included when 
assessing linguistic performance in children with Down's Syndrome. However, even 
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when signs are excluded, a number of children produced spoken referential terms prior to 
reaching the respective cognitive stage. These results are particularly surprising given 
evidence for a reliable delay in linguistic development relative to cognitive development in 
children with Down's Syndrome. With the caveat that in the case of correlational designs 
there is no indication of a causal relationship between domains, Hassan and Messer's 
results suggest a contradiction of `cognitive specificity' within this population. 
The predictions made by semantic bootstrapping and the cognitive specificity hypothesis 
suggest that in order to acquire conceptually laden lexical terms the child must first acquire 
the associated semantic or conceptual basis. The finding that children with Down's 
Syndrome, or indeed typically developing children, might follow the opposite pattern is 
theoretically challenging. However, recent evidence has suggested that measures of 
sensorimotor development which are crucial to such findings, may not give a reliable 
indication of the cognitive competence of children with Down's Syndrome. Researchers 
have found (e. g. Wishart, 1991; Morss 1983) that children with Down's Syndrome may 
not perform with the same degree of stability as typically developing children on tasks 
such as the object permanence scale. If such instability is present, it may have 
methodological implications in rendering the assessment of cognitive development 
unreliable. The puzzling results reported by Hassan and Messer may therefore reflect 
problems in the assessment of cognitive development rather that an anomalous 
relationship between linguistic and cognitive attainments. 
However, the instability in conceptual performance reported by Wishart (1991) and 
Morss (1983) may yet have developmental consequences for linguistic development. 
Gopnik and Meltzoff refer to the importance of salient developmental milestones in 
driving the process of lexical reference. If the salience of conceptual milestones is 
weakened by instability then acquisition of corresponding lexical terms may be affected. 
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4.3 Summary 
Studies of typically developing children argue strongly for a nativist account of linguistic 
development. However, a number of researchers have pointed to the importance of a 
number of specific semantic relations for the later acquisition of syntax. Empirical studies 
of links between conceptual and linguistic domains of development when focused on 
broad measure of linguistic and conceptual competence, have yielded mixed results. 
However, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986) provided a theoretically driven account for 
specific links between cognitive advances in the sensorimotor domain and acquisition of 
relational-verbs. Tomasello and Farrar (1986) add weight to a prerequisites view of these 
cognitive skills in relation to the acquisition of relational-verbs. Given the relative 
importance of the acquisition of relational terms in children's early grammatical 
development it may be that particular cognitive skills, while less important later in 
development, provide the impetus for language development. 
Across the domains which comprise language, children with Down's Syndrome display a 
surprising structural coherence which lies well within models of language development 
seen in typically developing children (Fowler et al., 1994). However, the rate of early 
vocabulary acquisition is slower in children with Down's Syndrome than in normally 
developing children, even when the slower rate of cognitive development is accounted for 
(Mervis, 1990) and children reach a lower ceiling in terms of grammatical complexity 
(Fowler et al., 1994). 
In contrast to the coherence within the linguistic domain, children with Down's Syndrome 
have exhibited a growing discrepancy between language development and general 
cognitive skills (Fowler et al., 1994; Ronda], 1996; Miller, 1988). A number of studies 
have seized upon the potential for a cognitive explanation of the linguistic deficit in 
children with Down's Syndrome and have investigated the relationship between advances 
in the two domains with mixed results. Many such studies which compare broad 
cognitive measures with broad linguistic measures, fail to capture the theoretical 
specificity of links between cognitive and linguistic domains such as those proposed by 
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Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986). One study of children with Down's Syndrome which 
investigated the cognitive specificity hypothesis yielded anomalous results (Hassan & 
Messer, 1995). There are a number of possible theoretical predictions which remain 
unexplored. 
Studies which show a discrepancy between linguistic and cognitive measures lead to a 
number of plausible conclusions. Given the apparent disruption to development in 
children with Down's Syndrome it may be that the links between cognition and language 
are absent or different in this population. Alternatively, we could argue that links between 
language and cognition are absent in both populations. Empirical investigation of links 
between cognitive skills and language in children with Down's Syndrome may inform 
both theoretical debate and practical interventions. The theoretical issues focus on the 
extent to which specific cognitive skills may be necessary and/or sufficient for acquisition 
of corresponding lexical terms. Interventions may be focused on factors found to 
influence the rate of lexical acquisition which may have consequence for grammatical 
development (Mervis, 1990). Recall that Anisfeld (1984) cited the rapid rate of lexical 
development observed in typically developing children as a causal influence on early 
combinations of words. Therefore the absence of a period of rapid lexical acquisition in 
children with Down's Syndrome may have implications for subsequent language 
development. An investigation of the links between specific cognitive and lexical 
advances is therefore warranted from both a theoretical and practical perspective. 
The empirical study described in chapter 10 addresses the question of the relationship 
between specific conceptual achievements and lexical acquisition. Furthermore, this 
investigation quantifies the level of performance instability in order to address the 
possibility that instability itself may have implications for lexical acquisition. 
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The Development of Representation: The Role of 
Imitation 
While language is consistently viewed as a relative weakness in children with Down's 
Syndrome, imitation and social development are seen as relative strengths (e. g. Gibbs & 
Thorpe, 1982; Rast & Meltzoff, 1995). In this chapter the representational basis for 
imitation is discussed with reference to its typical developmental characteristics. In 
relation to children with Down's Syndrome the extent to which imitation may be regarded 
as a domain strength is first considered. The consequences of a propensity for imitation in 
relation to other developmental processes will subsequently be addressed. 
In previous chapters, discussion has focused on development within circumscribed 
domains, sensorimotor or linguistic respectively, and summarised the representations 
which form the basis for links between these domains. The present discussion of 
imitation is unique in the sense that imitation is rarely regarded as a domain of 
development but is seen as a pervasive developmental process with a role to play within a 
number of domains. In chapter 3 it was argued that there may be a `link' between 
imitation and development within the object permanence domain. However this link is 
best regarded as a role for imitation in the development of object permanence. Despite this 
apparent shift of emphasis from representational links to developmental processes, in the 
following section it is argued that imitation, as a process, conveys representations. 
5.1 Imitation as Representation 
The study of imitation is important to developmental psychologists and assumes a central 
role in developmental theory (Piaget, 1951/1967; Meltzoff, 1990). Furthermore, imitation 
is often seen as a revealing expression of children's representational status. Imitation 
occurs spontaneously in very young children and therefore provides an empirical tool 
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with which to examine the emergence of representations. Imitation has also been 
implicated as playing a fundamental role in both language and social development 
(Meltzoff, & Gopnik, 1989; Rogers & Pennington, 1991; Snow, 1989). In language 
development, imitation allows children to appropriate new sounds (Snow, 1989; 
Solokov, 1992). In terms of social representations, children's capacity for imitation 
clearly reflects the growing distinction between self and others (Piaget, 1951/1967). 
Conversely, the representation of other humans as being `like me' endows the child with 
a propensity for social learning via the imitation of the actions of others (Meltzoff 1988; 
Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1989). The close correspondence between early play and imitative 
development is also described in Piaget's (1951/1967) `Play, Dreams and Imitation in 
childhood' and it is clear that both play and imitation as complementary developmental 
processes provide a `window on the child's representational world' (Bergman & 
Lefcourt, 1994). 
This chapter discusses the development of imitation skills in infants and expands upon the 
developmental role which imitation may serve. The relationship between imitation and 
object permanence was introduced in chapter 3 and will be expanded upon in the present 
chapter. We begin by discussing the development of imitation from the perspective of 
typical development and conclude with a discussion of the role of imitation as a 
developmental process in children with Down's Syndrome. 
5.2 The development of imitation in typically developing 
children 
5.2.1 The role of imitation as a developmental process 
The development of imitation in typically developing children is an integral part of early 
representational development according to Piaget (1951/1967). Imitation as a means of 
co-ordinating the observation and production of action is fundamental to the Piagetian 
view of action as a precursor to thought. The Piagetian course of development comprises 
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the complementary processes of assimilation and accommodation. While assimilation 
involves the incorporation of new experience onto existing structures, during 
accommodation, new structures are added to the child's repertoire. Intelligence, according 
to Piaget, represents the achievementof a balance between the processes of assimilation 
and accommodation. Assimilation applies existing schemes to new objects in new 
contexts while accommodation adapts existing schema to represent new objects. 
Imitation, as an extension of accommodation, is the means by which children append new 
experiences to their internalised repertoire. Without the imitation process, assimilation 
would proceed unchecked, perpetually distorting objects to fit existing schema. 
Conversely, without assimilation, imitation would fail to produce co-ordination or 
comprehension of new experiences. In Piagetian terms it is essential that the process of 
imitation which provides new schema is matched by a tendency to assimilate new 
experience using these acquired schema. 
According to Piaget (1951/1967), imitation in young infants involves the immediateand 
faithful reproduction of actions which the child has witnessed. Such imitation obviates the 
need for mental representation of action. However, in older infants, forms of imitation are 
entirely mediated by internal, mental representations of the actions witnessed. The 
development of imitation skills is pertinent to Piagetian theory given the close 
correspondence between constraints on forms of imitation and the child's representational 
status. Piaget took the view that imitation, as with all aspects of development, is rooted in 
sensorimotor action during the first 18 months of life. The emergence of the symbolic 
function at the end of this period enables children to internalise and form mental 
representations of action. This transition therefore corresponds with the capacity for more 
sophisticated forms of imitation such as deferred imitation. Deferred imitation involves the 
child reproducing a modelled act after a substantial interval of time. McShane (1991) 
raises an objection to Piaget's view of representation as a theoretical construct and 
deferred imitation as an operational measure of its emergence. Fundamentally, McShane 
argues that like a number of Piaget's claims, the denial of representation to the 
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sensorimotor infant may be overcautious. Furthermore, the use of deferred imitation as 
the defining property of imitation based on mental representation may reflect empirical 
convenience rather that genuine theoretical validity. 
Rather than work backwards from a empirical construct to a theoretical one McShane 
(1991) advises the search for unambiguous evidence for symbolic representations should 
proceed on a firm basis of theoretical definitions of representation. The process of 
imitation can be viewed as three distinct serial processes represented schematically in 
Figure 5-1 
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Figure 5-1: Schematic diagram of imitation processes 
Prior to the emergence of symbolic representations imitation is simply a complex reflex 
action and follows a direct path from behavioural observation to motor output. Piaget 
argued that in the case of deferred imitation, the delay between observation and motor 
response demanded that perceptual inputs be stored in the interim as abstract 
representations. While it is clear that deferred imitation must imply some representational 
coding, Piaget may have been wrong to deny the existence of this path prior to the 
emergence of deferred imitation. 
The onset of the deferred imitation is seen from a Piagetian point of view as an important 
indicator of the child's ability to form symbolic mental representations. Imitation in 
general has a clear status both in representational terms and as a consequence of its role in 
early development. In order to understand the role which imitation may play in 
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development we need to have a clear understanding of the timing of its development in 
relation to other developmental processes and transition. The following section begins 
with a Piagetian account of imitative development and subsequently introduces some 
recent evidence which is contrary to this view. 
5.2.2 The chronology of Plagetlan development 
According to Piaget, the child's capacity to imitate is constrained, during the period of 
sensorimotor development, by a lack of ability to store and process mental 
representations. Imitation in the first 18 months proceeds from a circumscribed set of 
reflex actions which are subsequently elaborated alongside sensorimotor schemes. 
Imitation is initially absent, if we discount a few reflex actions, and progresses through to 
sporadic imitation at stage II of sensorimotor development. By stage III, the child is able 
to imitate sounds she has already produced and respond imitativelyto movements which 
are both within her repertoire and which she herself can observe. The requirement for the 
child to observe her own attempts at imitation precludes both facial imitation and tongue 
protrusion. Observations of tongue protrusion, as early as stage III, are discounted by 
Piaget as `pseudo imitation', maintained only in response to intensive and sustained 
training. By stage IV the child is able to imitate hidden movements and attempts to imitate 
new models of sound and movement. Piaget describes Jacqueline's inaccurate but 
consistent attempts at imitation of tongue protrusion at this stage. More systematic 
attempts at imitation are being made by stage V with successful imitation of new and 
complex schemes. At the final stage of sensorimotor development, stage VI, children 
develop a capacity for deferred imitation, imitation of more complex models, and imitation 
of objects. 
Piaget's view of imitation as a stagewise process concordant with advances in general 
sensorimotor development is not supported by Uzgiris and Hunt (1975). Although 
empirical evidence on imitation supports the sequential progression outlined by Piaget, 
there is little evidence for correspondence with general sensorimotor development. 
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Uzgiris and Hunt claim that children show widespread developmental divergence between 
domains such as means-ends, object permanence and imitation. However, more 
damaging evidence for Piaget's theoretical approach to imitative development is provided 
by studies of neonatal imitation and evidence for deferred imitation prior to 18 months. 
5.2.3 Challenges to the Plagetian view: neonatal imitation and 
deferred imitation 
Recent advances in empirical paradigms have led to a greater understanding of the 
representational capacities of young and new-born infants. In chapter 3, it was suggested 
that young infants possess quite sophisticated representations of the objects well before 
Piagetattributed any representational capacity to them. There is growing evidence that in 
terms of imitation, children's early capacities may have again been underestimated. 
Meitzoff and Moore (1977) presented evidence to suggest that infants as young as nine 
days old have the capacity to imitate simple facial gestures such as lip protrusion, tongue 
protrusion, and mouth opening. Piaget denied that children can imitate such gestures 
accurately until they reach 12 months. This counter-evidence, seen as an `innate basis for 
facial imitation' (Meltzoff, 1990) is damaging for the Piagetian view of imitative 
development. More recent research has shown that even new born babies may have a 
more general capacity for imitation of simple facial expressions (Meltzoff & Moore, 
1989). However, Meltzoff and Moore's (1977) results have been criticised as 
methodologically dubious and while the findings have been replicated (Field, Woodson, 
Greenberg & Cohen, 1982; Meltzoff & Moore 1983), other studies have failed to do so 
(McKenzie & Over, 1983; Hayes & Watson, 1981). Kaitz, Meschulach-Sarfaty, 
Auerbach and Eidelman (1988) suggest that the neonate's capacity for imitation may be 
limited to tongue protrusion. The information processing requirements of translating 
perceptual representations into motor responses would seem to be taxing for new born 
infants. However, Meltzoff and Gopnik (1989) suggest a more simple mechanism for 
early imitation, active intermodal mapping (AIM). This process constitutes a supramodal, 
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or modality free representational basis common to both perceptual input and motor output. 
The modality free structure of representations obviates the need for translation, and the 
consequent processing demands. 
A number of authors have suggested that neonatal imitation as demonstrated by Meltzoff 
and Moore (1977) may be qualitatively different from later forms. Jacobson (1979) finds 
evidence that tongue protrusions can be elicited in response to the occilating motion of a 
pen in a tube and therefore have more in common with `fixed action patterns' (Tinbergen, 
1951) than genuine imitation. Other researchers have suggested that the developmental 
characteristics of neonatal imitation such as a reduction in frequency with age (Abravnel & 
Sigafoos, 1984; Maratos, 1982) is consistent with a transfer of control from sub-cortical 
to cortical mechanisms (Vinter, 1986). Neonatal imitation may be therefore under sub- 
cortical control as opposed to later cortical imitation. Regardless of neural mechanisms, 
neonatal imitation may be distinguishable in representational terms from the imitation 
observed in older infants. 
Further problems for the Piagetian model come from studies showing infants' precocious 
aptitude for deferred imitation of novel acts. Piaget argued that deferred imitation required 
the representational capacities which characterise stage VI of sensorimotor development. 
Deferred imitation entails imitation of a novel act following a delay. The act must be one 
which children have previously seen but have not themselves performed. A capacity for 
deferred imitation was Piaget's acid test for the existence of mental representation in 
infancy. However, a growing body of research suggests that infants as young as 14 
months, well before the transition to stage VI of sensorimotor development, have a 
capacity to produce acts of deferred imitation (Meltzoff, 1989; Meltzoff, 1988; Heimann 
& Meltzoff, 1996). Meltzoff (1988) modelled actions with specially constructed toy 
equipment. For example, one action involved the experimenter touching 
his head against a 
`light box' and thus activating a light. When presented with a sequence of these toys, and 
with delays of up to one week, 14-month-old children were able to reproduce the action at 
a higher frequency than a control group who had not witnessed the model. Children were 
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denied the opportunity to practice the action immediately following the model and hence 
the act involves deferred imitation. 
The apparent ability of children as young as 14 months to engage in deferred imitation 
suggests the capacity for mental representation. Such evidence for abstract internal 
representations of actions may have implications for representational development 
generally (Meltzoff, 1990; Heimann & Meltzoff, 1996). It is often claimed that Piaget 
underestimated the representational capacities of young children, as was discussed in 
relation to both object permanence (Chapter 3) and language (Chapter 4). Findings of 
precocious representational capacity across a number of domains may simply reflect the 
emergence of a generalised representational capacity well before the 18 month watershed 
proposed by Piaget. 
However, if mental representation occurs well before 18 months then reliable 
developmental features which emerge at this age cannot be attributed to a shift in 
representation per se as Piaget would argue. However, at around 18 months a number of 
social and linguistic features emerge which may reflect a shift in the form of 
representation. Meltzoff (1990) characterises this representational shift as a transition 
from empirical to hypothetical representations. Hypothetical representations allow the 
child to entertain simultaneous representations of actual and hypothetical states of affairs. 
Meltzoff argues that this general shift in representational capacity enable the child to 
entertain the proposition, `as if' in play, language and thought processes. In play this 
emerges as a capacity for pretence and in language as a use of terms which contrast actual 
and possible events such as the use of `gone'. 
5.2.4 Summary 
Imitation according to Piaget reflects a fundamental component of infant intelligence, that 
of accommodation. The capacity of the child to adapt internal schema in the light of 
experience of new models is complemented by a capacity to assimilate or apply these 
schema to situations. Piaget believed that imitation during the early sensorimotor period 
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was strictly limited to actions which children could observe themselves making and had 
already produced. Later children develop the capacity to imitate new models and actions 
which they could not observe themselves making. However, the most crucial change in 
the representational status of imitation corresponds, according to Piaget, with a capacity 
for deferred imitation. Deferred imitation involves the internalisation of imitation as a 
mental representation of action which is expressed after a substantial delay. In contrast, 
recent evidence has questioned the limitations which Piaget has imposed on children's 
early imitation and suggests that imitation of facial gestures is relatively intact even in 
neonates. Furthermore, children of 14 months appear to be able to produce acts of 
deferred imitation well before the Piagetian watershed for `representational thought'. 
A number of empirical and theoretical questions have arisen from studies of neonatal and 
deferred imitation. There is some debate over the possibility that neonatal imitation may be 
distinguished from similar forms of imitation which emerge later in development 
(Jacobson, 1979; Abravnel & Sigafoos, 1984; Maratos, 1982). Similarly, studies of 
deferred imitation raise questions about whether deferred imitation deserves a 
representational status distinctfrom immediate imitation (McShane, 1991). It may be that 
deferred imitation simply reflects an increase in the capacity to remember actions rather 
than a representative capacity per se (Meltzoff, 1990). The corollary of these claims is that 
imitation, deferred or immediate, has a representational basis. 
In summary, it appears that the use of imitation as a means of acquiring representations 
may be available to children much earlier that the 18 month transition as proposed by 
Piaget. The 18 month transition may not reflect the onset of representation but a shift in its 
nature. The development of representation in typically developing children may therefore 
be characterised by two general developmental transitions, a primary transition leading to 
the capacity for representation followed by a second general change in the form of 
representationalcapaci ties. 
Evidence presented thus far is consistent with a domain general view of representational 
development. Some would argue conversely that representational development may be a 
92 
Imitation 
domain specific process (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992/1995; Fodor, 1983,1989). However, 
as was argued in chapter 2, the rapid and coherent development in typical children may 
disguise any dissociations in representation which exist between domains. In contrast, 
children from atypical populations provide a powerful test of the domain general view. 
Imitation as an early indicator of representational capacity is in this respect a useful 
empirical tool and any discrepancy between imitative representations and representations 
in other domains would add support to a domain specific view of representational 
development. 
The subsequent section addresses the development of imitation and its relationship to 
other domains in children with Down's Syndrome. Furthermore, the evidence for 
imitation as a relative strength in children with Down's Syndrome will be discussed in 
terms of the role for imitation in development. 
5.3 The development of imitation in children with Down's 
Syndrome 
The status of children with Down's Syndrome as an atypical population with the 
consequent propensity for an anomalous developmental profile may prove informative in 
the light of evidence for early imitation and its relationship to other domains of 
representational capacity. A number of questions surround the timing of the emergence of 
representational imitation and the scope for imitation to impinge on other capacities such 
as play via a common representational framework. Given suggestions that imitation and 
social engagement represent a consistent developmental strength in children with Down's 
Syndrome, the role of imitation in development and its underlying representational basis 
is particularly pertinent. 
Children with Down's Syndrome are often described, somewhat stereotypically, as being 
`sociable' (Gibbs & Thorpe, 1982). However, empirical evidence for this is equivocal 
and depends upon the particular measure of social behaviour and the comparison group 
chosen (Beeghly, Weiss-Perry & Cicchetti, 1990; Krakow & Kopp, 1983; Sigman & 
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Ungerer, 1984). The perceived strength of social engagement in children with Down's 
Syndrome may reflect a tendency towards imitation which is often seen as indicating 
sociability and consequently rewarded (Ruff & Rothbart, 1996). 
Imitation or `mimicry' is very much part of the Down's Syndrome folklore and a number 
of claims have been made regarding imitation as a particularly strong feature of this 
population. Shuttleworth (1900) commented that `powers possessed by such children 
[with Down's Syndrome] of mimicry are often extraordinary' and Down (1866) wrote 
`they have considerable powers of imitation, even bordering on being mimics'. Both 
Down (1866) and Crookshank (1931) favoured an atavistic explanation for the propensity 
of children with Down's Syndrome to imitate. Many researchers take the view that an 
imitative strength is likely to be a consequence of having Down's Syndrome, or that it is 
used as a strategy to compensate for weaknesses. Benda (1946) saw the propensity for 
imitation as a result of a prolonged and exaggerated typical developmental phase. 
Bilovsky and Share (1965) suggested a compensatory view of imitation, as a supplement 
to deficits in the auditory and verbal domains. Blacketer-Simmonds (1953) argued 
similarly that imitation was a form of perseveration and over-compensation. Other authors 
appeal to the drive and impulse characteristics of Down's Syndrome in an attempt to 
understand imitation (Blessing, 1959; Sternlicht & Wanderer, 1962). 
Gibson (1996) remarks that regardless of the imitative propensity of the syndrome one 
needs to establish to what extent this propensity is unique, inherent, merely artifactual, 
useful, or exploitable, or a stereotypic novelty. Barr (1904) argued that superior short 
term recall and rote memory formed the basis for the imitative talent of children with 
Down's syndrome. Recent evidence suggesting that children with Down's Syndrome 
have strengths in visual short-term memory (Pueschel, Gallagher, Zartler, & Pezullo, 
1987) and in the imitation of hand movements (Hodapp, Leckman, Dykens, Sparrow, 
Zelinsky, & Ort, 1992; Neeman, 1971) is generally supportive of Barr's view. Neeman 
(1971) reports that motor imitation is a superior teaching tactic to directed motor training. 
Neeman's study reports the performance of 33 children with Down's Syndrome and 66 
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children with learning disabilities on the Purdue Perceptual-Motor Survey. Children with 
Down's Syndrome scored lower than the children with learning disabilities on 18 out of 
19 items but scored higher than the learning disabled group on `imitation of movement'. 
More recent studies by Hodapp et al. (1992) and Pueschel et al. (1987) report that 
children with Down's Syndrome have a particular strength in sequential imitation of hand 
movements. The apparent relative strength for imitation in children with Down's 
Syndrome, while often viewed in comparison to other cognitive skills, is rarely 
investigated from a representational perspective. Imitation clearly has some 
representational basis and any disparity between imitation and other cognitive skills can 
tell us something about the nature of common or distinct representational requirements 
which such skills require. 
Rast and Meltzoff (1995) examined the performance of 48 infants with Down's 
Syndrome aged between 20 and 43 months on both object permanence and deferred 
imitation tasks. Children were divided into two groups, `high-OP' and `low-OP', on the 
basis of performance on object permanence tasks. The deferred imitation task required 
children, having observed a novel act with one of six experimental objects, to reproduce 
the act after a five minute delay. Rast and Meltzoff report an asynchrony in the 
development of deferred imitation and object permanence in that they 
found no significant 
difference between high-OP and low-OP groups in terms of performance on the deferred 
imitation task. The claim for a developmental asynchrony rests on the Piagetian assertion 
that deferred imitation is not possible until the child has a representational basis and 
furthermore that this representational basis is not available until stage VI of sensorimotor 
development. Children with Down's Syndrome in Rast and Meltzoff's study appear to be 
capable of deferred imitation at stage V. Such findings lead to several theoretical 
conclusions concerning children with Down's Syndrome specifically and the development 
of representation generally. 
The most straightforward conclusion to be drawn from Rast and Meltzoff's study 
is that 
the ability to carry out deferred imitation prior to stage VI is contrary to Piaget's view of 
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sensorimotor development as a domain general process. It would also appear that mental 
representation is evident in imitation prior to the representation of hidden objects 
suggesting a degree of dissociation in the representational basis. 
However, there are a number of criticisms which can be levelled at Rast and Meltzoff's 
claims. Firstly, the study did not include a control group and consequently the 
asynchronous development may not be a Down's Syndrome specific phenomenon. A 
number of studies have reported precocious deferred imitation in typically developing 
children as early as 14m which suggests that `asynchrony' is not a specific feature of 
Down's Syndrome. Secondly, Rast and Meltzoff's assertion of asynchrony is based on 
comparison of tasks which have very different cognitive demands on children. Wishart 
(1997) argues, for example, that Rast and Meltzoff may have underestimated the object 
permanence skills of children with Down's Syndrome by adopting a particular protocol in 
assessment of search skills. Clearly, any dissociation between performance on imitation 
and object permanence tasks may reflect performance factors irrespective of the 
representational demands. 
Thirdly, with respect to the representational demands, and in a strictly Piagetian sense, 
Rast and Meltzoff s data do suggest asynchrony. However, a number of studies have 
suggested that Piaget may have been wrong about the representational status indicated by 
children's performance on standard object permanence tasks (see Chapter 3). Children 
appear to be capable of representing objects well before they can pass stage VI object 
permanence tasks. Thus the discrepancy between children's performance on imitation and 
object permanence tasks does not suggest an unequivocal discrepancy at the 
representational level. 
5.3.1 Imitation as a process: is imitation a developmental strength 
or weakness? 
While many early studies of children with Down's Syndrome speculate that a propensity 
to imitate may be as a result of, or compensation for, other cognitive weaknesses, few 
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studies have directly compared children's imitation to performance in a theoretically 
related domain. Rast and Meltzoff's (1995) study is one exception which compares the 
underlying representational capacity implicated in high level object permanence and 
deferred imitation. Piaget hypothesised that both deferred imitation and the representation 
of objects were limited by common representational constraints. The apparent disparity 
between the emergence of deferred imitation and high level object permanence are 
certainly counter to this strict Piagetian hypothesis. 
While Rast and Meltzoff identify an area worthy of investigation their study does not 
suggest a fundamental distinction in representational terms between object permanence 
and imitation. Furthermore, their study does not allow us to conclude that such a 
discrepancy is a unique strength in the Down's Syndrome population. The question of a 
representational discrepancy and the uniqueness of this discrepancy to the Down's 
Syndrome population is addressed in subsequent empirical work (Chapter 11). However, 
despite the weakness of Rast and Meltzoff's evidence it would appear to be worth 
considering imitation as a potentially genuine and unique strength in children with 
Down's Syndrome. 
5.4 Summary 
Referring to our initial discussion concerning the basis for imitation in typically 
developing children it is certain that some form of representation is implicated in imitation. 
Neonatal imitation may proceed via a different mechanism from later forms of imitation 
but it would appear that some form of `representative' imitation is evident well before 
children reach the 18 month transition proposed by Piaget. The domain general view of 
representation depends on the extent to which this early imitation is matched by similar 
representational capacity in other domains. 
Evidence from imitation and other representational capabilities in atypical populations may 
support or refute claims fora domain general representational capacity. If imitation clearly 
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emerges as a strength in children with Down's Syndrome then this would force us to 
address the extent to which imitation could reflect a common representational capacity. 
This chapter began by emphasising the pervasive nature of the imitation process across a 
number of developmental domains. If a capacity for imitation was to emerge as a strength 
within the Down's Syndrome population we must ask to what extent it would influence 
the course of development within related domains such as language and sensorimotor 
development. While imitation is, to a certain extent, fundamental to the development of a 
number of skills such a propensity in excess could lead to an imbalance in development. 
Piaget referred to the relationship between assimilation and accommodation as `intelligent' 
only in the case where such processes were present in equal measure. Piaget argues that 
an imbalance over a period of time would be maladaptive from the point of view of 
development. We have mentioned that Piaget regarded imitation as an extension of 
accommodation and therefore an excess of imitation could be seen as maladaptive in 
Piagetian terms. Piaget referred to the lack of co-ordination or comprehension which 
would result from the primacy of accommodation or imitation. This primacy of imitation 
refers to a tendency to continually incorporate or modify existing schemes or 
representations on the basis of new experiences. The corresponding lack of assimilation 
would result in a failure to apply such schemes in new contexts or with new objects. The 
acquired schemes incorporated through imitation would fail to yield greater understanding 
because such schemes could only serve to recreate the action in a context bound situation 
with the same object. Furthermore, accommodated schemes would not be co-ordinated in 
that schemes would refer to distinct objects and contexts. Learning, dominated by 
imitation, would therefore fail to be generalised. 
Beyond the Piagetian view of development, many would see development as a process 
involving an initial acquisition of skills followed by some form of internal and external 
consolidation and reorganisation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992/1995). The success of the 
acquisition process reflected in imitation would therefore serve to highlight a 
corresponding deficit in the consolidation, strengthening and internal reorganisation of 
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skills. Such a state of affairs is evidently counter-productive to development. New skills 
would tend to be learned by observation and would not then be generalised to other tasks 
or situations. There is some evidence for the failure of children with Down's Syndrome to 
generalise learning experiences (Duffy & Wishart, 1994) and to consolidate learned 
experiences (Wishart, 1996a; Karmiloff Smith, 1992/1995). A number of researchers 
have characterised the learning style in children with Down's Syndrome as being deviant 
(Wishart, 1996a; Rast and Meltzoff, 1995). It is argued here that observed differences in 
the learning style and performance of children with Down's Syndrome may reflect a 
relative strength in imitation rather than particular weaknesses elsewhere. 
As we have noted, imitation represents the accommodation pole of the Piagetian 
continuum between assimilation and accommodation. According to Piaget, play 
comprises the opposite pole, a continuation of assimilation. In the following chapter we 
consider play as a developmental process and its relationship to imitation. 
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The Development of Representation: The Role of 
Symbolic Play 
In the previous chapter, imitation was considered as a representational process. The 
evidence suggesting it is a relative strength in children with Down's Syndrome was also 
reviewed. In this chapter, the development of symbolic play is considered in terms of its 
characteristic representational qualities. Given the emphasis on imitation as a 
developmental process this chapter considers the relationship between play and imitation 
as complementary developmental processes. 
This chapter will first discuss the development of symbolic play from the perspective of 
typically developing children. The Piagetian view of play and imitation will be discussed 
in relation to the developmental role of these processes. The representational basis for 
play will subsequently be introduced with reference to links with an awareness of mental 
states, or theory of mind. The link between symbolic play and theory of mind has 
emerged largely from work with children with autism. The development of symbolic play 
will therefore be discussed from the perspective of atypical populations, and specifically 
children with autism. The concluding discussion will address symbolic play development 
in children with Down's Syndrome with reference to the motivational and broadly social 
components of play. The relationship between the development of symbolic play and 
representational development in general will also be considered. 
6.1 Symbolic play as representation 
Symbolic play can be seen as a `window into the representational world of the infant' 
(Bergman & Lefcourt, 1994) and provides us with an opportunity to gauge children's 
ability to engage with and manipulate symbolic representations. A frequently cited 
example of symbolic play is a child's use of a banana `as if' it were a telephone. It is the 
100 
Symbolic Play 
`as if', non-literal, or simulative quality of symbolic play in this example which 
distinguishes symbolic from functional acts (Garvey, 1977). Symbolic play encompasses 
a number of acts which can be regarded as representational in the sense that the acts 
distinguish between the `signifier' and the `signified'. In contrast, functional acts involve 
the use of miniature or lifelike copies of real objects while the requirements of symbolic 
play are more abstract. Leslie (1987) suggests the following as indicating symbolic play: 
object substitution (using one object to represent another), attribution of absent or false 
properties (pretending that a cold drink is hot), and referring to an absent object as if it 
were present (pretending an empty cup contains a drink). The symbolic act of pretending 
a banana is a telephone can thereby be distinguished from the functional act involving a 
miniature or toy telephone in the same procedure. This definition of symbolic play is 
intended to isolate a capacity for representation in play from play acts which could be 
learned or copied directly from adults (Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1978). 
The symbolic nature of play which emerges in pretence at around 18 months is 
fundamental to its role as an indicator of representational status. Furthermore the 
relationship between representation in play, linguistic representation, and the 
representation of mental states has elevated the status of symbolic play as a focus for 
empiricalinvestigation. 
6.2 The development of symbolic play in typically 
developing children 
In the previous chapter, it was noted that imitation was regarded by Piaget as an extension 
of accommodation(Piaget, 1951/1967). In contrast, symbolic play was regarded as an 
extension of assimilation and was referred to as `ludic' assimilation by Piaget. Piaget saw 
symbolic play in the extreme as an expression of pure egocentric thought. Piaget gives an 
example of a child placing a shell on box as if it were a cat on a wall, and comments that, 
such actions do not reflect any attempt at understanding, but are carried out by the child, 
`merely for the pleasure of combining these real objects to suit his whim' (p. 281). 
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6.2.1 Play and imitation as developmental processes 
The relationship between imitation and play, according to Piaget, characterised the 
distinction between assimilation and accommodation. While imitation involves the 
incorporation of new schemes into the child's existing repertoire, play is the application of 
existing schema to the world. According to Piaget, imitation and symbolic play therefore 
comprise opposite poles of the equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation. 
Play represents the primacy of assimilation over accommodation while imitation reflects 
pure accommodation. Before the emergence of representational thought, Plaget 
(1951/1967) believed that play and imitation developed separately and were `to some 
extent antithetic' (p. 89) during the sensorimotor stage. With the emergence of 
representational thought, imitation becomes internalised as mental representation and thus 
play and imitation come to depend on common underlying representations. 
Despite the representational codependence of imitation and play, Piaget argued that the 
emphasis on assimilation or accommodation distinguishes between the two behaviours. 
Imitation as an extension of accommodation involves a transformation of existing 
schemata to incorporate a new model. New schema thus formed are `susceptible to 
immediate or subsequent reconstruction' (p. 103). This subsequent transformation can 
either be adaptive or `ludic' depending upon the nature of the subsequent assimilation 
process. `Ludic' assimilation characterises symbolic play and therefore allows the child to 
express models in novel contexts and with unfamiliar materials. Symbolic play, therefore 
reflects the absence of accommodation and a consequent disregard for the object in 
preference to the expression of thought. 
The functional role for symbolic play in development stems from its relationship to 
`intelligence' as defined by Piaget. Intelligent action in Piagetian terms requires an 
established equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation in which the child's 
actions remain concerned with the properties of the real object. The developmental role for 
symbolic play is therefore enshrined in the assimilation process. 
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6.2.2 The Plagetlan chronology of development 
Piaget argued that like many other representational capacities, symbolic play reflected the 
emergence of the capacity for representational thought at around 18 months. Piaget 
believed that play during the sensorimotor period was limited to sensorimotor practice. 
Subsequent to the emergence of pretend play at around 18 months, children are 
hypothesised to develop games with rules which gradually supersede pretence as a 
dominant form of play. Overall therefore, symbolic play emerges towards the end of the 
second year, increases over the following three to four years and then begins to decline in 
favour of rule based games. 
Evidence for a Piagetian chronology in the emergence is symbolic play is relatively 
strong. Sensorimotor activity with single objects declines between 7 and 30 months and 
this decline is met with a corresponding increase in symbolic play. The onset of symbolic 
play is relatively abrupt and increases in frequency in children between 12 and 30 months 
(Fein, 1981). Despite the prevalence of references to symbolic play in the child 
development literature the frequency of symbolic, as opposed to other forms of play 
remains quite low and reaches a maximum of around 17% in pre-school children and 33% 
in nursery groups (Rubin, Watson & Jambor, 1978) 
The emergence of symbolic play was thought by Piaget (1951/1967) to correspond with 
the emergence of the semiotic, or symbolic function characterising the emergence of 
mental representation. Children's play in the second year of life is therefore regarded as 
increasingly representational. Piaget characterises the representational qualities of play in 
terms of the child's use of schemes `(i) instead of using them in the presence of objects to 
which they are usually applied, he assimilates to them new objectives unrelated to them 
from the point of view of effective accommodation, (ii) these new objects... are used to 
mime or evoke the schemas in question' (p. 97). Piaget offers the example of Jacqueline 
pretending to sleep while holding a cloth, a coat collar, or a donkey's tail, rather than a 
pillow, as an example of emergent pretend play. 
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The developing capacity for symbolic play is characterised by three trends; decentration, 
decontextualisation, and integration. Decentration refers to the trend for play to move 
from being self-directed to becoming increasingly other-directed. Decontextualisation 
refers to the capacity for the use of symbolic as opposed to realistic objects in acts of 
pretence. Integration refers to children's capacity to concatenate a number of related play 
acts into a coherent sequence such as `going to the shops'. 
Evidence for such sequential trends in the development of play is relatively strong. 
Watson and Fischer (1977) reporta decline in self-directed behaviour between 12 and 30 
months and a corresponding increase in doll-directed behaviour over the same period. 
Additionally Watson and Fisher note an increasing trend for dolls to be used as active 
agents in play rather than as passive recipients. With respect to object substitution, 
Watson and Fischer report that children predominantly use a realistic doll in play between 
14 and 19 months but are subsequently able to treat a block as a doll in symbolic acts. By 
24 months, children are able to use two unrealistic objects in a combined act (Watson & 
Fischer, 1977; Fein, 1981). 
The sequential properties of symbolic play receive additional support from Nicholich 
(1977) who observed the emergence of play in five typically developing children. 
Nicholich classified the emergence of play as a five level ordinal scale. The scale begins at 
`presymbolic schemes' in which children demonstrate knowledge of an object's function 
in brief gestures, for example by touching a comb to their hair. The first evidence of 
pretence, according to Nicholich, emerges at level 2, with simple pretend acts such as 
sleeping, eating, drinking etc. The pretence at level 2 is conditional upon single acts being 
performed with inadequate materials, such as an empty cup, or outside their normal 
context. The third level of play involves single actions directed at others, e. g. the child's 
mother, and acts which adopt another person's role, e. g. driving a car. The final two 
levels of play involve the combination of numerous symbolic acts which at the 
final level 
are demonstrably planned in advance. 
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A similar ordinal scale is proposed by Belsky and Most (1981) and is based on a cross- 
sectional study of 40 infants. Play is characterised as progressing from self directed 
single-scheme play to other-directed single-scheme acts. At subsequent stages, according 
to Belsky and Most, children begin to perform `substitution' acts in which `meaningless' 
objects are used in a creative or imaginative manner. Higher levels of play involve the 
progression towards elaborate sequences with multiple object substitutions such as giving 
a stick a `drink' with a seashell. Belsky and Most's requirement for substitution of objects 
and Nicholich's use of criteria for inadequate materials support the Piagetian trend 
towards decontextualisation in play and reflect Leslie's distinctions between functional 
play and pretend play (Leslie, 1987). A recently introduced test of pretend play, the 
ToPP, (Lewis & Boucher, 1997) emphasises the significance of object substitution in 
pretend play. In contrast to other tests of so-called symbolic play such as the Lowe and 
Costello test (Lowe & Costello, 1988) the ToPP requires children to progress beyond the 
use of realistic objects in play and use `junk' objects in a decontextualised manner. 
While the Piagetian chronology of pretend play development is well supported, the 
representational requirements of pretend play are frequently disputed. In contrast to 
Piaget's view of symbolic play as a reflection of a general emergent capacity for symbolic 
representation (Piaget, 1951/1967), some researchers view play as a domain specific 
representational capacity (e. g. Leslie, 1987). In the following section alternatives to 
Piaget's account are discussed in terms of representational links with other developmental 
domains. 
6.2.3 Challenges to the Plagetian view: symbolic play and 
representational development 
Piaget suggested that both play and language were dependent upon the semiotic 
function, 
a domain general capacity for symbolic thought. In contrast, Vygotsky 
believed that the 
development of substitution in pretend play was instrumental in the development of 
linguistic representation. Vygotsky saw the emergent distinction between substitute object 
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and real object as precipitating a shift from things as objects of action, to things as objects 
of thought (see Fein, 1981). 
Many contemporary views of representational development suggest a more modular, 
circumscribed structure to symbolic play development. Furthermore, symbolic play is 
often seen as related in representational terms to children's understanding of mental states. 
In the current section, contemporary views of representational development are discussed 
in relation to symbolic play and other domains of development. 
Both Leslie (1987) and Perner (1988/1991) acknowledge that there is a watershed at 18 
months in respect of children's ability to engage in pretence. However Leslie, Perner and 
Piaget have contrasting views of the representational nature and developmental properties 
of early pretence. Leslie argues that the onset of pretend play at 18 months corresponds to 
an ability to decouple primary representations, objects as themselves, from secondary 
representations, objects as targets for pretence. In Leslie's terminology the act of 
pretending that a banana is a telephone is one of drawing a distinction between the 
representation of the banana as a banana, the primary representation, and the banana as a 
telephone, the secondary representation. Leslie argues that the capacity to form secondary 
representations, or meta-representation, allows children to `tamper' with the secondary 
representation during pretence while maintaining a veridical representation of reality. 
Leslie suggests furthermore that the structural distinction between propositional attitude, 
e. g. `pretending that X', and propositional content, e. g. `this banana is a telephone', is a 
fundamental component of children's capacity for meta-representation and pretence. 
Leslie's views, at face value, correspond closely to Piaget's view of the emergent 
symbolic function but differ widely in terms of its origin. Leslie, like Fodor (1983), 
argues that the structural properties of pretence are both domain specific, modular, and 
innately constrained, rather than built on experience of action. What is striking about 
Leslie's account is that it posits the existence of conceptual structures prior to linguistic 
expression. The distinction between propositional attitude and propositional content 
presupposes distinct concepts of agent, event and object. The Piagetian view of 
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development strongly denies that such representational concepts could be innately 
specified. 
Perner (1988/1991) acknowledges that some form of transition takes place at 18 months. 
However, he suggests that this transition does not involve a increased capacity for 
representation per se but the capacity to hold simultaneously two alternative world views. 
Thus, according to Perner, the 18 month old does not distinguish between propositional 
attitude and propositional content, as Leslie would argue, but instead maintains two 
alternative versions of propositional content. The representational shift according to 
Perser occurs at around four years and corresponds with the capacity to understand 
mental states, referred to as a theory of mind. Perner suggests that prior to this transition 
the child does not understand representation in the sense of being explicitly aware of its 
existence. This capacity for meta-representation, according to Perner, is not available until 
the child is four years old. In contrast, Leslie attributes this capacity to the 18 month old 
child. 
The theoretical positions adopted by Piaget, Leslie and Perner with respect to 
representational development can be compared and contrasted according to the domain 
specificity of the structure of pretence and the status of pretence as a representational 
capacity. Does symbolic play reflect a domain general capacity (ä la Piaget and Perner), or 
is pretence a domain specific capacity as Leslie would argue? Furthermore does the 
emergence of pretence reflect a understanding of representation? Leslie and Piaget would 
agree it does while Perner suggests this capacity does not emerge until four years. 
Much of the current research emphasis on pretend play is based on its relationship to later 
understanding of mental states in both linguistic and behavioural domains. Perner views 
pretence as distinct from the behavioural and linguistic encoding of mental states. In 
contrast Leslie sees a `deep isomorphism' between the structure of pretend play and 
children's mental state awareness. Much of the crucial evidence on the representational 
status of pretend play and theory of mind has been gleaned from atypical populations, and 
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specifically children with autism. The following discussion of symbolic play will focus 
on empirical evidence from children with autism and children with Down's Syndrome. 
6.2.4 Symbolic play in atypical populations: evidence from 
children with autism 
The link between the development of symbolic play, performance on theory of mind 
tasks, and use of mental state language, has been extensively investigated. The reason for 
the interest in these links stems from studies of children with autism. Children with 
autism, in contrast to typically developing children, tend to fail tasks requiring an 
understanding of the mental states of others or changes in their own mental state, so called 
theory of mind tasks (TOM). TOM tasks require children to use mental states as a means 
of understanding and predicting behaviour. Tasks such as the false-belief task (Baron- 
Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), the Smarties task (ferner, Frith, Leslie & Leekham, 1989) 
and strategic deception tasks (Russell, Jarrold & Potel, 1991) are generally failed by 
typically developingthree-year-olds but passed by four-year olds. Furthermore, children 
with autism appear to be dramatically delayed in performance on theory of mind tasks and 
often fail such tasks until they have a developmental age of seven to eight years (Happe, 
1995). 
The specificity of this apparent TOM deficit in autism has prompted a flurry of theoretical 
explanations for its aetiology. One robust finding is that children with autism appear to 
engage in significantly less symbolic play than both typically developing children and 
children with learning disabilities matched for developmental age (Baron-Cohen, 1987; 
Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1991). The suggestion that both pretend play and TOM are 
selectively impaired in autism has led a number of authors to suggest a common aetiology 
(Leslie, 1987). Leslie argues that symbolic play and theory of mind tasks depend on the 
same representational components. Furthermore, Leslie, argues that this representational 
capacity is normally present at birth. Typically developing children of three-years-old 
reliably fail the false belief task but engage in pretend play. How could such tasks reflect 
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the presence of a common innate representational basis? Leslie argues that children fail 
false belief tasks in this case, not because they lack a capacity for meta-representation, but 
because they lack the necessary information processing capacity (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). 
Common to both Leslie and Perner's account of symbolic play is the ability at 18 months 
to form two representations of an object which thereby facilitates pretence. Evidence that 
children do not pass false belief or TOM tasks until four years of age weakens Leslie's 
account and supports Perner's view of TOM as distinct from play. Evidence, from 
autism, for a link between early symbolic play and later measures of mental state 
understanding supports Leslie's view that both symbolic play and explicit knowledge of 
mental states are reliant on the same capacity for meta - representation. 
However, evidence from Lewis and Boucher (1988) casts doubt on Leslie's views of a 
common deficit and a common representational basis for play and TOM. Lewis and 
Boucher argue that children with autism do engage in pretend play if play is prompted or 
elicited. The deficit does not therefore appear to be a problem with representation per se, 
but a deficit in generating spontaneous play. 
While much of the evidence for the coincidence of symbolic play and TOM deficits has 
been gleaned from studies of children with autism, children with Down's Syndrome have 
frequently formed a comparison group in these studies. Such studies typically report 
lower levels of symbolic play in children with autism than in children with Down's 
Syndrome (e. g. Sigman & Ungerer, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1987; Riguet, Taylor, 
Benaroya & Klein, 1981). The evidence for specific deficits in children with autism 
therefore relies upon the assumption of relative coherence in the development of children 
with Down's Syndrome. Children with Down's Syndrome appear to have been seen as a 
convenient comparison group due to their aetiological homogeneity and ostensibly typical 
developmental profile. However, on close examination, it appears that children with 
Down's Syndrome may not show a typical developmental progression in symbolic play 
thereby casting doubt on the validity of many comparisons. Furthermore, recent research 
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has suggested an increased prevalence of autism within the Down's Syndrome population 
(Howlin, Wing & Gould, 1995). 
The status of symbolic play development in atypical populations is central to 
understanding the representational status of symbolic play. Evidence from autism 
suggests a close correspondence between early symbolic play and later awareness of 
mental states. Furthermore, the relationship between symbolic play and TOM suggests a 
common representational basis. The development of symbolic play in children with 
Down's Syndrome therefore warrants scrutiny, not least because of the indirect links with 
research in the autistic population. 
6.3 The development of symbolic play in children with 
Down's Syndrome 
There is widespread evidence which suggests that the development of symbolic play in 
children with Down's Syndrome proceeds in a sequence similar to that of typically 
developing children (Beeghly, Weiss-Perry & Cicchetti, 1990; Hill & McCune-Nicholich, 
1981; Motti, Cicchetti & Sroufe, 1983). Beeghly et al. (1990) examined age related 
changes in the development of symbolic play in older and younger cohorts of children 
with Down's Syndrome with developmental ages of 23 months and 48 months 
respectively. Beeghly et al. found similar proportions of object and social play in children 
with Down's Syndrome compared to age matched controls. The proportion of overall 
play time deemed to be symbolic play was significantly greater in the older cohorts for 
both the Down's Syndrome and the typically developing group. This finding is consistent 
with trends observed in typically developing children (Belsky & Most, 1981). Further 
comparisons of play types revealed few differences between children with Down's 
Syndrome and typically developing children matched for developmental age. The one 
exception to this was a significantly greater frequency of manipulative play in the younger 
cohort of children with Down's Syndrome. 
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While global measures of duration of symbolic play reveal few differences between 
children with Down's Syndrome and typically developing children, differences do emerge 
when one compares the frequency of play acts within each group. There is growing 
evidence to suggest that the play of children with Down's Syndrome may be 
stereotypical, repetitive and rigid (Kopp, 1990; Kopp, Krakow & Johnson, 1983; 
Krakow & Kopp, 1982,1983; Mundy & Kasari, 1990). Krakow and Kopp (1982) 
suggest that children with Down's Syndrome, in contrast to typically developing children, 
often repeat sequences of play such as `feeding baby', in the same order rather than 
elaborate upon them. 
Krakow and Kopp (1983) report data from a study of 38 children, 12 children with 
Down's Syndrome, 13 typically developing children and 12 children with learning 
disabilities of unknown aetiology. The mean developmental ages of the groups were 
between 27 months and 29 months. Krakow and Kopp (1983) report a significantly 
higher proportion of repetitive, regressive and inflexible play in the group of children with 
Down's Syndrome in contrast to both control groups. Once again the authors observed 
repetitive sequences of bathing-feeding-bathing-feeding during doll play with no 
elaboration or change in the play sequence. Kopp (1990) describes a play sequence in 
which a child with Down's Syndrome repeated the same scheme of play eight times. In a 
similar study of younger children (developmental age 17 months) Krakow and Kopp 
(1983) witnessed a relatively high level of throwing behaviour which was not seen in the 
other two groups. Krakow and Kopp attribute this behaviour to a limitation in the range 
and repertoire of activities available to the children with Down's Syndrome. 
A number of other researchers also report a high rate of repetition in the symbolic play of 
children with Down's Syndrome (McConkey, 1985; Riguet, Taylor, Benaroya & Klein 
1981; Beeghly, Weiss-Perry & Cicchetti, 1990). McConkey (1985) and Riguet et al. 
(1981) report significantly fewer substitute symbolic acts in children with Down's 
Syndrome compared to typically developing children matched for developmental age. 
111 
Symbolic Play 
Riguet et al. ascribe the lower frequency of play acts to the `tendency to elaborate the 
same idea repeatedly throughout a play period' (p. 447). 
Beeghly, Weiss-Perry and Cicchetti (1990) present data from a study of 35 children with 
Down's Syndrome in comparison to 41 typically developing children. The authors report 
that children with Down's Syndrome, with the exception of object substitution, did not 
differ in terms of the highest level of play, and produced a greater number of play 
schemes. However, children with Down's Syndrome did not produce a greater number of 
different schemes but merely repeated existing ones. Furthermore, average play scores for 
the older cohort of children with Down's Syndrome were lower on all scales of 
measurement. Taken together the results from these studies suggest a tendency for 
children with Down's Syndrome to repeat play acts rather than invent novel schemes. 
A number of explanations have been advanced for these characteristics of play in children 
with Down's Syndrome. In the following section anomalies in the pattern of attention, 
motivation and social engagement are discussed in relation to their potential impact on 
play. The tendency to view attention as the primary deficit may disguise the causal 
influences of motivation and social engagement on attention patterns. Therefore, 
throughout the following discussion, the interrelationship between these factors is 
emphasised. 
6.3.1 Attention in dyadic play 
Krakow and Kopp (1983) suggest that the differences in play observed in children with 
Down's Syndrome may stem from a lack of awareness of the object and social resources 
available or possibly an inability to make use of such resources. Furthermore, Krakow 
and Kopp speculate that a lack of awareness may be related to differing patterns of 
attention in typical play situations. In Krakow and Kopp's study, children with Down's 
Syndrome directed excessive attention to one stimulus, the toy, in a social-toy situation. 
Krakow and Kopp suggest this excessive focus on one stimulus reflects an inability to 
shift attention from the focal object to social engagement. 
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While Krakow and Kopp's result suggests a preference for the object rather than the 
social stimulus, a number of studies suggest the reverse preference i. e. excessive attention 
to social `objects' (parent, tester, etc. ). Both Gunn, Berry and Andrews (1982) and 
Berger and Cunningham (1981) show that, in a social play situation, children with 
Down's Syndrome focus more attention towards the caregiver when compared to 
typically developing children. Kasari, Mundy, Yirmiya, and Sigman (1990) report a 
similar set of results when children with Down's Syndrome were compared with typically 
developing children matched for developmental age. Landry and Chapieski (1990) also 
report a socially biased focus of attention in a joint play situation. A recent study by 
Ruskin, Kasari, Mundy and Sigman (1994) examined the effects of the relative salience 
of the social and object stimuli in joint play situations. Ruskin at al. report a similar 
pattern of environmental monitoring in children with Down's Syndrome as in typically 
developing children in the object focused situation but a greater social-focus in the social 
situation. 
These results suggest that children with Down's Syndrome may be more socially focused 
in play than typically developing children matched for developmental age. Furthermore 
the size of this effect appears to be related to the relative salience of the object relative to 
the social stimulus (Ruskin et al., 1994; Legerstee & Bowerman, 1989). 
Some research suggests that children with Down's Syndrome may have difficulty in 
redirecting attention, rather than a particular preference for objects or social stimuli. If this 
was the case the findings of Krakow and Kopp (1983) could be reconciled with studies 
showing a social preference during play. Evidence suggests that parents of children with 
Down's Syndrome show more frequent attempts to redirect attention but such attempts 
may be less effective (Landry & Chapieski, 1989,1990; Cielinski, Vaughn, Seifer & 
Contreras, 1995). 
Differences in attention patterns found in children with Down's Syndrome could be seen 
either as causal influences or consequences of an emergent deficit in play quality. Krakow 
and Kopp (1983) suggest the former explanation, that an excessively focused attentional 
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style is responsible for the repetitive symbolic play observed in children with Down's 
Syndrome. Krakow and Kopp draw support for this argument from children's 
performance on other tasks which indicates repetitive behaviour (Berry, Gunn & 
Andrews, 1984). 
However, differences in attention could also be seen as a consequence of different play 
quality. The socially directed attention bias witnessed in many studies of dyadic play 
could reflect a relative lack of engagement in object play. An increase in socially directed 
attention therefore simply reflects a lack of engagement in the alternative activity when 
children are faced with a choice. However, corresponding preference for social rather 
than object stimuli may have further effects on the quality of play. In the following two 
sections the implications of this account are discussed; first in terms of a reduced 
motivation to engage in object play and second, a correspondingly increased tendency 
towards social engagement. 
6.3.2 Symbolic play and motivation 
The central role of motivation as the driving force in play suggests that a motivational 
account of qualitative difference is particularly plausible (Hrncir, Speller & West, 1985; 
Yarrow, Morgan, Jennings, Harmon & Gaiter, 1982). Play is characterised as the `ideal 
expression of intrinsic motivation' (Goodman, 1996, p. 220) and, in contrast to many 
behaviours, may actually be degraded by external reinforcement (Deci, 1975; Deci & 
Ryan, 1982; Lepper, 1981). In this section evidence for a motivational deficit in children 
with Down's Syndrome will be considered. Furthermore, qualitative differences in 
symbolic play are addressed in terms of a motivational deficit. 
A number of studies have suggested that children with Down's Syndrome do not derive 
as much pleasure from mastery as typically developing children. The use of `mastery 
motivation' to describe the motivating force behind children's play has arisen from the 
notion of competence motivation referred to by White (1959). The drive for mastery in 
play or exploration of toys is also the driving force in the Piagetian view of assimilation. 
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Pleasure derived from the application of internal schema to the world is implicit in the 
constructivist account of development. Mastery may also be an important indicator of 
concurrent and later developmental status (Messer, McCarthy, McQuiston, MacTurk, 
Yarrow & Vietze, 1986; Yarrow et al., 1982). 
Studies of children with Down's Syndrome suggest a general reduction in mastery 
motivation in comparison to typically developing children. Gunn, Berry and Andrews 
(1981) noted that children with Down's Syndrome did not seem to enjoy mastery type 
activities. Berry, Gunn and Andrews (1984) studied children with Down's Syndrome 
playing with a `lock box' (Goodman, 1979) and reported that they appeared not to be 
interested in mastery of the toy. In contrast, typically developing children were both 
purposeful and consistent in their exploration of the toy. MacTurk, Hunter, McCarthy, 
Vietze and McQuiston (1985) have shown that children with Down's Syndrome spend 
more time looking at and less time engaged in manual exploration of objects. 
Consistent with these motivational accounts are studies of children with Down's 
Syndrome which report lower levels of positive affect associated with task success, or 
`causality pleasure'. While children with Down's Syndrome may not react to success with 
the same speed and intensity of typically developing children (Cicchetti & Beeghly, 1990) 
it appears that the dampening of affect has a number of task dependent characteristics 
which explicitly suggest lower motivation. Dunst (1981) has shown in relation to task 
performance that children with Down's Syndrome show less causality pleasure in 
completing a difficult task as compared to an easier task. This result is consistent with 
Rast and Meltzoff's (1995) account of a `dampening of epistemic curiosity' in children 
with Down's Syndrome which characterises behaviour in object search. Wishart (1996) 
reports that children with Down's Syndrome often use `party tricks' as a means of 
avoiding difficult tasks. 
In children with Down's Syndrome motivational accounts have been cited as a potential 
cause of differences in play quality and particularly excessive repetition of play schemes. 
Gunn (1982) suggests that repetition in children's play indicates attainment of a `comfort 
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level' where children feel secure and competent in their play. Furthermore Gunn suggests 
that this results in a difficulty in initiating a new focus or direction for further activity. 
Beeghly, Weiss-Perry and Cicchetti (1990) remark that the observed spontaneous play 
does not necessarily reflect children's true competencies. Beeghly et al. 's play study 
found measures of peak symbolic performance did not differ between children with 
Down's Syndrome and typically developing children. However, within their older cohort 
of children with Down's Syndrome, deficits in most spontaneous symbolic play measures 
were found in terms of the mean level of symbolic activity. This discrepancy between 
peak performance and mean activity in the Down's Syndrome group suggests that a 
performance or motivational deficit may, in part, explain observed differences in the 
development of symbolic play. 
Some authors cite pre-school intervention programmes as a potential cause of lower 
motivation of children with Down's Syndrome to engage in spontaneous symbolic play. 
Gunn and Berry (1989) suggest that intensive intervention may have lowered the mutual 
enjoyment of play activity for parents and their children. This suggestion is supported by 
evidence introduced earlier which suggests that directing children's attention often results 
in a degradation of spontaneous play, particularly in children with Down's Syndrome 
(Landry & Chapieski, 1989,1990; Cielinski, Vaughn, Seifer & Contreras, 1995) 
The apparent motivational deficit which characterises the lower quality of play in children 
with Down's Syndrome may also be the cause of differences observed in attention 
patterns. A relative strength in the capacity of social engagement in children with Down's 
Syndrome, contrasted with a reduced motivation to engage in symbolic play, may be 
reflected in a characteristic attention pattern during dyadic play. We now consider the 
evidence for a relationship between social engagement and symbolic play. 
6.3.3 Imitation, social development and symbolic play 
Irrespective of motivational weakness which may impinge directly on spontaneous play, 
children with Down's Syndrome do appear to have a tendency to attend to social objects 
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and this may interfere with play in social situations. Children with Down's Syndrome 
have been characterised, stereotypically, as being sociable (Gibbs & Thorpe, 1983) and a 
number of studies have shown evidence for advanced social development relative to more 
general cognitive skills (Beeghly, Weiss-Perry & Cicchetti, 1990; Krakow & Kopp, 
1983; Sigman & Ungerer, 1984). There is also complementary evidence showing an 
apparent attention bias towards social targets in dyadic play (Landry & Chapieski, 1990) 
There is some general evidence to suggest that a relative social strength in Down's 
Syndrome can interfere with children's performance. Wishart's (1996) work reporting 
children's misuse of social skills as party tricks is clearly a result of advanced social skills 
in comparison to developmental age. However, most studies of symbolic play indicate a 
positive relationship between social functioning, or people orientation and competence in 
play (Jennings 1975; Fein, 1981). 
The relationship between imitation and symbolic play is, at first inspection, a 
straightforward one. A capacity for imitation enables children to acquire symbolic 
representations of the social world which are certainly implicated in play (Bandura, 
1965). Imitation provides models for symbolic play and is certain to be important in its 
early development (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1994; Rogers & Pennington, 1981). 
Children with Down's Syndrome also appear to respond particularly well to models of 
play provided by adults (McConkey & Martin, 1984; Shimada, 1988). However, other 
studies have shown that while modelling does tend to improve children's play, in such 
cases it becomes neither more elaborate nor more diverse (Jeffree & McConkey, 1976). 
Furthermore, both Jeffree and McConkey (1976), and Riguet et al. (1981) suggest that 
although modelling has an immediate effect on the frequency of play acts there is no 
apparent improvement or carry-over effect in subsequent play. It therefore appears that 
although imitation does serve a useful function in the play of children with Down's 
Syndrome, and leads to an improvement under modelling conditions, this improvement is 
short-lived and limited in quality. In the following section we argue furthermore, that 
imitation may have a deleterious effect on play quality 
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In Piagetian terms the relative strength of imitation and accommodation over the 
assimilation process would have consequences for the quality of play (Piaget, 1951/ 
1967). Just as was argued in Chapter 5, the dominance of accommodation results in a 
failure to generalise or to integrate new knowledge. The accommodation or imitation of 
new models for play is not therefore reconstructed, or generalised to more abstract objects 
and contexts. The qualitative distinctions which have been observed in children with 
Down's Syndrome may therefore reflect an imbalance in the processes underlying play. 
Play driven by imitation would lack decontextualisation, that is, it would be largely 
functional and context bound. Children with Down's Syndrome show similar levels of 
functional play compared to typically developing children matched for developmental age 
but they show fewer object substitutions (Beeghly, Weiss-Perry & Cicchetti, 1990). Such 
qualitative differences may suggest a tendency not to produce decontextualised play. 
Furthermore the failure of children with Down's Syndrome to elaborate play schemes and 
the tendency to play repetitively could also be seen as a failure to generalise play schemes 
to other models. 
6.4 Summary 
In typically developing children, evidence for a broadly Piagetian chronology in the 
development of early functional and symbolic play is relatively strong. Many studies 
confirm developmental trends in symbolic play which include increasing decentration, 
decontextualisationand integration of play acts. The capacity for symbolic play emerges 
around 18 months and play becomes increasingly sophisticated throughout the first three 
years. Much of the controversy in studies of symbolic play surround its representational 
status and links with an understanding of mental states or theory of mind. Leslie (1987) 
argues for a fundamental isomorphism between children's representations in symbolic 
play, language and comprehension of mental states, all dependent upon an 
innately 
specified capacity for meta-representation. In contrast Perner (1988/1991) argues that 
while a four year old's understanding of mental states is driven by meta-representation, 
early pretence is less mature in representational terms. 
118 
Symbolic Play 
The impetus for the speculation which surrounds pretend play is largely fuelled by 
evidence from children with autism who appear to exhibit impairments including a paucity 
of symbolic play, social interaction and mental state awareness. Studies of children with 
autism relate the characteristic social impairment, symbolic play impairment and mental 
state awareness to a common underlying cause in which primacy is attached to one or 
other of the three domains (Hobson, 1993; Leslie, 1987 ; Perner, 1988/1991) 
In contrast to children with autism, children with Down's Syndrome appear to be 
relatively unimpaired in play, social and TOM domains. Such has been the justification 
for using children with Down's Syndrome as a comparison group in empirical studies of 
autistic children. However, it appears that many quantitative measures of symbolic play in 
children with Down's Syndrome which focus on the highest level of play, proportion of 
time spent in play and number of play acts, misrepresent the play of children with Down's 
Syndrome. Evidence has suggested that play in children with Down's Syndrome may be 
repetitive, rigid and stereotypical (e. g. Krakow & Kopp, 1983). Therefore, while the play 
'deficit' in children with Down's Syndrome is certainly distinguishable from the deficit 
observed in autism, play in children with Down's Syndrome may be far from typical. 
Accounts of the differences in play quality which are observed in children with Down's 
Syndrome suggest differences in both attention and motivation during play. Children with 
Down's Syndrome appear to remain excessively focused on one stimulus, either object or 
social during dyadic play. Although some studies show a preference for objects rather 
than engaging in social interaction most studies show the reverse pattern in which children 
with Down's Syndrome show an attention bias towards social stimuli. Children with 
Down's Syndrome appear to respond poorly in comparison to typically developing 
children when attempts are made to redirect their attention, and mothers of children with 
Down's Syndrome are reported as adopting different strategies in directing their 
children's attention. 
It is therefore claimed that, far from being a cause of differences in play quality, 
attentional biases may illustrate a motivationally based failure to engage in symbolic play 
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and a corresponding strength in social engagement. The current chapter has outlined how 
reduced motivation and social strengths could both serve to weaken underlying 
representations in play and lead to changes in play quality 
Children with Down's Syndrome are often characterised as showing lower levels of 
mastery motivation during play. One possible explanation for a difference in play quality 
is that children with Down's Syndrome are simply less motivated to engage in the type of 
pretence which appears to be routine in typically developing children. A lack of 
motivation to adapt and change and elaborate play schemes could therefore be the root 
cause of a tendency towards repetitive, stereotypical play. Furthermore, Karmiloff- 
Smith's (1992/1995) model implies that achievement of behavioural mastery is a key step 
in strengthening and making explicit existing representations. Additionally the reduced 
motivation to elaborate existing play schemes could reinforce the paucity of the 
representational basis for play. 
It is argued that the social strength in children with Down's Syndrome may be deleterious 
to play quality. Social skills are certainly important at some level for acquisition of, or 
accommodation to, models for symbolic play. However the emphasis on accommodation 
and imitation of new models without the corresponding integration and generalisation 
processes may result in a lower quality of symbolic play. The discrepancy in domain 
strengths observed in children with Down's Syndrome, while increasing the number of 
play schemes, ensures that such schemes remain context bound and stereotypical. 
Chapter 12 details an empirical study which investigates the prevalence and relative 
strength of imitation in the symbolic play of children with Down's Syndrome. 
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Methodological Issues 
The empirical studies detailed in this thesis are characterised by distinct procedures. 
However, there are a number of ethical and empirical problems which are common to the 
studies in general. Work with children and particularly children with Down's Syndrome 
demands consideration of specific ethical and empirical problems which are described in 
this chapter. 
7.1 Ethical principles for work with infants 
The empirical studies in this thesis were carried out with particular reference to the ethical 
guidelines for conducting research with human participants (British Psychological 
Society, 1991). The BPS guidelines cover a range of aspects relevant to empirical 
investigation; consent, deception, debriefing, withdrawal from the investigation, 
confidentiality, protection of participants, and giving advice. Each of these areas were 
considered with reference to work with children, and particularly children with Down's 
Syndrome. Discussion of ethical procedures may encourage increased sensitivity to these 
issues and increase emphasis in published material (Range & Cotton, 1995). An extended 
discussion of the ethical procedures adopted during empirical studies is presented in 
Appendix A. 
7.2 Empirical considerations 
This section considers the empirical and methodological considerations which apply to 
studies in this thesis. Work with children, and with atypical populations in general, 
involves a number of considerations which were addressed throughout the studies. 
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7.2.1 Participants 
The total sample comprised 91 children. Given that a number of children took part in 
more than one study, details are presented for frequency of participation within each of 
the empirical groups. Table 7-1 shows the frequency with which children took part in 
more than one empirical study. Given the limited access which we had to children with 
Down's Syndrome within an appropriate age range, it was of practical necessity for 
children to participate in more than one empirical study. At the outset, it was also 
envisaged that children from the typically developing group would take part in more than 
one study. However, given the relative speed of developmental progression in this group, 
and the requirement that the groups be matched in terms of developmental age, many 
typically developing children were necessarily precluded from participating in more than 
one experiment. 
1 Study 2 Studies 3 Studies 4 Studies Total 
DS 14 12 81 35 
NDS 46 10 00 56 
Table 7-1: Frequency of repeated participation by group 
This thesis details five empirical studies. In chronological order of administration these 
are referred to in this thesis as study one, study two, study four and study five: i. e. study 
three was carried out after study four. The interval between successive empirical studies is 
pertinent to the effect of repeated testing on children. 
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Table 7-2 shows the number of children from each experimental group taking part in 
consecutive studies, and the mean interval between consecutive studies. Children taking 
part in more than one, non-consecutive, study are not included in this table. Mean 
intervals in such cases are in excess of 12 months. Study one is excluded as it was based 
on questionnaires given to parents and is therefore not relevant to the present discussion. 
DS NDS 
Studies 2& 4 n= 30 
Interval (m) 11.7 (1S) NA 
Range (m) 10 - 13 NA 
Studies 4&3n= 12 0 
Interval (m) 4.4 (1.2) NA 
Range (m) 3 -7 NA 
Studies 3&5n= 12 9 
Interval (m) 7.3 (1.0) 7.1 (1.2) 
Range (m) 6-9 6-9 
Table 7-2: Number of children participating in consecutive 
studies and interval between studies in months (DS and NDS 
groups) 
Repeated testing has a number of possible implications. Children may experience 
particular learning or fatigue effects which reflect repeated exposure to similar tasks. 
Furthermore, increased familiarity with the tester may influence performance. Table 7-2 
addresses, in particular, the interval between consecutive studies. However, the interval 
between studies was over three months in the case of every participant and it would seem 
unlikely that significant carry-over effects could be confounded with empirical effects. 
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7.2.2 Matching 
The issue of matching typically developing children to children from an atypical 
population is particularly problematic. When using a standard developmental assessment 
to gauge the developmental age of a child, one needs to be sure that the reliability and 
validity of its use is established and is comparable in both populations. Wishart & Duffy 
(1990) identified a number of problems with using developmental scales standardised on 
typically developing children when assessing the developmental status of children with 
Down's Syndrome. Children with Down's Syndrome may perform in an anomalous 
manner during testing which reduces both the reliability and validity of developmental 
assessments. This issue is pertinent to the correct interpretation of findings and is 
discussed at length in chapter 8. 
Related to this issue is the nature of children's general learning experiences and the 
various ways in which children with Down's Syndrome systematically differ from 
typically developing children. Evidently, Down's Syndrome is necessarily associated 
with what is characterised as a global deficit in learning. The co-occurrence of Down's 
Syndrome and particular features of learning is often the purpose of empirical 
investigation. However, Down's Syndrome is also associated with a number of specific 
extraneous environmental irregularities which prevent the isolation of particular 
components of Down's Syndrome. Parents of children with Down's Syndrome know 
before, or shortly after, the birth of their child that he, or she, is likely to have a learning 
disability and this may effect the nature of their interaction with their children (see, for 
example, Crawley & Spiker, 1983; Jones, 1977). Furthermore, the involvement of 
clinical professionals in monitoring and guiding the development of infants with Down's 
Syndrome is almost universal in the UK. Such intervention necessarily leads to prior 
experience of clinical intervention and associated developmental assessments. However, 
the existence of such confounding variables is a characteristic feature of the population 
and cannot be avoided, particularly if children are to be matched to typically developing 
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children. Given such sources of experimental confounds, it is also important to bear in 
mind the widely different circumstances experienced by children with Down's Syndrome. 
The specificity of claims relating independent to dependent variables is strongly 
influenced by the adequacy with which matching isolates the independent variable from 
confounding variables. When studying children with Down's Syndrome, a central issue 
is the relative specificity with which differences can be ascribed to Down's Syndrome 
rather than more generally to children with learning disabilities. Throughout this thesis the 
performance of children with Down's Syndrome is compared to typically developing 
children. This comparison was considered to be preferable to a comparison with children 
with learning disabilities (but not Down's Syndrome). We are therefore seeking to 
identify ways in which children with Down's Syndrome are different from typically 
developing children. However, we are limited in the extent to which we can claim that 
effects are specifically due to Down's Syndrome and not to learning disabilities in 
general. 
With respect to this comparison procedure a typical protocol was followed. Attempts were 
made, where practically possible, to match groups for gender, birth order, and social 
class. These variables are widely held to affect the development of typically children 
(Travis & Kohli, 1995). The ratio of male: female participants is detailed in Table 7-3 and 
includes repeated counts where children took part in more than one study. There is little 
difference in the proportion of male: female participants between the two empirical groups. 
Strictly, x2 tests are not appropriate when there are repeated counts but for descriptive 
purposes it is noted that x2 (1)=0.12 which would typically be regarded as non- 
significant. 
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Male Female 
DS n=66 33 33 
NDS n=66 31 35 
Table 7-3: Number of male and female children participating 
in studies (DS & NDS groups) 
Table 7-4 details the birth order of participants in the empirical studies. Once again 
children taking part in more than one study are counted cumulatively. Although it appears 
that there are proportionately fewer first born children in the DS group, the difference in 
the birth order distribution between the two groups was small. In this case x2 (2)=1.58 
which again would, typically, be regarded as non-significant. The relatively higher 
proportion of 2nd and 3rd born children in the DS group may reflect the influence of 
maternal age on incidence of Down's Syndrome. 
Ist 2nd 3n1 
DS n=66 18 34 14 
NDS n=66 24 32 10 
Table 7-4: Birth order by group - cumulative frequency 
for all 
studies 
In order to ascertain the socio-economic status of the two groups we present the social 
grade classifications of the principal income earners in the families comprising the two 
groups (Table 7-5). Social grade classifications range from `A', representing higher 
managerial, professional or administrative occupations, to `E', which represent those at 
the lowest level of subsistence. 
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A B Cl C2 D E 
DS 0 
NDS 2 
10 
12 
20 
27 
26 
14 
7 
7 
3 
4 
Table 7-5: Frequency of social grouping 
classifications in sample of participant families 
Recruitment of participants was targeted at particular parent-toddler groups so as to 
optimise the broad range of socio-economic groupings being represented. The groups 
appear well matched and the frequency of social grade classifications did not differ 
between the two groups (x2(5)=6.96, this would not typically be regarded as significant). 
The majority of families in both groups fall into the Cl and C2, groupings. However, 
there does appear to be a slightly higher proportion of Cl families in the NDS group and 
this may reflect overrepresentation of this group at toddler groups (Finch, 1984). 
7.2.3 Testing procedure 
Whilst a number of aspects of procedure are discussed in the previous section on ethics, 
consideration is given here to the specific methodological implications of the procedures 
adopted in the studies. 
In order to reduce the adversity of the experimental situation for the child, and parent, 
testing took place in children's homes. Testing in the home environment may produce 
different results to laboratory testing. Durham and Black (1984) found significantly 
higher levels of performance on developmental assessments carried out in the home in 
comparison to laboratory-based assessments. Durham and Black identify increased 
familiarity with the home setting as being responsible for improved performance. 
Furthermore, children with Down's Syndrome may show an increased incidence of 
failure to engage relative to typically developing children, and such failure may be more 
frequent in laboratory settings (Wishart & Duffy, 1990; Hassan & Messer, 1992, & 
chapter 8). The use of a home setting was therefore considered to increase the naturalistic 
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validity of our experiments and reduce the possibility of specific engagement problems in 
children with Down's Syndrome. 
Prior to each testing session, the purpose of the experiment was explained to parents in 
general terms, without reference to the expected outcome or empirical hypotheses. All our 
investigations predicted a within subjects discrepancy in performance between conditions. 
The parent was thus blind to the nature of the hypothesised prediction and it was 
considered unlikely that parents would be aware of such predictions. In relation to the 
performance of their children, parents were asked to be generally supportive and 
encouraging but not to offer explicit clues or to guide performance. The use of such 
guidance may otherwise have prompted particular behaviour which was pertinent to the 
empirical hypothesis. 
Given the characteristic psychological and physical features associated with Down's 
Syndrome and the widespread recognition of these, a double-blind procedure would be 
particularly difficult to administer. It would also be difficult to disguise the group variable 
from those rating reliability of judgements. However, inter-rater reliability statistics 
reported throughout this thesis were based on observations made by a graduate 
psychologist who was not aware of the empirical predictions of the studies. 
During empirical work particular attention was paid to any distress on the part of the child 
(see Appendix A). However, in infants, distress can occur for a variety of reasons and is 
often transient. Distress was often identified by parents as being due to the child having 
particular requirements, such as being hungry or thirsty. After satisfaction of apparent 
needs children were thus able to resume participation. In cases of mild distress, and with 
the guidance of parents, attempts were made to re-engage children in the empirical 
procedure. Where such attempts failed, or distress was judged to be extreme, experiments 
were curtailed. 
Explicit attempts were made to reduce the adversity of the experimental procedure. Prior 
to each empirical investigation the researcher spent 5-10 mins talking to the parent and 
attempting to engage with the child using the child's own toys. This was intended to 
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increase the child's willingness to engage in the experimental procedure and engender a 
sense of fun. Further measures to reduce the child's subjective experience of failure were 
made by adopting ceiling criteria beyond which further trials were not presented. 
Therefore, if a child failed a specified number of trials, testing was curtailed. The use of 
such ceiling criteria compromises the validity of developmental assessment to a certain 
extent (see chapter 8). However, the alternative to these attempts to increase engagement 
and reduce procedural adversity increases drop-out rate which is also methodologically 
dubious. Adoption of ceiling criteria and idiosyncratic attempts to maintain engagement, 
whilst lacking empirical rigour, represent a compromise to minimise drop-out due to 
distress. Of 324 testing sessions in total, only four sessions were abandoned due to the 
child's distress. 
7.3 Summary 
Ethical and empirical considerations are particularly pertinent in work with children. The 
studies detailed in this thesis, whilst differing widely in specific procedural techniques, 
adopted a common approach to recruitment, obtaining consent and debriefing participants. 
Procedures followed the BPS code of conduct guidelines (1991). Additional attention has 
been given to recruitment and debriefing of parents of children with Down's Syndrome. 
Throughout, distress in children and drop-out rates were reduced to a minimum by 
adopting more flexible procedures for testing and maintaining engagement, such as the 
decision to carry out testing in the home and adopt ceiling criteria for performance. 
On the specific issue of matching, data on socio-economic status, gender and birth order 
have been described. Such matching is considered to be important in studies of typically 
developing children. However, we believe there are issues which apply to children with 
Down's Syndrome worthy of particular consideration. Children with Down's Syndrome 
differ from typically developing children in a number of ways which compromise the 
validity of empirical comparisons with typically developing children. The following 
chapter will consider this issue in depth. 
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Methodological Issues: Empirical Evidence for Stability 
of Cognitive Test Performance in Infants and Young 
Children with Down's Syndrome 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses specific methodological problems associated with carrying out 
developmental assessments in children with Down's Syndrome. A number of studies 
have suggested that such assessments may be unreliable and invalid when applied to 
children with Down's Syndrome. A detailed experimental investigation of current 
procedures for determining developmental status addresses the validity and reliability of 
developmental assessments. The present chapter reports data from an empirical 
investigation relating to the sequence of development and temporal stability of 
performance in children with Down's Syndrome. A review of findings from several 
published studies are also reported. 
Research with children with learning disabilities commonly involves comparing these 
children's performance on particular tasks with that of children with other types of 
learning disability or younger children without significant disabilities. Such 
comparisons usually require that children are of a specific developmental level, either 
generally or with respect to an aspect of development relevant to performance on 
particular tasks. It is argued that this 'matching procedure' allows researchers to attribute 
differences in task performance specifically to the disability in question and not simply 
to generalised differences in cognitive or language development. For example, children 
with Down's Syndrome are often reported to have 'delayed language' even when 
matched for cognitive ability with younger non-delayed children (Rondal, 1996; 
Fowler, Gelman, & Gleitman, 1996). This implies that language is a specific problem 
for children with Down's Syndrome and cannot be explained by a general `slowing 
down' of development. 
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The procedure by which children are 'matched' is necessarily imperfect and is based on 
a number of assumptions about the course of children's development. A central 
assumption is that scales used for developmental assessment track development in the 
same way for different groups of children and are therefore equally applicable to those 
with learning disabilities, as to those without. A related assumption is that the 
developmental profile (i. e. the pattern of test items passed and failed) will be broadly 
similar given similar overall scores. These assumptions are based on classical 
developmental theory and what Hodapp and Zigler (1990) terms `the orderliness, 
sequentiality, and apparent lawfulness of the transition taking place from Jbirth] to the 
attainment of maturity'. Paradoxically, many studies reporting a distinct developmental 
pathway for children with disabilities implicitly assume a similar course of development 
when matching. 
Research with children with Down's Syndrome has suggested that development may 
not follow the same sequential pathway in children with Down's Syndrome as that 
observed in the performance of typically developing children (Wishart & Duffy, 1990). 
Furthermore, the performance of children with Down's Syndrome may not be as stable 
over time as that of typically developing children (Wishart & Duffy, 1990; Morss, 1983; 
Dunst, 1990; Cicchetti and Mans-Wagener, 1987; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992/1995). Such 
findings, if confirmed, bring into question the results of studies which seek to make 
comparisons between children with and without Down's Syndrome founded on matched 
performance on standardised tests. The evidence for performance discrepancies 
therefore warrants careful scrutiny. The following discussion considers the evidence for 
such performance discrepancies in terms of the sequence of development, performance 
instability and failure to engage during testing. 
8.1.1 Ordinality 
Ordinal scales of development assume that development proceeds in the same way for 
children with Down's Syndrome as for typically developing children. The validity of 
this claim is referred to as the `similar sequence hypothesis' (Hodapp & Zigler, 1990) 
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and was discussed in chapter 2. Many developmental assessments also assume that 
difficulty increases monotonically for the sequence of test items presented (e. g. Bayley, 
1969/1993). This assumption is built into criteria for floor and ceiling effects which 
dictate where in a particular scale of items, testing will begin and end (Anastasi, 1997). 
However, what constitutes a difficult task for a typically developing child may not be 
difficult for a child with Down's Syndrome and vice versa. The possibility that the 
developmental profile of children with Down's Syndrome may be atypical suggests that 
there may be a distortion of the relative difficulty associated with particular tasks. It 
may not be surprising to find that children differ in their developmental profile across 
domains. For example, some children may be particularly good linguistically and have 
poor fine motor development. However, whilst developmental scales are designed to 
accommodate differences between domains the possibility of discrepancies within 
domains is rarely accounted for. 
Wishart and Duffy (1990) suggest that the development of children with Down's 
Syndrome may follow a different sequential pathway to that of children without Down's 
Syndrome. `Normative' studies suggest that tasks comprising the Uzgiris & Hunt Scales 
form a developmental hierarchy (i. e. the order of difficulty is task 1- task 2- task 3- 
task 4). This implies that any child passing a difficult task should also perform correctly 
on easier tasks and that there should be a developmental progression in the ability to 
pass increasingly difficult tasks. However, Wishart and Duffy report that children with 
Down's Syndrome may not show the same sequential improvement seen in typically 
developing children, showing frequent reversals in the order of acquisition. Morss 
(1983) also reports some idiosyncratic errors in the search performance of children with 
Down's Syndrome which suggest a different course of development within the object 
permanence domain. 
8.1.2 Instability 
An additional methodological problem associated with developmental assessments is 
the issue of reliability. Morss (1983) suggested that the performance of children with 
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Down's Syndrome on certain tasks may be unstable. He examined the development of 
the object concept in a longitudinal study of children with and without Down's 
Syndrome. Morss compared the performance of eight infants with Down's Syndrome 
aged from 12 to 22 months with a group of 26 infants without Down's Syndrome aged 
from 9 months to 21 months. Children performed three tasks designed to assess object 
concept development. In the Down's Syndrome group, success in the first session was 
repeated in the following session on only 61% of occasions whilst in the control group 
successes were subsequently repeated on 77% of occasions. Children with Down's 
Syndrome were therefore more likely to show regressions in performance across testing 
sessions. Morss claimed that for children with Down's Syndrome, initial success is less 
likely to indicate 'secure achievement' than for normal children. However, Morss' 
results are based on performance across eight sessions for the Down's Syndrome group, 
but only two sessions for the larger control group. One plausible explanation for the 
apparently greater performance instability in the Down's Syndrome group is that greater 
task fatigue in the children with Down's Syndrome resulted in poor engagement. 
In a similar study of 85 children with Down's Syndrome on object concept tasks Dunst 
(1990) argued that performance deterioration may be a feature of the reorganisation 
required to assimilate environmental events during cognitive stage transitions. 
Transitions between developmental stages would therefore be characterised by 
regressions in performance on cognitive tasks, the frequency of such regressions 
reflecting the relative difficulty of the transition. Furthermore, regressions in 
performance are more likely to be discernible in a population where stage transitions are 
made more slowly. However, even when the protracted speed of transitions were 
accounted for, Dunst reported significantly more regressions in the Down's Syndrome 
group when compared with normative data reported by Uzgiris (1987). More recent data 
from Wishart & Duffy (1990) demonstrates that children with Down's Syndrome show 
fluctuating performance on tests of object concept and standard cognitive tests such as 
the Bayley scales when given the same test on several occasions. Children with Down's 
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Syndrome show more frequent regressions in performance when compared to large 
scale normative studies such as Bayley (1969). 
Contrary to the conclusions of the above studies, Hassan and Messer (1992) reported 
results from a study of six children with Down's Syndrome tested on the object concept 
and means-ends Uzgiris and Hunt scales at monthly intervals over a period of six 
months. They report a `remarkably stable success rate' for both scales. Of the six 
children tested across the six testing sessions there were no regressions in performance 
for either of the scales. Furthermore Hassan and Messer found no evidence for a lack of 
engagement in the tasks. 
In order to understand and perhaps ameliorate performance instability, one clearly needs 
to understand more about the mechanism which underlies such a tendency. Wishart and 
Duffy (1990) propose that instability may be related to failure to engage in task 
performance. Evidence for this will now be discussed. 
8.1.3 Task avoidance and failure to engage 
Children with Down's Syndrome appear to frequently fail test items by default, due to 
their failure to engage in performing tasks (Wishart & Duffy, 1990). Wishart (1993b) 
claims that this `switching out' appears to have a motivational basis. Furthermore, 
Pitcairn and Wishart (1994) have demonstrated the unique behaviour of children with 
Down's Syndrome in response to an impossible task, producing 'party tricks' to distract 
the experimenter or avoiding the testing situation altogether. Such idiosyncratic or 
avoidant behaviour has also been observed in children with Down's Syndrome 
performing difficult tasks (those at or above their current level of performance). Wishart 
and Duffy conclude that this pattern may characterise an approach to learning which is 
essentially avoidant and results in poor consolidation of newly learned skills. These 
results suggest that unreliability in performance may not only be a feature specific to 
children with Down's Syndrome but may correspond to tasks which children find 
particularly difficult. 
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It is clearly vital, if matching is to reflect children's cognitive abilities, that the 
measurements are consistently reliable in both children with Down's Syndrome and the 
comparison group. The evidence of unreliability and poor engagement and its 
specificity to the population of children with Down's Syndrome has a number of 
implications for matching procedures. 
8.1.4 Developmental age matching 
Wishart and Duffy (1990) claim that to include a control group matched on the basis of 
mental age (MA) assumes that developmental processes are identical in both groups of 
children and that this assumption seems unwise. Morss (1985) justifies the lack of 
extensive MA matching with similar claims, `the procedure for matching... is extremely 
problematical' (p. 247). In the absence of a control group, Wishart and Duffy compared 
the number of regressions observed in the performance of children with Down's 
Syndrome to the number of items one would expect to be unstable given the Standard 
Error of Measurement quoted in large scale reliability studies (Bayley, 1969). Similarly, 
Dunst (1990) compared his data on children with Down's Syndrome with normative 
data reported by Uzgiris (1987). Evidence suggesting discrepancies both in the 
reliability and ordinality with which children with Down's Syndrome perform cognitive 
tasks is counter to many of the assumptions which are implicit in matching. 
It must be acknowledged that a tendency for children with Down's Syndrome to 
consistently under-perform (i. e. failures represent performance as opposed to 
competence factors) would result in a systematic underestimation of their 
developmental age. Empirical studies which rely upon matching may be subject to 
discrepancies in cognitive development which are not apparent in raw scores on 
developmental scales. Furthermore, a deviation from typical sequential development 
may cause problems if developmental scales which rely on ordinal difficulty are used as 
a basis for matching. 
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However, despite reservations about the adequacy of the current procedures for 
matching infants for developmental age, the exclusion of control groups from studies of 
unreliability is unwarranted for a number of reasons. Studies which cite increased 
failure to engage (Wishart & Duffy, 1990; Rast & Meltzoff, 1995; Wishart, 1991) must 
account for variation in testing style and other environmental variables which are 
certain to influence engagement (e. g. Durham & Black, 1978). Furthermore, as an 
alternative to including a control group, comparisons of instability in children with 
Down's Syndrome with large scale normative data seem contradictory and provide a 
`control' of dubious validity. 
It is clear that matching is fundamental to empirical studies based on atypical 
populations. The objective of the present study was to evaluate the validity of matching 
children with Down's Syndrome to a group of typically developing children on the basis 
of developmental age. In order to establish this validity we propose to provide an 
empirical estimation of scale ordinality, levels of instability and engagement in children 
with Down's Syndrome under the conditions of our study. 
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The present study therefore had several aims: 
I. to assess the degree to which the scale of difficulty and profile of development 
observed in typically developing children is observed in the performance of children 
with Down's Syndrome; 
II. to investigate the possibility that children with Down's Syndrome may perform with 
increased instability when compared to a control group performing the same 
cognitive tasks; 
III. to investigate the relationship between instability, task difficulty and task 
engagement. 
Given the results of these investigations we propose to assess the adequacy of matching 
children with Down's Syndrome to a control group on the basis of developmental age. 
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8.2 Method 
8.21 Participants 
12 children with Down's Syndrome (DS) and 12 typically developing children (NDS) 
from a range of socio-economic backgrounds made up the sample for a short-term 
study. All infants were capable of retrieving a small occluded object from beneath a 
cover, i. e. could do at least one task from the Uzgiris and Hunt Scales (Uzgiris & Hunt, 
1975). The mean chronological age, age range, birth order, and gender distribution for 
both groups is shown in Table 8-1. 
CA Birth Order Gender 
Ist: 2nd : 3rd female: male 
DS (n=12) 31m (18m - 52m) 5: 5: 27: 5 
NDS(n=12) 19m(14m-21m) 73: 275 
Table 8-1: Mean chronological ages of participants, birth order, and gender 
Table 8-2 shows the mean developmental ages for both the DS and NDS groups. The 
Developmental age was calculated as the mean of the two developmental ages assessed 
with the Bayley at the beginning and end of the study (these assessments were four 
weeks apart). 
Mean DA (range) 
DS (n=12) 18m (12m-29m) 
NDS (n=12) 19m (13m-26m) 
Table 8-2: Mean developmental ages of 
participants 
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8.2.2 Procedure 
Each child was seen at home in the company of her parent or close relative on eight 
occasions. Each child was visited twice a week with at least a day's break between 
visits. 
During the visits, the following three assessments were administered; 
1. The Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID II)' (Bayley, 1969/1993) 
This was administered twice, on the first and eighth visit, with an interval of four weeks 
between assessments. The BSID is a hierarchy of items beginning at one month level 
and ending at the 42 month level. The starting point for a non-delayed child is dictated 
by their chronological age but the starting point for children with suspected 
developmental delay is somewhat arbitrary. Due to the anticipated developmental delay 
of children with DS and the need to be consistent in administering the assessment, 
testing began at the 13 month baseline (item 78) for all the children. However, in order 
to avoid unnecessary distress to the child, testing was terminated if a child failed to pass 
10 consecutive items. 
2. Object permanence and means-ends scales (Uzgiris and Hunt, 1975) 
Object permanence & means-ends scales were administered six times, from second to 
seventh visit, at twice weekly sessions. The scales were modified versions of the 
originals (see Appendix B), each scale comprising the six items as used by Gopnik and 
Meltzoff (1986). On each occasion, children were presented with three items from each 
scale: the first or last three items from one scale, followed by the last or first three from 
the other respectively. Three trials were presented at each level of object permanence 
task. The directions for administering the object concept scale suggest that the items 
should be administered in order from the 'easiest' to the most difficult item. However, 
such a procedure potentially confounds the effects of difficulty and task fatigue. Task 
'This second edition is subsequently referred to as `the `Bayley Scales' - explicit reference will 
be made to the first edition when necessary. 
139 
Methodological Issues: Empirical Evidence 
fatigue is especially likely in the case of the object concept scales where all the tasks 
involve taking an object from the child and hiding it. This is often frustrating for the 
children and results in a 'failure to engage' and consequent failure. The presentation of 
object concept items was split between sessions so as to compensate for fatigue effects 
which might cause children to fail later items on the object concept scale. This 
procedure minimised fatigue effects which were evident in both groups during pilot 
testing. Over six visits each full scale was administered three times. 
3. Behaviour Rating Scale (BRS) (Bayley, 1969/1993) 
This was completed by the experimenter following the object concept and means-ends 
assessments i. e. on six occasions. The BRS focuses on assessment of three main areas 
of behaviour for children between 13 and 42 months; an orientation-engagement factor, 
an emotional-regulation factor, and a total motor quality factor. Inter-rater reliability 
was assessed for a randomly selected 10% of the sessions and sessions were video taped 
for this purpose. A second rater, a graduate psychologist, also completed the BRS. The 
intra-class correlation for overall BRS score was 0.73. 
8.3 Results 
The results of this study are presented as a description of the ordinality, and stability of 
developmental scales and as an attempt to address the behavioural factors which 
influence performance on these scales. Descriptive statistics relating to the 
developmental scales are first presented. An analysis of the ordinal properties of the 
developmental scales is subsequently described, followed by data on instability in 
performance. Finally, the relationship between instability, difficulty and engagement is 
studied in relation to data from the short-term study. The results of our empirical studies 
are thus presented in the following order: ordinality of the developmental scales, 
stability of performance, and behavioural factors related to performance. 
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8.3.1 Performance on developmental scales 
In this section, the scores of each group are presented as raw scores to illustrate a close 
matching in terms of raw scores. Data is first presented for the Bayley and subsequently 
for the object permanence and means-ends scales. 
83.1.1 Bayley Scaks 
Table 8-3 shows the raw scores on the Bayley (BSID II) for each administration of the 
test. The optimal score reflects the number of items passed by children irrespective of 
stability. Thus if a child passed the item at test one, or test two, this would be recorded 
as a 'pass'. 
DS n=12 NDS n=12 
Session I(s. d. ) 108 (18.0) 115 (15.8) 
Session 2(s. d. ) 112 (20.1) 116(14.3) 
Mean(s. d. ) 109 (18.8) 115(14.8) 
Optimal 'summed' (s. d. ) 115 (18.3) 120 (13.9) 
Table 8-3: Bayley raw scores' (s. d. ) for DS and NDS groups 
at test and re-test 
Results of a two way (group x session) analysis of variance confirmed no main effect 
for groups (F(1,22)=0.663 NS) or for session (F(1,22)= 4.06 NS). The interaction group 
x session was also non significant (F(1,22)=0.394, NS). These results suggest apparent 
stability of performance across sessions and close matching in terms of raw test scores. 
2 Item scores were 77 points lower than this. 77 points were credited to each score 
because testing began started at 13m point in all cases. 
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83.1.2 Uzgiris & Hunt Scales 
Table 8-4 and Table 8-5 indicate the mean percentage of children passing items from 
the object permanence and means-ends scales over 3 sessions. For each session, the 
criteria for passing an item was correct performance on 2/3 trials. Given that each item 
was administered on three septet occasions for 12 children in each group, scores reflect 
the proportion of the 36 item presentations which reached criteria for a pass. The item 
numbers (e. g. OP4) refer to the tasks as identified by Uzgiris and Hunt (1975); these are 
described in appendix B. 
Task Number 
(Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975) 
Sensorimotor stage 
DS 
ON OP8 OPIO OP13 OP14 OP15 
IV late V early VI 
100 94 75 
VI late VI late VI 
72 72 39 
NDS 100 97 97 89 92 53 
Table 8-4: Percentage pass rate on OP scale for 3 testing sessions (DS and NDS groups) 
Task Number ME4 ME8 ME9 ME10 ME11 ME12 
(Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975) 
DS 97 97 69 19 22 28 
NDS 100 100 86 25 22 36 
Table 8-5: Percentage pass rate on ME scale for 3 testing sessions (DS and NDS groups) 
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8.3.2 The ordinal difficulty of developmental scales 
Given the heterogeneity of the items from the Bayley test battery, it is necessary to 
consider pass rates and measures of reliability for each test item rather than a global 
measure. Items on the Bayley and Uzgiris and Hunt Scales are intended to form an 
ordinal scale in which items become increasingly difficult for the child to pass. In the 
standard administration of the scales, the highest level of performance is represented by 
the last item passed. The validity of this assumption as applied to children with Down's 
Syndrome will now be considered. 
832.1 Bayley Scales 
Figure 8-1 shows the mean pass rates for individual test items for both DS and NDS 
groups over two testing sessions. It is clear that some items appear to be more difficult 
for children with Down's Syndrome when compared to children without Down's 
Syndrome. This difference is indicated by a lower pass rate for items in the DS sample 
(i. e.. item 93 -'places circle piece in pink board'). However, there is a great deal of 
deviation from ordinality in both groups as indicated by the fluctuation in pass rates for 
adjacent items. 
The Rank Correlation between pass rates for the DS and NDS groups was relatively 
high, r=0.93, indicating a close correspondence in item difficulty for the two groups. 
However, it would also appear that the pattern of pass rates in the NDS group 
corresponds more closely to the ordinal scale. The correlation between item number and 
score was 0.94 for the NDS group and 0.90 for the DS group. Although the correlation 
is stronger in the NDS group reflecting closer conformity to the ordinal scale, the 
correlations are not substantially different. 
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Conformity of individuals to group trends was also examined to establish the variability 
within each group with respect to the ordinality of the scale. Rank correlation 
coefficients were calculated for each child in relation to the scores for the overall group. 
The mean correlation coefficient for the DS group was 0.71(s. d. = 0.13) whilst for the 
NDS group the mean correlation was 0.77 (s. d. = 0.08). These figures suggest a 
reasonable level of conformity to the ordinal scale in both DS and NDS groups. A t-test 
was carried out on transformed correlation coefficients following Fisher (1921). The 
group difference in correlation coefficients was not significant, t(22)=1.19 p=0.24. 
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8.3.2.2 Uzgiris and Hunt Scales 
Overall scores for each group on the object permanence and means-ends scales are 
shown in Table 8-4 and Table 8-5 respectively. Correspondence between the groups, in 
terms of ordinal difficulty, was calculated as for items from the Bayley scales. The rank 
correlation coefficients between item scores for the groups were 0.89 for the object 
permanence and 0.98 for the means-ends scale. For the object permanence scale, the 
correlations between item number and item scores were 0.94 for the DS group and 0.93 
for the NDS group. This indicates marginally less ordinal conformity in the NDS group. 
For the means-ends scale, the correlations between item and group scores were 0.79 for 
the DS group and 0.75 for the NDS group, again indicating marginally less conformity 
in the NDS group. However, what is most striking about the pattern of results for the 
means-ends scale is that the concordance in difficulty between the groups is much lower 
than between each group and the scale order. Taken together, these results imply a 
global shift in ordinality of the means-ends scale, i. e. children in the DS and NDS 
groups both show a deviation from ordinality. Referring to Table 8-5 it would appear 
that item ME 12 is easier than items 10 and 11. 
Once again, correlations between each individual and the group scores were calculated 
to establish the degree of conformity to the group trends. For the means-ends scale, rank 
correlations were 0.72 (s. d. = 0.25) and 0.68 (s. d. =0.18) for the DS and NDS groups 
respectively. For the object permanence scale, rank correlations were 0.79 (s. d. =0.26) 
and 0.82 (s. d. =0.22) for the DS and NDS groups. 
T-tests were also carried out on Fisher transformed correlation coefficients between 
individual item score and group totals. These tests revealed no group differences, either 
for the means-ends scale t(22)=0.27 p=0.79, or for the object permanence scale' 
t(16)=0.51 p=0.62. 
Three children from each group performed at ceiling and were therefore excluded from this 
analysis 
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It therefore appears that there are anomalies in the ordinality of performance with 
respect to the developmental scales. However, the generally high correlation between 
scores in the DS and NDS groups, and the high correlation of individual scores with the 
group trends, suggests a high degree of consistency between the groups in terms of 
ordinal difficulty. 
8.3.3 Instability in performance on test items 
In this section we consider the stability of performance across sessions on individual 
test items which constitute the Bayley and Uzgiris and Hunt scales. If a child is given 
the same test item on two occasion the performance pattern may suggest either stability 
or instability. Stability entails a consistent pass or failure on both testing occasions. 
Instability can also be manifest in one of two ways. An `improvement' represents an 
item passed on the second session which was failed on the first session. A 
`deterioration' represents an item failed at the second session which was previously 
passed. Our subsequent analyses will take account of the relative frequency of such 
patterns of performance. Whilst improvements represent performance instability they 
may also represent genuine development and learning. In contrast, excluding the 
possibility of mental deterioration, regressions imply that a child fails to perform despite 
recently having the appropriate skills within her repertoire. 
8.3.3.1 Bayley Scales 
Raw, `whole test', scores such as the above may disguise underlying instability by 
failing to consider the profile of performance across items from the assessment battery. 
For example, it was possible for a child to achieve the same raw score on the second 
testing as on the first session despite failing many of the items passed on the first 
occasion by passing items previously failed. In order to determine whether children may 
be unstable in the pattern of items passed and failed, the frequency with which 
regressions and improvements occurred between the successive administrations of the 
Bayley was examined. 
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Table 8-6 shows the frequency of improvements and regressions for the DS and NDS 
Groups. Data from Wishart and Duffy (1990) have been included for comparison. 
n No. of items Regressions Improvements Stable Items 
presented 
DS (Present Sample) 12 58 4.5(12) 6.5 (9) 47.0 
NDS (Present Sample) 12 55 3.6 (7) 7.1 (9) 44.3 
Wishart & Duffy 18 37 5.4 4.4 27.2 
(1990) 
Table 8-6: Mean no. of regressions, improvements and stable items per child on Bayley Scales 
II (range in brackets) 
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The data from Table 8-6 are presented in Table 8-7 as percentages of total number of 
administered test items. 
NP Ni Regressions Improvements Stability 
(children) (mean %%% 
items) 
NDS Horner (1980) 48 43 79 84.6 
(age range 9m - 15m) 
DS Wishart & Duffy 18 37 11 14 75.1 
(I 99(°) 
(age range 6m - 48m) 
DS (Present Sample) 12 58 8 11 79.2 
(age range 18m - 52m) 
NDS (Present Sample) 12 55 7 13 80.6 
(age range 14m - 2l m) 
Table 8-7: Percentage of item deterioration, improvement, and agreement in test - retest 
performance 
Table 8-7 shows the proportion of items from the second testing session which represent 
regressions, improvements and stability when compared to performance on items during 
the first testing session. This table also presents, for comparison, data from a large scale 
normative study, Horner (1980). However, data taken from different studies must be 
interpreted with caution particularly where testing was undertaken with children of 
different ages. Percentage agreement represents the combined proportion of items 
consistently passed or failed in both testing sessions. All the studies report a 75%-85% 
consistency in children's performance on test items, irrespective of whether or not 
children had DS. A two-way analysis of variance (regressions & improvements x group) 
° figures from Duffy (1990) p. 82 
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revealed no group difference in the frequency of regressions or improvements (F 
(1,22)=0.00, NS). However, there do appear to be more improvements than regressions 
(F (1,22)=7.84, p=0.01) as confirmed by a t-test between the regression and 
improvement frequencies across both groups (t(23) = 2, p<0.01). The interaction of 
regression and improvement frequency x group was not significant (F(1,22)=0.22, NS). 
Thus the relative frequency of regressions and improvements does not appear to be 
group dependent. 
It would appear in the short term, repeated testing gives rise to a greater proportion of 
improvements that regressions on test items. However, there does not appear to be any 
definitive evidence that children with Down's Syndrome show a relatively higher 
proportion of regressions than that in typically developing children. 
Thus with respect to the frequency of regressions, which was the focus of this 
investigation, it does appear that children in the DS group show more regressions than 
the NDS group. Given the large standard deviations and test-retest interval these results 
must be interpreted with great caution and statistical tests were not carried out. 
However, despite apparently comparable levels of stability, it may be that the items for 
which children with Down's Syndrome show poor stability are different from the items 
in the NDS group. Given small sample sizes in our study, and the relatively high 
consistency in overall performance, these data are unlikely to be robust and are not 
presented here. However, items showing particularly poor short-term reliability for the 
DS and NDS groups are shown in appendix C alongside a similar list of items reported 
by Duffy (1990). 
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8.3.3.2 Uzgiris & Hunt Scales 
This section presents an analysis of instability in performance on object permanence 
and means-ends scales. Given that there were three administrations at weekly intervals 
of each item from these scales, the patterns of instability are more complex. However, 
as was the case for instability in item performance on the Bayley scales, a regression 
represents a failure on an item which was previously passed. 
Table 8-8 shows the mean number of regressions for the Uzgiris and Hunt scales. There 
were no significant group differences in the frequency of regressions for either the 
object permanence scale, F(1,22)=0.186 NS, or for the means-ends scale F(1,22)=O. 178 
NS. 
Object - Permanence Scales Means-Ends 
Scales 
DS (N=12) 0.67 (0.78) 0.42 (0.51) 
NDS (N=12) 0.75 (0.87) 0.42 (0.67) 
Table 8-8: Mean frequency (per child) of test-retest regressions in performance(s. d. ) 
Table 8-9 illustrates the percentage of improvements and regressions between 
successive administrations of the object permanence scales. The relevant data from 
Wishart and Duffy are also included. The proportion of regressions do not differ 
substantially between either the NDS and DS groups including Wishart and Duffy's 
sample. What is striking about these data is the high level of stability in all three 
samples. 
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N, 
(Children) 
Ni (Mean 
Items) 
Regressions 
% 
Improvements 
% 
Stability 
% 
Wishart & Duffy, 18 4 5.5 11.0 83.5 
1990 (DS) 
(mean age 21m) 
Uzgiris & Hunt, 84 10 - - 79.0 
1975 (NDS) 
(mean age 10m) 
DS 12 6 (x2)=125 3.7 4.6 91.7 
(mean age 31m) 
NDS 12 6 (x2)=12 4.4 4.6 91.0 
(mean age 19m) 
Table 8-9: Mean proportion of improvements and regressions in performance on object 
permanence scales as a percentage of total tasks administered. 
5 data from three sessions are presented as the cumulative total of regressions accumulated 
during the second and third testing sessions. 
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Table 8-10 illustrates the percentage of improvements and regressions between 
successive administrations of the means-ends scales. Data from Uzgiris and Hunt 
(1975) are also included for comparison. The proportion of regressions do not differ 
between the NDS and DS groups and, as with the object permanence scales, a high level 
of stability is apparent in both groups. 
NP Ni (Mean Regressions Improvements Stability 
(Children) Items) %%% 
Uzgiris & Hunt, 84 13 -- 75.5 
1975 (NDS) 
(mean age I Om) 
DS 12 6(*2)=126 2.3 6.9 90.8 
(mean age 31 m) 
NDS 12 6(*2)=12 2.3 4.1 93.6 
(mean age 19m) 
Table 8-10: Mean proportion of improvements and regressions in performance on means-ends 
scales as a percentage of total tasks administered. 
8.3.3.3 The relationship between instability and difficulty 
It seems reasonable when considering inconsistency in performance to consider the 
relative difficulty of items as performed by both groups. Items on which children 
perform inconsistently may be distributed differently for the DS and NDS groups. The 
consistency of performance was examined according to relative difficulty of test items 
within each group. Bayley items were divided into four difficulty quartiles according to 
fi In the case of the present study of performance over three testing sessions, patterns of 
instability were more complex. However, as with the other studies, a regression indicates an 
item which was failed despite being passed at the session immediately preceding it. Data from 
three sessions are presented as the cumulative total of regressions accumulated during the 
second and third testing sessions. 
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the pass rates on items for each group. The first quartile therefore represents the easiest 
25% of test items according to performance within each group i. e. this will be a 
different item set for each group. 
Figure 8-2 shows the number of regressions in test-retest performance on items 
according to relative difficulty within each group. 
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Figure 8-2: Number of regressions on test items from Bayley by 
normalised difficulty index score (quartiles) 
Figure 8-2 shows a greater proportion of regressions on easier items for children with 
Down's Syndrome. An analysis of variance (regression frequency x group x quartile) 
was carried out to determine if the pattern of regressions was different for the two 
groups. The main effect of quartile was significant (F(3,132)=2.91, p<0.01) as was the 
interaction group x quartile (F(3,132)=5.86, p<0.01). T-tests revealed a significant 
difference for the first quartile only i. e. the easiest items, (t (28)=4.17, p<0.001). These 
results therefore reflect a tendency for children with Down's Syndrome to show 
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regressions on the easiest items in contrast to typically developing children. The 
correlation between difficulty and frequency of regressions was significant for the NDS 
group, r=0.25 p<0.05, but not for the DS group, r= -0.22, NS. The negative correlation 
in the DS group indicates a reduction in regression frequency with increasing difficulty, 
whilst the reverse pattern is observed in the NDS group. 
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8.3.4 Behaviour Rating Scale 
A number of studies have suggested that the instability in children with Down's 
Syndrome may have a behavioural cause. Data from the behaviour rating scales (BRS) 
is presented here to address this possibility. The mean group scores by testing session 
for the BRS are shown in Table 8-11. 
Session 123456 Mean 
Emotional Regulation Score 
DS (N=12) 38.6 39.1 38.9 37.0 37.6 37.6 38.1 
(3.9) (6.6) (5.0) (4.6) (5.6) (5.1) (4.9) 
NDS (N=12) 41.7 41.4 40.6 41.9 39.5 41.3 41.1 
(5.2) (5.7) (5.2) (3.3) (5.2) (5.2) (4.9) 
Orientation / Engagement Score 
DS (N=12) 30.3 * 31.1 * 30.6* 29.8* 30.4* 30.9* 30.5* 
(3.2) (2.7) (2.7) (3.0) (2.0) (2.9) (2.7) 
NDS (N=12) 33.6 31.6 32.2 32.6 32.6 32.0 32.5 
(4.8) (4.6) (3.6) (3.3) (3.8) (3.5) (3.9) 
Total Scores 
DS 115.3 110.8 117.1 111.8 115.3 112.8 113.7 
(8.4) (11.0) (6.6) (5.7) (6.7) (7.5) (9.1) 
NDS 110.1 119.3 110.9 114.4 112.6 111.1 115.2 
(13.0) (9.4) (13.1) (11.6) (8.4) (12.4) (11.7) 
Table 8-11: BRS scores (and s. d. ) by session for emotional regulation and 
orientation/engagement (DS and NDS groups) * Indicates 'questionable' behaviour 
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The scores are broken down into two factors; an orientation-engagement factor, and an 
emotional-regulation factor. The orientation-engagement factor measures a child's 
tendency to approach or avoid interactions which are task-related or social. The 
emotional regulation factor measures the child's `activity, adaptability, affect, co- 
operation, persistence, and frustration tolerance'. Low scores on any scale indicate 
questionable behaviour (i. e. in the lowest 11-25th percentile) and non-optimal 
behaviour (0-10th percentile) in the extreme cases (Bayley, 1993). 
According to normative data provided by Bayley, orientation scores for the Down's 
Syndrome group may be regarded as `questionable'. A low score on this factor indicates 
a `low level of initiative and involvement with tasks, and a reluctance to engage 
socially' (Bayley, 1969/1993, p. 231). Two-way (group x session) analyses of variance 
were carried out on each of the two subscales, and the overall BRS scores. Orientation / 
Engagement scores for the DS group were significantly lower than those of the typically 
developing children. F(1,120)=7.08 p<0.05. Group differences were not significant 
either for the emotional regulation scores or for the overall rating scores. F(1,120)=2.97 
p=0.146 for emotional regulation, and F(1,120) = 0.04, p=0.850 for total behaviour 
rating score by group. 
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8.3.4.1 The relationship between behaviour and stability 
In order to investigate the relationship between instability on cognitive measures and 
behaviour ratings, correlation coefficients were calculated for each group. The 
correlation coefficients between measure of cognitive instability and behaviour ratings 
are shown in Table 8-12 and Table 8-13. Given that positive behaviour is credited with 
a high behaviour rating, one might expect instability and regressions in particular to be 
negatively correlated with these ratings. However, most correlation coefficients are 
small, many are positive, and none of the coefficients reached significance. 
Scale Orientation/ Engagement Emotional Engagement Total Behaviour Score 
Bayley Scale 
Object Permanence 
0.05 
-0.39 
-0.29 
-0.15 
-0.03 
-0.34 
Means-Ends 0.29 0.27 -0.14 
Table 8-12: Correlation coefficients for regressions in cognitive performance ana venavioural 
rating: DS Group 
Orientation/ Engagement Emotional Engagement Total Behaviour Score 
Bayley Regressions 0.16 -0.11 -0.07 
OP Regressions 0.24 -0.01 -0.01 
Me Regressions 0.29 0.37 0.31 
Table 8-13: Correlation coefficients for regressions in cognitive performance and 
behavioural 
Rating: NDS Group 
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8.4 Discussion 
This methodological investigation had three aims, first to establish the degree to which 
children with Down's Syndrome follow a typical ordinal sequence with respect to task 
performance. Second, to investigate the possibility that children with Down's Syndrome 
may perform with increased instability and finally, to examine the possibility that 
instability might be related to task difficulty and to behaviour during testing. These 
three aims and the consequent validity of matching groups on the basis of 
developmental assessments will now be discussed in the light of the evidence presented. 
8.4.1 Ordinality of the developmental scales: 
Use of the BSID II and the Uzgiris and Hunt Scales in assessment of cognitive 
development in children with Down's Syndrome implicitly assumes that these scales 
track development in the same way as for typically developing children. Items are 
intended to form an ordinal scale of difficulty and items are therefore presented to 
children in order of difficulty. The routine adoption of floor and ceiling criteria during 
testing also implies that children's performance will adhere to the ordinal profile of the 
scales. 
The data suggest a similar degree of conformity to the ordinal difficulty scale both in 
children with Down's Syndrome and in the typically developing group. Furthermore, 
children within each group show a close correspondence to the group profiles in terms 
of item pass rates. There is thus no evidence for increased variability between children 
in the Down's Syndrome group with respect to variability within the typically 
developing group. However, both groups do appear to deviate from the ordinal pattern 
which is implicit in the scales. Global differences such as this could be due to adoption 
of particularly conservative or liberal criteria for items by the examiner or due to normal 
individual variation in children's strengths and weaknesses. In particular, deviation from 
ordinality is most striking in terms of performance on the means-ends scale. It is 
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perhaps not surprising that performance on such a heterogeneous scale should deviate 
from ordinality with a sample of this size. 
In summary, children with Down's Syndrome show a performance profile on the 
developmental scales administered which conforms to the pattern observed in typically 
developing children. Despite some anomalies in terms of item difficulty within each of 
the developmental scales it would be premature to conclude that the use of such scales 
is invalid. The small sample size used in this investigation means that such 
discrepancies are unlikely to be robust. 
8.4.2 Stability of test-retest performance on developmental scales 
The second aim of our investigation was to determine the test retest stability of 
performance on items which comprise each scale. There is increasing evidence to 
suggest that the performance of children with Down's Syndrome may not be as stable as 
that observed in typically developing children. Such findings threaten the reliability of 
such scales and consequently the validity of studies using groups matched on the basis 
of performance. 
Whenever a child is given the same task on two different occasions, instability can be 
manifest in one of several different ways. One possibility is that the child fails the task 
on the first occasion and passes it on the second. Such a pattern reflects performance 
instability, but could also reflect a genuine development in the child's competence. 
However, how can we account for a pass on the first occasion followed by a failure on 
the second? In this case we can be sure that the item was within the child's repertoire 
(assuming that we can reject the possibility that the child passed by chance) and 
attribute the second failure to a regression in performance on that task. 
Referring to the aims of our study, we found firstly that the quantitative measures of 
instability suggested by Wishart and Duffy (1990) appear to indicate no more 
performance instability, and particularly performance regressions, in children with 
Down's syndrome than typically developing children. Reliability over short term test- 
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retest intervals shows consistent performance on over 80% of Bayley test items in both 
groups. The data presented on short term test stability in Down's Syndrome suggests 
similar rates of instability to the present control group and to other large scale normative 
studies (Bayley, 1969; Homer, 1980). 
It is clear that levels of stability between studies do appear to vary from 75% to 85% 
within the typically developing populations. Although comparisons between studies 
must be drawn with caution, this between-study variation would seem to more than 
adequately encompass results from Wishart and Duffy's study of children with Down's 
Syndrome. Furthermore, the absence of a control group in the latter study means that 
situational variables might have encouraged elevated instability. Performance 
consistency for object permanence and mean-ends scales in the current study also show 
similar levels of stability in the DS and NDS groups. 
Reports of greater instability in children with Down's Syndrome are not universal. 
Hassan and Messer (1992) report high levels of performance stability in testing which 
took place at children's homes. This finding, and the current results, suggest that if there 
are increased levels of instability in children with Down's Syndrome then instability 
may be limited to more formal testing situations. This finding together with the results 
presented here may therefore provide justification for a less formal, and more flexible, 
testing procedure particularly with children with Down's Syndrome. 
8.4.3 The effects of item difficulty on performance stability 
It has been suggested that performance instability in children with Down's syndrome 
may be related to task difficulty. Wishart and Duffy reported that instability was more 
frequent with items which were relatively difficult. The distribution of unstable items 
was considered with respect to item difficulty within each group. The pattern of 
regressions appears to be more heavily loaded on easy items for the DS group (Table 
8- 
7). This pattern is not consistent with the findings of Wishart and Duffy who found a 
greater proportion of item regressions above the midpoint. However, the current data 
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reveal a clear tendency for regressions in children with Down's Syndrome to occur on 
the easiest items rather that the most difficult ones 
Children with Down's syndrome may not perform optimally for reasons similar to those 
known to influence performance in typically developing children. However, whilst a 
uniform increase in instability in children with Down's Syndrome could be explained 
by an exaggeration of the typical motivational factors such as a poor attentional capacity 
(Krakow and Kopp, 1983), the pattern of instability observed in our sample of children 
with Down's Syndrome suggests otherwise. The differential instability of easier test 
items suggests that the performance of children with Down's Syndrome is mediated by 
motivational factors which differ in quality from typical patterns of motivational 
variation. 
8.4.4 The relationship between behaviour during testing and performance 
stability 
The third and final aim of the present investigation was to evaluate the extent to which 
behavioural factors may be responsible for increased levels of instability. 
When examining behaviour during testing, it is important to recognise that children with 
Down's syndrome, like all children with `developmental delays', are generally older 
than children in developmentally matched control groups. Such a discrepancy in 
chronological age may result in performance anomalies which relate to the deployment 
of advanced social skills and a consequent `failure to engage' (Wishart and Duffy , 
1990). Wishart (1996) refers to the increased use of party tricks by children with 
Down's Syndrome, a strategy which may not be available to younger, typically 
developing children. In addition, as Duffy (1990) mentions, children could plausibly 
`outgrow' an item which is part of an assessment. Easier items are therefore less 
cognitively relevant to older children and this may explain a higher incidence of 
instability as a result of lower levels of implicit `cognitive' motivation (White, 1969; 
Harter, 1974). A combination of advanced social skills and lower levels of motivation 
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may also result in avoidance of a wide range of tasks which are nonetheless within 
children's cognitive capabilities 
The results presented in this chapter support the view that the task orientation and 
engagement of children with Down's Syndrome may be different to that of typically 
developing children. The behaviour of children with Down's Syndrome was rated as 
`questionable' in respect of orientation and engagement suggesting a reduced 
willingness to co-operate in the assessment regime. However, correlations between 
behavioural measures and levels of instability suggest that there is not a direct 
relationship between these effects. 
Despite the lack of strong evidence for a relationship between performance instability 
and behaviour during testing, the reduced levels of orientation and engagement 
witnessed in children with Down's Syndrome is consistent with findings from a number 
of studies. Wishart (1993) found that children with Down's syndrome appear reluctant 
to approach tasks just above their current developmental level and also react 
idiosyncratically when faced with an impossible task (Pitcairn and Wishart, 1994). 
Wishart and Duffy (1990) and Morss (1983) also noted that children with Down's 
syndrome often make atypical `errors' when performing object permanence tasks. Rast 
and Meltzoff (1995) characterise these motivational differences in children with 
Down's Syndrome as a 'dampening of epistemic curiosity' which reflect an 
unwillingness to engage in task performance. 
In summary, the findings in relation to the aims of this chapter suggest that whilst 
instability may not be increased in children with Down's Syndrome, there are a number 
of reasons to believe that the performance of these children may be atypical. Children 
with Down's Syndrome showed increased unreliability on relatively easy items and 
showed lower levels of task engagement during testing. Taken together, these findings 
are strongly supportive of motivational accounts of instability. Furthermore, these 
findings suggest that assessments may underestimate the cognitive abilities of children 
with Down's Syndrome. 
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8.45 Developmental assessment of children with Down's Syndrome 
Whilst it is not surprising that the relative difficulty of items for children with Down's 
Syndrome is not equivalent to that for typically developing children it is worrying that 
measurement error appears to be more heavily loaded on easy items for children with 
Down's Syndrome. The consequences of unreliability of this kind are twofold. Firstly, 
such systematic differences in reliability patterns may adversely affect the reliability of 
developmental age assessments based on floor and ceiling criteria. For example, on the 
basis of a string of failures on easy test items, the testing of a child with Down's 
Syndrome could be prematurely curtailed despite the child's capability of passing a 
number of more difficult items which are not presented. Such a procedure would result 
in a systematic underestimation of developmental age with consequences for the 
progress of early intervention, psychological research and decisions about schooling 
which may be based on such assessments. Secondly, if the difference in reliability 
patterns reflects, as has been suggested, a failure to consolidate skills, it may present 
more immediate developmental problems for the child with Down's Syndrome. Such a 
position has been adopted by Wishart (1995). 
Furthermore, the lower task engagement found in children with Down's Syndrome, 
whilst not directly responsible for instability may result in a global underperformance 
on cognitive assessments. Rauh (1997) reports that behavioural measures may predict 
subsequent test performance in children with Down's Syndrome as well as an initial 
cognitive measure. Thus, as a result of both motivational and purely cognitive 
anomalies, the standard administration of cognitive assessments may provide an 
inadequate assessment of developmental age for children with Down's Syndrome. For 
example, the manual for administration of the BSID II recommends that, for children 
with known developmental delays, testing should begin at an `educated guess' of the 
child's developmental level. This starting point would seem rather arbitrary and could 
lead to radical differences in performance depending upon the starting point. Children 
with Down's Syndrome on the basis of atypical developmental profiles and anomalous 
164 
Methodological Issues: Empirical Evidence 
motivation may fail items earlier in the scale. Failure on an item, or series of items, 
could result in premature curtailment of testing and give an inaccurate estimate of 
developmental age 
In the light of evidence for comparable levels of stability in children with Down's 
Syndrome and typically developing children it would seem premature to abandon 
matching groups on the basis of developmental age. However, the possibility of an 
atypical profile in instability suggest that establishing an appropriate starting point for 
assessment may be crucial to the validity of the measure. One solution would be to 
establish a pre-test battery to give a rough estimate of children developmental age in 
order to proceed with testing at a more objective baseline. However in the absence of 
such a battery, a number of cautionary procedures will be adopted in carrying out 
developmental age assessments to ensure the adequate matching between children with 
Down's Syndrome and typically developing children. To circumvent problems of 
children reaching a premature ceiling, all children will be tested over a complete set of 
items and testing will only be curtailed following a complete and protracted sequence of 
failures. Whilst one cannot abandon absolutely the ceiling criteria, for practical and 
ethical reasons, it would seem worthwhile to continue testing for up to ten items before 
terminating a test session. Testing will only be terminated if a child fails ten consecutive 
items or appears unduly distressed. 
The results presented in this chapter suggest that levels of instability in children with 
Down's Syndrome are broadly similar to those observed in typically developing 
children. However, the distribution of instability appears to be skewed towards 
developmentally easier items in contrast to typically developing children. This finding 
suggests that easy items may be `difficult' for children with Down's Syndrome. Tests 
administered according to floor and ceiling criteria may therefore not be valid or 
reliable assessments of cognitive competence. The finding that children with Down's 
Syndrome show lower levels of task orientation and engagement suggest that failures 
may not reflect children's true competencies. Attention must therefore be paid to factors 
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which influence the motivation and engagement of children with Down's Syndrome 
particularly variables related to the testing environment. 
In the subsequent chapters the development of representation within a number of 
domains is considered in relation to children with Down's Syndrome. These 
experiments are based on the assumption that developmental assessments provide a 
valid and reliable measure of children's developmental status. The results presented in 
the current chapter and the procedures adopted as a consequence will serve to limit any 
unreliability in the developmental assessment of children with Down's Syndrome. 
The following chapter considers the extent to which cognitive development in children 
with Down's Syndrome may be linked to and limited by motor development. 
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Study 1: Object Permanence and Motor Development 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes a study to investigate the links between motor and cognitive 
development in children with Down's Syndrome. Hypotonia, or floppiness, is often 
associated with babies and infants who have Down's Syndrome and major motor 
milestones are often delayed in comparison to typically developing children. There is 
some empirical evidence to suggest that motor development may have an impact on 
cognitive development (Bertenthal, Campos, & Kermoian, 1994; Kermoian & Campos, 
1988). There are also theoretical reasons to believe that object permanence should be 
linked to children's experience of self generated locomotor activity (Piaget, 1955/1976). 
In this chapter the evidence for specific links between locomotor experience and object 
permanence performance is introduced in relation to typically developing children and 
children with Down's Syndrome. The results of an empirical investigation are 
subsequently presented and discussed. 
9.1.1 Cognitive and motor development in typically developing 
children 
Piaget ascribed a great deal of significance to the child's early motor development as a 
prerequisite to thought (Piaget, 1955/1976,1953/1970). Early sensorimotor experience 
was seen by Piaget as a precursor to mental representation and necessitates an 
increasingly sophisticated mastery of fine and gross motor skills over the first 18 months 
of life. A number of empirical studies carried out on typically developing children support 
the view of a link between cognitive and motor development during infancy. Trevarthen 
(1968) argues that early postural control may be important for the child to establish a 
frame of reference for directing attention. Postural control allows the body to serve as a 
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frame of reference for fine motor skills such as reaching and tool use. Children's 
awareness of depth as indicated by wariness also appears to correspond to motor 
development and the onset of crawling in particular (Bertenthal & Campos, 1984). 
Further changes in social and exploratory behaviour also appear to coincide with the 
ability to locomote. Children show a greater interest in social stimuli when either able to 
crawl or use a baby-walker (Gustafson, 1984). The onset of crawling is evidently an 
important transition for children's cognitive development and facilitates greater social 
awareness. More specifically however, children's motor development may have particular 
implications for children's performance on object search tasks. 
There is growing evidence to suggest that children's early search capabilities may not 
reflect a lack cognitive or representational capability but motor limitations (Bower and 
Wishart, 1973; Diamond, 1991). Bower and Wishart (1973) have shown that failure to 
search may, at least in part, be attributed to lack of motor skill. Evidence for this focuses 
on children's visual tracking of hidden objects before they are able to search for them. 
Children clearly appear to have the necessary representations of hidden objects well 
before they begin to search (Baillargeon, Grabber, DeVos, & Black, 1990). Such 
awareness of objects suggests that failure to search must implicate either motor limitations 
or inability to plan and execute manual retrieval (Diamond, 1991). 
Once children begin to execute successful search at a single location, they must develop 
sufficient spatial awareness to tackle a two location task. The link between locomotor 
experience and awareness of the properties of the spatial environment was first postulated 
by Piaget (1955/1976). Piaget suggested that success on the two location search task 
required spatial awareness beyond the capabilities of the average 9 month old. Many 
researchers emphasise the theoretical significance of locomotor experience in determining 
children's knowledge of the spatial environment (Piaget, 1955/1976; Russell, 1996; 
Bertenthal, Campos, & Kermoian, 1994; Kermoian & Campos, 1988). 
Empirical evidence to support specific links between locomotor experience and spatial 
representation is provided by a number of researchers (Bremner & Bryant, 1977; 
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Bremner, 1988; Acredolo, 1978; Acredolo, Adams, & Goodwyn, 1984). Bremner and 
Bryant (1977) and Bremner (1985) examined the performance of infants on a two location 
search task under two conditions. In the first condition, infants were moved relative to the 
locations between successive hidings. In the second condition, the locations themselves 
were transposed. The results suggest that infants performed better when they themselves 
were moved relative to the hiding locations. Acredolo, Adams and Goodwyn (1984) have 
shown that infants were more successful on a two location search task if they crawled 
around a barrier than if they were carried around it. Taken together, these empirical results 
suggest that an infant's spatial reference may be linked to their experience of movement 
and self-generated movement in particular. Acredolo (1978) suggests a direct link 
between an infant's ability to crawl and the acquisition of an allocentric (or world-centred) 
spatial representation. Prior to this change, children's spatial awareness is characterised 
by an egocentric spatial code which is responsible for search errors such as the A-not-B 
error (Horrobin & Acredolo, 1986). The experience of self-generated locomotion through 
crawling may therefore contribute to an increased experience of agency (Russell, 1996), a 
corresponding decline in egocentricity, and success on search tasks. 
Kermoian and Campos (1988) examined the relationship between experience of 
locomotion and performance on object permanence tasks in typically developing children. 
Three groups of children matched for developmental age had different levels of locomotor 
experience. A group of children who had just begun to crawl were compared to two 
groups of pre-locomotor infants. One of the pre-locomotor groups were given baby 
walkers to facilitate the experience of self-generated locomotion. This `walker-assisted' 
group were allowed two hours experience per day over a period of seven weeks. The 
findings suggested that performance on object permanence tasks was facilitated by 
locomotor experience whether through crawling or walker-assisted. Kermoian and 
Campos suggest that locomotor development may facilitate, though may not necessarily 
induce, developmental changes. 
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It is perhaps not surprising that typically developing children show some association 
between developmental milestones in both motor and cognitive performance. The 
domains may be linked by common maturational processes such as development of the 
prefrontal cortex (Diamond, 1991). Thus in typically developing children it may be 
inherently difficult to elucidate the direction of cause and effect in linking motor and 
cognitive performance. However, stronger evidence to suggest a causal relationship 
between locomotor and cognitive development may be gleaned from populations that 
experience a specific motor impairment relative to other domains. The case of a child, 
`Jup', described by Gouin-Decarie (1969), whose ability to crawl was severely limited, 
illustrates that restriction of locomotor experience had only a marginal effect on her 
intellectual development. This case, in contrast to studies of typically developing children 
suggest the absence of a link between locomotor experience and object permanence 
performance. Despite the fact that in this case, the child was able to locomote in a limited 
manner, one would expect a more profound delay in object permanence if there was a 
strong link between these domains. However, Kermoian and Campos (1988) argue that 
locomotor experience may facilitate object permanence development rather than being a 
necessary causal influence. A larger sample of children with motor delays is clearly 
required if such a hypothesis is to be fully investigated. 
9.1.2 Cognitive and motor development in children with Down's 
Syndrome 
A number of studies have shown that, while the early gross motor milestones such as 
rolling or sitting are only slightly delayed in children with Down's Syndrome, later 
milestones such as standing and walking are more profoundly delayed (Carr, 1988). 
Henderson (1985) reports that although typically developing children sit independently at 
seven month, stand unsupported at 11 months, and walk at 12 months, children with 
Down's Syndrome usually achieve such milestones at 9,18,19 months respectively. 
There also appears to be much greater variability in milestones within the Down's 
Syndrome population compared to typically developing children. Children with Down's 
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Syndrome begin walking between 13-48 months whilst for typically developing children 
the range for this achievement is 9-17 months. 
Despite such delays in motor development, children with Down's Syndrome do appear to 
follow a similar sequence in the acquisition of motor milestones (Carr, 1970). However, 
a number of studies suggest anomalies in the early postural control of children with 
Down's Syndrome. Children with Down's Syndrome often adopt unique positions or 
make unusual movements to maintain postural stability (Lydic & Steele, 1979). Rast and 
Harris (1985) found the postural reactions of children with Down's Syndrome to be less 
effective than typically developing peers. Evidence from Butterworth and Cicchetti (1978) 
supports this finding. Butterworth and Cicchetti report that the frequency of postural 
adjustments to visual proprioception followed a similar pattern to that observed in 
typically developing children. However, the magnitude of adjustments in the Down's 
Syndrome group were less effective than the typically developing group. Children with 
Down's Syndrome either over or undercompensated to visual stimuli. 
As we have noted, there is evidence to suggest a link between motor and cognitive 
advances in typically developing children. Variability in achievement of motor milestones 
and differences in motor development may therefore have corresponding implications for 
cognitive development. A number of studies have pointed to the close correspondence 
between motor and cognitive development in children with Down's Syndrome (Cicchetti 
& Sroufe, 1976; Lenneberg 1966,1967; Yessayan & Pueschel, 1984). Cicchetti and 
Sroufe found that hypotonia appeared be associated with a delay in the development of 
affective expression in children with Down's Syndrome. Lenneberg (1967) suggested 
that there is a close correspondence between motor and linguistic development in children 
with Down's Syndrome. Cicchetti and Beeghly (1990) argue that the co-occurrence of 
these problems across different domains may reflect a common central deficit. Yessayan 
and Pueschel (1984) report that the early quality of muscle tone in children with Down's 
Syndrome is a good predictor of competence in a number of domains. 
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There are a number of difficulties in establishing the independent contribution of motor 
delay to a deficit in sensorimotor development. Firstly, correlations between motor 
performance and cognitive tasks, as with studies of typically developing children, do not 
necessarily suggest a causal relationship between the domains. If, as Cicchetti and 
Beeghly suggest, the correspondence of motor and cognitive impairments reflect a 
common deficit, this deficit may simply be a global maturational delay. However, if it 
could be demonstrated that the correlation between cognitive and motor development is 
stronger than that with other domains it would add weight to the hypothesis that there are 
specific links between motor and cognitive development. However, given the evidence 
suggesting relative developmental coherence (e. g. Lenneberg, 1967; Cicchetti & Beeghly, 
1990), indicators of motor development and developmental age are likely to be highly 
correlated in children with Down's Syndrome. Any discrepancy between the predictive 
value of motor milestones, and the predictive value of chronological and developmental 
age is therefore likely to be small. However, the widespread variability in developmental 
and motor milestones in children with Down's Syndrome may illuminate a specific link. 
Motor performance and cognitive development are clearly associated in typically 
developing children. However, the consistent delay in the motor development of children 
with Down's Syndrome allows us to investigate the extent to which this relationship is 
causal rather than coincidental. Studies which demonstrate the equivalence of locomotor 
experience in baby walkers to unassisted locomotion point to a simple and effective 
intervention strategy (Gustafson, 1984; Kermoian & Campos, 1988). The importance of 
ascertaining whether the sensorimotor development of children with Down's Syndrome is 
limited particularly by deficient motor experience rather than general cognitive 
development is therefore particularly important from the point of view of intervention. 
The aim of this study was to investigate the possibility that motor development and 
locomotor experience may predict sensorimotor performance in infants with Down's 
Syndrome. In order to ascertain whether motor development may independently 
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contribute to sensorimotor performance, the predictive value of motor development was 
compared to the predictive value of chronological and developmental age. 
9.2 Method 
Questionnaires were sent to 27 parents of children with Down's Syndrome all of whom 
took part in other studies detailed in this thesis. Questionnaires asked parents to report 
significant dates for children's motor milestones i. e. ages when children belly-crawled, 
crawled, cruised using furniture as support, and took four steps unsupported. Parents 
were also asked to provide contact details for either a home teacher or physiotherapist 
who had clinical involvement with their child. A copy of the questionnaire is shown in 
Appendix D. 22 questionnaires were returned which represents a response rate of 81 %. 
Given that most children were the subject of routine clinical intervention, the reliability of 
parental responses regarding motor milestones was checked with physiotherapists. Four 
physiotherapists completed 12 questionnaires identical to those given to parents. The 
intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC(2,1)) was calculated for locomotor milestones as 
reported by physiotherapists and parents. The reliability for walking, cruising, and 
crawling were 0.85,0.73, and 0.58 respectively. Where discrepancies existed in the 
reported onset of locomotor activity the figure reported by parents was used. Donoghue 
and Shakespeare (1967) found that parent's retrospective accounts of motor milestones 
were remarkably accurate. 
Data on children's developmental status, both developmental age and sensorimotor 
performance, were collected as part of other empirical studies detailed in this thesis. A 
number of children had more than one developmental assessment since they took part in 
more than one of our empirical studies. Eight children had one assessment, 13 children 
had two, and one child had three assessments. The data comprised 6 assessments from 
study two, 15 assessments from study three, and 16 assessments from study four. In 
summary, our data comprise 37 developmental assessments from 22 children. 
173 
Study 1: Object Permanence & Motor Development 
The BSID II was administered to determine children's developmental age on each testing 
occasion. The criteria for administration of the BSID II were consistent for all 
assessments although for study two and three, assessment was carried out on the first 
visit, while for study four, assessments were carried out on the second visit. Assessment 
of object permanence performance was carried out using a selection of items from the 
Uzgiris and Hunt scales (Appendix B). The assessment of object permanence was 
obtained on the first and second sessions for study two, on the first session for study 
three and on the second session for study four. 
9.3 Results 
9.3.1 Developmental age and motor milestones 
At the time of developmental assessments children were at varying stages of motor and 
cognitive development. Given that for 14 children, repeated measures were available, 
descriptive statistics are presented for all 37 assessments rather than for the 22 children. 
This presentation is preferred for reasons of clarity and simplicity rather than statistical 
rigour. The mean interval between repeated assessments was 5.5 months with a range 
from 3.2 to 12.6 months. The chronological and developmental ages of the sample are 
shown in Table 9-1. Developmental milestones as reported by parents are also shown in 
this table, again as a mean of the data from 37 assessments (i. e. some children counted 
repeatedly). 
174 
Study 1: Object Permanence & Motor Development 
Mean (s. d. ) Min Max. 
Age at Assessment 25.5 (9.1) 12.0 44.0 
Developmental Age 14.5 (4.7) 6.0 25.0 
Age at Crawling 15.8 (5.5) 9.0 30.0 
Age at Cruising 18.2 (5.2) 8.0 26.0 
Age at Walking 23.3 (5.3) 15.0 32.0 
Table 9-1: Chronological, developmental ages, and 
motor milestones of Down's Syndrome sample (37 
observations) 
The locomotor status of the sample at the time of testing is shown in Table 9-2 for all 37 
observations. 
Non-locomotor Locomotor Locomotor 
(Crawling or Cruising) (Walking) 
5 12 20 
Table 9-2: Locomotor status of the sample (37 
observations) 
Children are thus divided into three groups according to their locomotor status. One child 
in the sample was reported to have begun cruising before she began crawling. Given that 
we are specifically interested in the effect of locomotor experience on object permanence, 
this child was included in a general locomotor (crawling or cruising) group. 
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Given that the relationship between locomotor experience and sensorimotor performance 
may be restricted to the period prior to walking (Kermoian & Campos, 1988) data were 
examined from a subset of children who were not walking at the time of assessment. The 
developmental details for this subset of 11 children (17 observations) are shown in Table 
9-3. 
Mean (s. d. ) Min Max. 
Age at Assessment 
DA 
Age at Walking 
Age at Cruising 
18.9 (5.6) 12.0 28.7 
11.1 (3.2) 6.0 16.0 
25.5 (5.8) 15.0 32.0 
19.0 (5.5) 8.0 26.0 
Age at Crawling 15.7 (3.8) 10.0 22.0 
Table 9-3: Chronological and developmental ages 
and motor milestones of DS sample (non-walkers at 
test) (17 observations) 
The duration of locomotor experience was calculated as the difference between 
chronological age at the time of assessment and the age of onset of crawling or cruising as 
reported by parents. Children not crawling or cruising at the time of assessment were 
deemed to have no locomotor experience. 
The mean locomotor experience for the whole sample, and the non-walking sample, is 
shown in Table 9-4. 
Mean (s. d. ) Min Max. 
Locomotor experience (months) 11.6 (9.2) 0.0 32.5 
Whole sample (37 observations) 
Locomotor experience (Months) 5.1 (5.5) 0.0 18.7 
Non-walking sample (17 observations) 
Table 9-4: Locomotor experience (months) 
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9.3.2 Object permanence and motor milestones 
Object permanence performance was tested during each study and the highest level of 
performance is indicated in Table 9-5 for each assessment. 
Uzgiris and Hunt Task <4 48 10 13 14 15 
Sensorimotor Stage <TV IV Late V Early VI VI Late VI Late VI 
Non-locomotor n=5 14 
Locomotor n=12 155 
Walkers n=20 22538 
Table 9-5: Object permanence performance of the whole sample (37 assessments) by 
locomotor status 
Performance on the object permanence tasks was converted to a score based on the most 
difficult task which each child passed. Given that there are six levels of task (Item 4- Item 
15) the maximum score achievable was six. A two-way analysis of variance was carried 
out for each combination of locomotor experience, developmental age, chronological age 
and object permanence score. In each case, the effect of subject identity (i. e. the within 
subjects effect) was included as a factor. Correlation coefficients were calculated from F 
ratios obtained in these analyses with the within subjects effects partialled out of the 
correlation. 
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Table 9-6 shows the correlation coefficients calculated for the 37 observations (top-right) 
and for the non-walking sample of 17 observations (bottom left). Correlation coefficients 
are generally higher in the whole sample as opposed to the non-walking sub-sample. This 
is perhaps not surprising given that there are fewer observations in the sub-sample. 
Central to the hypothesis of this study is that object permanence score should be predicted 
by locomotor experience. For the whole group the correlation between OP score and 
locomotor experience is no higher than that with chronological and developmental age. 
However, this result does suggest that locomotor development may predict object 
permanence scores at least as well as these other developmental measures. The high 
correlation between locomotor experience and chronological age reflects the fact that the 
locomotor experience is partially derived from chronological age. 
Locomotor Chronological Developmental OP Score 
Experience Age Age 
Locomotor Experience - 0.96** 
0.43 0.63* 
Chronological Age 0.87* - 
0.82** 0.62* 
Developmental Age 0.52 0.81 *- 0"60 
OP Score 0.19 0.24 0.20 
Table 9-6: Correlation coefficients with OP scores from regression analysis (shaded: 
37 
observations, unshaded: 17 observations) *p<0.05, **p<O. 
OI. 
The regression coefficients and F-ratios from which the above correlation coefficients 
were derived are detailed in Appendix E. 
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Given that the current hypothesis predicts an independent contribution of locomotor 
experience to object permanence performance, correlation coefficients were calculated 
with either developmental age or chronological age partialled out. These coefficients are 
shown in Table 9-7. 
Controlling for Controlling for 
Developmental Age Chronological Age 
Whole Sample (n=37) 0.32 NS 0.16 NS 
Non-Walking Sample (n=17) 0.10 NS 0.11 NS 
Table 9-7: Partial correlation coefficients with OP scores (effect of age 
and developmental age partialled out) 
Given the high correlations between the three predictor variables it is not surprising that 
these partial correlation coefficients are low. Although locomotor experience may relate to 
object permanence independent of developmental age, as indicated by the correlation of 
0.32 for the whole sample, this coefficient did not reach significance. 
Figure 9-1 illustrates, as a scatterplot, the relationship between performance on the object 
permanence tasks and locomotor experience at the time of testing. A number of 
anomalous results may pose a threat to any claim that there 
is a causal relationship 
between locomotor experience and object permanence development. Firstly 
it would 
appear that four months of locomotor experience is sufficient 
for performance at the 
highest level of object permanence, serial invisible displacement. 
Conversely however, 
one child with 18 months of locomotor experience had failed to progress beyond a score 
of 3, i. e. could not solve invisible displacement tasks. 
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Figure 9-1: Scatterplot of OP scores vs. locomotor 
experience for 37 observations (22 cases) 
Locomotor experience may be particularly important in only the early stages of object 
permanence development, where spatial factors are influential (Bremner, 1989). Any 
causal relationship between locomotor experience and object permanence development 
might therefore be restricted to tasks involving visible displacements such as the first two 
tasks. Even in this restricted sample there is an exceptional child who scored 2 in the 
absence of locomotor experience. 
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9.4 Discussion 
The evidence suggests that in children with Down's Syndrome there does appear to be a 
relationship between object permanence development and locomotor experience. This 
result is consistent with other findings suggesting such a relationship in typically 
developing children (e. g. Piaget, 1955/1976). Given the high correlation between the 
predictors, locomotor experience, developmental and chronological age, it was not 
possible to isolate a specific and independent contribution of locomotor experience 
discernible from the effects of other predictors. However, in terms of correlations, the 
predictive value of locomotor experience does appear to be at least as strong as the other 
variables. Furthermore, the partial correlations indicate that locomotor experience may 
offer a contribution to object permanence development independent of other 
developmental variables. 
The analyses which isolated a sub-sample of non-walkers did not reveal any significant 
effects. However, whilst it makes theoretical sense to limit inspection to a narrow 
window of sensorimotor development (cf. Kermoian & Campos, 1988) our sample size 
was clearly too small to illuminate any relationships. 
Clearly, given the high correlation between locomotor experience and other developmental 
measures, this type of investigation requires a much larger sample. Furthermore, it may 
also be necessary, given the findings of Kermoian and Campos, to limit investigation to 
the first 14 weeks of locomotor experience. The Piagetian view of development suggests 
that during infancy, sensorimotor development should be explicitly linked to motor 
performance. The data presented here, while not explicitly counter to this claim, do 
suggest that apparent links between motor performance and sensorimotor development 
may be mediated to a large extent by other variables such as developmental and 
chronological age. Chronological age dependence in this case does not necessarily 
implicate endogenous maturational limitations but could also indicate dependence on 
particular environmental factors or experiences. 
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These findings do not strongly support the Piagetian view of sensorimotor development. 
However, a number of more specific claims have been made regarding the effect of early 
locomotor experience on spatial representations (Bremner, 1988; Horrobin & Acredolo, 
1986; Kermoian & Campos, 1988). These studies suggest that early locomotor 
experience may be particularly influential in facilitating a transition away from egocentric 
spatial coding. This transition is theoretically seen as leading to success on visible 
displacement tasks involving more than one spatial location. Kermoian and Campos 
suggest that nine weeks of locomotor experience may be sufficient to ease the transition 
from stage IV to stage V i. e. from single location to multiple location search tasks. 
However, evidence against a strong causal account of locomotor development as being 
necessary for advanced performance on object permanence tasks comes from a single 
exceptional child in the present study. This child was able to solve visible displacements 
with multiple covers despite not having begun to crawl. This would appear to indicate that 
children can gain sufficient experience of spatial relationships to solve stage V object 
permanence tasks whilst unable to crawl. This finding is consistent with case studies 
reporting near typical object permanence performance despite profound locomotor 
impairment (Gouin-Decarie, 1969). Such a finding is not however inconsistent with 
Kermoian and Campos's limited conclusion that locomotor experience may facilitate the 
development of spatial awareness rather than being a necessary prerequisite. 
Kermoian and Campos restricted their analyses to children with less than 3.5 months 
locomotor experience. The data presented in this chapter are consistent with their findings 
within this range, although on the basis of a severely restricted sample size. Thus, there is 
no evidence against the more limited claim that children with nine weeks locomotor 
experience are more likely to solve stage V object permanence tasks. However, in our 
study, one exceptional child with five months locomotor experience was unable to solve 
any search tasks. However, the possibility that motor development may lag behind 
cognitive performance in children with Down's Syndrome certainly reduces the chances, 
in general, of finding such counter evidence (LaVeck & LaVeck, 1977). 
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In summary, we do not find support for a more general relationship between 
sensorimotor development and motor performance as proposed by Piaget (1955/1976). 
Our data suggest that there may be a relationship between early locomotor experience and 
the development of spatial awareness as indicated by stage V object permanence. There is 
thus limited evidence that self-generated locomotor experience may facilitate spatial 
representation in object permanence tasks. This finding, if confirmed in longitudinal 
intervention studies, may provide a valuable intervention to facilitate early cognitive 
development. 
The apparent equivalence of self-generated, locomotor and baby-walker experience in 
facilitating success on search tasks (Kermoian and Campos, 1988) may prove to be 
important from the point of view of intervention. Kermoian and Campos also 
distinguished between belly crawling and hands and knees crawling and found the former 
to be less effective in facilitating performance. Whilst there are a number of plausible 
explanations for this finding it does suggest that different forms of locomotor 
development may have different experiential benefits. The effects, anomalies and delays 
reported for motor development in children with Down's Syndrome and the availability of 
practical intervention warrant further investigation. 
Given the evidence presented here, there is no specific suggestion that locomotor 
experience is necessary for the representational development of object permanence. These 
findings are contrary to the Piagetian prediction that the two domains should be linked and 
suggest that findings in typically developing children may be coincidental.. The current 
results are however consistent with exceptional cases published elsewhere (Gouin- 
Ddcarie, 1969). It appears that the representational development in the object permanence 
domain is broadly typical in terms of its dependence on locomotor experience. This 
typical pattern is an accordance with the developmental coherence view of Down's 
Syndrome suggested by Cicchetti and Beeghly (1990). However, if the development of 
object permanence is genuinely coherent one would expect to find typical patterns in other 
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cross domain relationships. In the next chapter, the links between representation in object 
permanence and language are investigated. 
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Development 
10.1 Introduction 
Piaget's view of development as a domain general process in which early thought is 
linked to sensorimotor action leads to a number of hypotheses concerning links between 
early sensorimotor performance and linguistic development. Piaget believed that 
attainment of stage VI of sensorimotor development at around 18 months marked the 
emergence of the symbolic (or semiotic) function and hence the onset of symbolic thought 
facilitating language and symbolic play. However, empirical evidence has largely failed to 
support Piaget's general claim and the consequent limitations which it makes on the 
emergence of language (Corrigan, 1979; Gopnik, 1988; Harding & Golinkoff, 1970). 
There are a growing number of theoretical accounts supported by evidence which both 
criticise and offer alternatives to Piaget's domain general view of language learning. 
Children learning a language face at least three problems according to Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992/1995): how to divide the speech stream into meaningful units; how to analyse the 
world into objects and events relevant to linguistic encoding; and how to organise the 
mapping between the units of speech and the objects and events. Nativists argue that the 
complexity of language with respect to these demands precludes the possibility that 
language can be learned without innate constraints. Furthermore, nativists argue that such 
is the specificity of these constraints that an innate cognitive module or device exists 
which is dedicated to meeting the demands of learning language. 
Despite the persuasiveness of the argument for nativism with respect to grammatical 
structure in particular, there are a number of areas in which linguistic development could 
be dependent upon representations in the cognitive domain. It is widely accepted that there 
are a number of linguistic forms which map directly onto semantic relationships which 
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themselves reflect the child's physical and social world. Pinker (1984,1987) argues that 
the child's awareness of semantic categories facilitates a structural analysis of adult 
language. Pinker argues that without such `semantic bootstrapping', the child would be 
unable to use an innate knowledge of grammar to understand language input. This 
bootstrapping process therefore serves to feed an innate language acquisition device such 
as that proposed by Chomsky (1965,1982). 
Thus a child's knowledge of the semantic roles of agent, actor, object, recipient and 
patient, could therefore be a necessary prerequisite for linguistic expression of these 
relationships. A number of approaches also suggest that more general semantic 
relationships may allow children to find a way into syntax (Tomasello, 1992; Bruner, 
1977,1978; Greenfield, Nelson, & Saltzman, 1972; Ferreiro & Sinclair, 1971). 
However, the semantic bootstrapping hypothesis, as espoused by Pinker, is focused on 
the means by which children begin to combine words to form sentences and understand 
the structure of combinations used by adults. A number of authors suggested a much 
earlier role for semantic and conceptual development in the acquisition of language, at the 
single word level (Brown, 1983; Bloom, 1983; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1986; Tomasello & 
Farrar, 1986). Furthermore, some researchers have suggested that lexical acquisition at 
the one-word stage of language development may be a particularly important precursor to 
the acquisition of syntax (Tomasello, 1992; Anisfeld, 1984; Bates, Bretherton, & Snyder, 
1988/1991). 
Anisfeld (1984), and Bates et at. (1988/1991) suggest that the rate of lexical acquisition 
may predict the child's later grammatical development and the two processes may share a 
common underlying mechanism. Tomasello (1992) also argues that the roots of syntactic 
development may be in lexical acquisition. However, Tomasello emphasises the particular 
importance of verbs in feeding the development of syntax. Thus the semantic and 
conceptual precursors which govern the children's acquisition of lexical items may have 
implications for later grammatical development. In this chapter we describe an experiment 
to investigate the cognitive and semantic processes which govern lexical acquisition. The 
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subsequent discussion addresses evidence from children with and without Down's 
syndrome in relation to these processes 
A number of specific claims have postulated that a high level of object permanence should 
be a prerequisite for lexical reference (Brown, 1973; Bloom, 1973). The rationale for this 
claim is that children must have well founded representations of objects before they can 
refer to them linguistically. However, despite the intuitive appeal of the hypothesis, 
empirical studies have failed to support a general relationship between linguistic measures 
(such as MLU or vocabulary size) and object permanence level (see Corrigan, 1979, for a 
review). Some authors have claimed that lexical advances are more strongly related to 
means-ends performance than to object permanence (Curcio, 1978; Mundy, Seibert & 
Hogan, 1984; Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camioni, & Volterra, 1979). McCune- 
Nicholich (1981 a) suggests that, in any case, broad linguistic measures are likely to be 
influenced by a range of social-communicative factors which would overshadow the 
contribution of cognitive prerequisites. However, McCune-Nicolich reports that the 
emergence of specific features in children's vocabulary, such as relational words (those 
particularly referring to the 'dynamic state of objects'; such as up, more, gone) may be 
strongly related to object permanence development. 
This view is summarised in Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1986) `Cognitive Specificity 
hypothesis' which postulates links between development in specific domains, object 
permanence and means-ends, and related linguistic features. Gopnik and Meltzoff claim 
that the emergence of linguistic terms relating to the disappearance of objects, `gone', 
`more', etc., should be linked to a high level of object permanence. Furthermore, lexical 
terms expressing success or failure, such as `uh-oh', `no', should be related to 
performance on means-ends tasks. Gopnik and Meltzoff found a high correlations 
between acquisition of such terms and the related cognitive performance. 
Work by Tomasello and Farrar (1986) broadly supports the findings of Gopnik and 
Meltzoff (1986), but suggests a further subdivision of relational words. Tomasello and 
Farrar argue that words expressing visible displacement (move, fall-down, etc. ) should 
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be distinguished form those expressing invisible displacement (gone, find, more, etc. ). 
Furthermore, while visible displacement terms may emerge at stage V object permanence, 
invisible displacement terms should not emerge until stage VI when a concept of invisible 
displacement (stage VI) is acquired. 
Tomasello and Farrar carried out a training study in order to add causal weight to their 
claim. Children at both stage V and stage VI were taught two nonsense words related to 
either a visible or invisible displacement. While children at stage VI were able to acquire 
both words, only the visible displacement term was acquired by the children at stage V. 
Tomasello and Farrar conclude that such evidence suggests that stage VI object 
permanence should be a cognitive prerequisite for acquisition of relational words referring 
to the invisible displacement of objects. 
The equivocal evidence obtained in studies of typically developing children suggests that 
the general language-cognition relationship, if it exists, may be contaminated with a range 
of other cognitive and social factors (McCune-Nicholich, 1981a). Children with Down's 
Syndrome have a well documented delay in language development which exceeds the 
delay in general cognitive functioning. These children would therefore seem to provide an 
opportunity to empirically isolate linguistic and cognitive milestones. This pattern 
therefore affords a unique opportunity to investigate links, both general and specific, 
between language and conceptual development. 
10.1.1 Language and cognitive development in children with 
Down's Syndrome 
Children with Down's Syndrome have a well documented delay in cognitive, motor and 
language development. Language production (and especially syntax) tends to be more 
delayed than both comprehension and general cognitive development (Fowler, Gelman & 
Gleitman, 1994). Vocabulary acquisition is slower in children with Down's Syndrome 
than in normally developing children, even when the slower rate of cognitive development 
is accounted for (Mervis, 1990). 
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One potential explanation for a delay in linguistic representation in children with Down's 
Syndrome is that it arises as a consequence of a delay in sensorimotor prerequisites which 
form the basis of linguistic representation. Gibson (1978) claims that the transition from 
stage V to stage VI in general is a 'developmental wall' for children with Down's 
syndrome. Gibson reported that development was relatively rapid up to a mental age of 18 
months, equivalent to the end of sensorimotor stage V, and reached a plateau before 
continuing to advance. However Gibson's results were based on general assessment of 
mental age rather than explicit measurement of performance on sensorimotor scales. More 
recent research has found the stage transition to proceed at a rate comparable to that of 
children without Down's syndrome, particularly when the slower rate of general 
development is accounted for (Mervis & Cardoso-Martins, 1984; Dunst, 1990). 
However, while cognitive development is certainly delayed, language delays in children 
with Down's syndrome cannot be fully attributed to a delay in object permanence. 
Cardoso-Martins, Mervis and Mervis (1985) report that children with Down's Syndrome 
comprehended fewer object names upon attainment of stages V and VI object permanence 
than a control group of non-delayed children at the same stages of sensorimotor 
development. Therefore, despite possessing the requisite cognitive skills, and notably 
object permanence, children with Down's syndrome appear to have an additional 
difficulty in the expressive language domain. 
Is it possible, therefore, that expressive language at the one word stage could be limited 
by 'cognitive factors'? The profile of children with Down's Syndrome, typified by 
relatively advanced sensorimotor skill, suggests that language development may be 
impaired by cognitive factors outside the sensorimotor domain. However it is possible 
that structural relationships in atypical populations may be different from those in typically 
developing populations. Therefore, while sensorimotor development may be a necessary 
condition for the acquisition of particular linguistic terms, the data on the development of 
children with Down's Syndrome raises questions about whether cognitive prerequisites 
are sufficient. Evidence for the failure to learn particular relational words despite the 
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presence of sensorimotor prerequisites might suggest differences, either in the quality of 
such representations, or a breakdown in the link between cognitive and linguistic 
domains. Alternatively, adopting a domain specific view of language development, such 
evidence would imply that such cognitive factors are not solely responsible for delays in 
linguistic acquisition. 
A number of researchers have pointed to qualitative differences and increased instability in 
the performance of children with Down's Syndrome on cognitive tasks such as the object 
permanence scale (Wishart & Duffy, 1990; Morss 1983,1985). Evidence presented in 
chapter 8 failed to confirm these findings but, nevertheless, the suggestion of cognitive 
instability may have implications for acquisition of corresponding linguistic features. 
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1984) speculate that the link between cognitive and linguistic 
transitions may be influence by the `salience' of particular cognitive achievements. If 
these achievements are rendered less salient through unstable or weaker representations 
then linguistic acquisition may be correspondingly impaired. 
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10.1.2 Aims 
The general aim of this experiment was to study the relationship between conceptual 
representations in the cognitive domain and the acquisition of corresponding linguistic 
representations. The relationship between the development of object permanence and the 
acquisition of words related to the invisible displacement of objects was specifically 
investigated. In an attempt to identify a causal relationship between the development of 
object permanence and the emergence of relational words the methodology of Tomasello 
and Farrar (1986) was adopted. 
In relation to children with and without Down's Syndrome, this experiment addressed a 
number of specific questions: 
1. To what extent is stage VI of object permanence performance a necessary and 
sufficient condition for comprehension and production of an invisible displacement 
term? 
II. To what extent is stable performance at stage VI of the object permanence scale 
necessary for the comprehension and production of an invisible displacement term? 
III. a) To what extent is sensorimotor development related to the comprehension and 
production of linguistic reference to actions and objects. b) Is there general evidence 
for an association between cognitive and linguistic development in children with 
Down's syndrome? 
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10.2 Method 
10.2.1 Participants 
Children took part in this experiment as an adjunct to the methodological investigation 
detailed in Chapter 8.12 children with Down's syndrome and 12 typically developing 
children from a range of socio-economic backgrounds made up the sample for this study. 
Table 10-1 show the chronological ages, birth order, and gender of participants from both 
groups. 
CA Birth Order Gender 
1st 2nd 3rd female: male 
DS (n=12) 31m (18m - 52m) 552 7: 5 
NDS (n=12) 19m (14m - 21m) 7: 3: 27: 5 
Table 10-1: Mean chronological age (CA), birth order, and gender of 
participants 
Table 10-2 shows the mean developmental ages for both the DS and NDS groups. 
Developmental age was calculated as the mean of two developmental assessments with the 
Bayley Scales (2nd edition) carried out at the beginning and at the end of the training 
study (these assessments were 3 weeks apart). These data were also reported in chapter 8. 
Mean DA (range) 
DS (n=12) 18m (12m-29m) 
NDS (n=12) 19m (13m-26m) 
Table 10-2: Mean developmental ages of 
participants 
Language development was assessed using the MacArthur Communicative Development 
Inventory (CDI) (Fenson, Dale, Reznick, Thal, Bates, Hartung, Pethick, & Reilly, 
1993). This questionnaire was completed by parents after the first visit. An extra word 
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`spin' was included in the questionnaire in order to assess the children's naturalistic 
acquisition of this lexical term as an adjunct to the training regime described below. For 
children with Down's syndrome, a checklist measure of the number of Makaton signs 
used was also administered. Table 10-3 shows the age equivalent scores for language 
comprehension and production assessed using the MacArthur CDI. For the children with 
DS, the mean number of Makaton signs produced is also shown. 
Language Comprehension Language Production Age Number of Makaton signs 
Age produced 
DS (n=12) 14m (1.5m) 15m (6m) 39(38) 
NDS (n=12) 17m (Im) 18 months (6m) N/A 
Table 10-3: Assessment of language comprehension and language production, MacArthur 
CDI age equivalent scores, and mean no of Makaton Signs produced. (standard deviations 
in brackets). 
When comparing the two groups, language comprehension and production scores were 
significantly different only for the comprehension measure (t= 2.178 DF=22 p<0.05). 
However, given the relatively large standard deviations in production for both groups, the 
lack of a significant difference in production is hardly surprising. The large standard 
deviation in the number of Makaton signs produced by the DS group reflects the fact that 
while some children are encouraged to learn Makaton, others are not (two children did not 
produce any Makaton signs). 
10.2.2 Procedure 
Children were visited for eight, twice weekly sessions, over a period of four weeks. 
During the first and last session, children's developmental ages were assessed using the 
Bayley scales of infant development. During the intervening six sessions, children were 
trained in, and tested on, the comprehension and production of lexical terms as outlined 
below. At the close of each session, sensorimotor development was assessed using object 
permanence and mean-ends scales from Uzgiris and Hunt (1975). Modified versions of 
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each scale were administered three times over six sessions (see Appendix B). The 
protocol for the administration of these items is detailed in chapter 8 
Lexical training took place over three weeks with two training sessions per week. 
Sessions were arranged at a convenient time for the parents and the experimenter 
emphasised the need to select a time at which the child would be alert. There was an 
interval of at least one day between sessions. 
During each session, children were taught lexical terms referring to the displacement of 
objects. The objects used in the experiment are shown in Figure 10-1. 
Objects were intended to be novel to the children taking part and parents were asked to 
confirm that the objects were unfamiliar to their children. Children were taught two 
nonsense words `deke' and `dop' which related to the visible and invisible displacements 
of the objects. Visible displacement of the objects entailed spinning them by hand about 
the vertical axis through the plane of the object. Invisible displacement entailed hiding the 
object under a brightly coloured cloth so that it could not be seen by either the 
experimenter or the child. The words `deke' and `dop' were assigned to actions prior to 
the training and the combinations of word and action were counterbalanced between 
subjects. The objects were labelled with nonsense words from a selection provided by 
Schwartz and Leonard (1982). Particular words were selected to match the child's current 
productive phonology as reported by parents as this may have influenced their 
acquisition. In the absence of any information from parents on the child's production of 
phonological forms, two nonsense words with open syllabic structure (CV or CVCV) 
were chosen by the experimenter. 
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10.2.2.1 Lexical training 
Lexical training was carried out as by Tomasello and Farrar (1986). The general training 
procedure consisted of the experimenter performing acts with the objects which were 
labelled using nonsense words as follows: 
`Watch the bob deke', for the first action, and `Watch the bob dop', for the second 
action. Visible and invisible displacements were assigned to first and second actions 
with the particular pairing being counterbalanced between children. Each action was 
demonstrated twice in this manner. 
After demonstrating four actions with the first object, the procedure was repeated with 
the second object as follows: `Watch the osh-osh deke' (*2), and `Watch the osh-osh 
dop' (*2). 
Attempts were made to maintain the child's attention throughout the labelling procedure 
and children were directed both verbally (calling `look' or the child's name) and 
physically (following the direction of child's gaze). Following the training period which 
lasted a maximum of 15 minutes, the child's comprehension and production of the target 
words was tested as described in the next three sections. 
10.2.2.2 Lexical assessment: comprehension testing 
To assess comprehension of object names, children were presented with the two objects 
and asked to find one of them. The experimenter would ask, for example, `Where's the 
osh-osh? ' or, `Show me the osh-osh'. These questions were followed by similar requests 
about the second object name. 
To assess comprehension of action words, children were asked to perform the actions 
with each object in turn, `Make the osh-osh deke' followed by the second action, `Make it 
dop'. These questions were followed by the same questions about the second object. 
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Assessment of children's comprehension was followed by assessment of their lexical 
production. 
10.2.2.3 Lexical assessment: elicited production 
To elicit production of object names children were asked `What's this? ', while the 
experimenter held up an object, followed by the same question about the second object. 
For production of action words, children were asked, `What's the osh-osh doing? ', or, 
`What happened? ', while the experimenter performed one of the actions. This question 
was asked for each object - action pairing i. e. 2 objects, 2 actions, and a total of four 
questions. In all cases each question was repeated up to three times if the child made no 
response. Correct responses to these questions are referred to as `elicited production'. 
10.2.2.4 Lexical assessment: spontaneous production 
Children's spontaneous imitative and non-imitative utterances of target words and actions 
were also scored. The target words were the two object names and the two action words 
as recognised by the experimenter viewing the video tape. The minimal conditions for 
production of a target word were production of either a vowel or consonant matching that 
of the target word. A word was rated as imitative if it occurred within 5 seconds of its use 
by the experimenter and with no intervening utterance by the experimenter or child. Other 
utterances were rated as non-imitative. 
10.2.2.5 Treatment of results 
Children's responses were rated by the experimenter from video tapes of the sessions. 
For comprehension, responses were deemed to be correct if, in the case of the object 
words, the child selected the correct object, or, in the case of action words, successfully 
performed the correct action (spinning or hiding). Responses for comprehension of target 
words, including object words, and the visible and invisible displacement words, were 
scored out of a total of 2 per session (2 responses for each word). Conservative criteria 
were adopted in the scoring of the child's responses. Responses were scored as correct 
only for responses which were both correct and exclusively given in response to the 
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appropriate question. Thus, if a child simply hid the object in response to both, "can you 
make it deke? ' and `can you make it dop? ' the child would not score for action word 
(invisible) comprehension. Similarly conservative criteria were adopted for scoring the 
production of action words and comprehension and production of object names. 
Maximum scores for production questions were 2 for each action word (2 per session). 
Scores for objects names were combined and the maximum score was again 2 per session 
(1 per session x2 objects). 
Inter-rater reliability of comprehension, production and spontaneous utterance frequency 
was assessed for a randomly selected 10% of the video taped sessions. A second rater, a 
graduate psychologist, rated the tapes according to the above criteria. The interclass 
correlations, ICC(2, I ), were 0.76 for judgements of comprehension and 0.63 for 
judgements of production. The interclass correlation for spontaneous utterances was 
0.64. 
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10.3 Results 
Sensorimotor development was assessed in terms of means-ends and object permanence 
scales. Children were categorised as either stage V or stage VI according to their 
performance on the object permanence scales. This classification was made on the basis 
of children's performance on item 15 of the scales involving the serial invisible 
displacement of an object under three covers. This item was used as it requires children to 
have a firm conceptual basis for understanding the invisible displacement of objects, and 
is consistent with the procedure adopted by Tomasello and Farrar (1986). Given that the 
stage VI task was administered on three occasions, we adopted the criterion of 2/3 passes 
to be classified as stage VI. 
Stage V Stage VI 
N DA (s. d. ) N DA (s. d. ) 
DS (N=12) 7 14m (lm) 5 22m (2m) 
NDS (N=12) 6 16m (2m) 6 21m (2m) 
Table 10-4: Developmental age (DA) of children by group: classified 
at stage V or stage VI object permanence 
Table 10-4 shows the sample sizes and developmental ages for children classified at either 
Stage V or Stage VI of object permanence. A two way analysis of variance (group x 
stage) was carried out on developmental ages. This analysis suggested a significant 
difference in developmental age between stage V and stage VI, (F(1,20)=21.66, 
p<0.001), but the main effect of group, and the group x stage interaction, were non- 
significant, F(1,20) =0.13, p=0.73, and F(1,20)=0.99, p=0.33 respectively. 
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10.3.1 Object permanence and relational verb learning 
The primary aim of this study was to determine the extent to which performance of stage 
VI object permanence is a necessary prerequisite to acquisition of a relational word 
referring to the invisible displacement of an object. 
Table 10-5 shows the mean comprehension scores for the DS and NDS groups. The 
means suggest, at least for comprehension, that children with Down's syndrome acquired 
both words with a similar frequency to the NDS group. 
Group Invisible displacement Visible displacement 
('gone' word) ('spin' word) 
DS 3.6 (4.8) 3.2(4.1) 
NDS 3.0 (4.5) 3.5 (4.4) 
Table 10-5: Mean comprehension score by group and 
word type - max. score 12 (s. 
d. ) 
A three way analysis of variance ( group x word type x session) showed no main effect of 
group (F(1,22)=0.01, NS) or word-type (F(1,22)=0.01, NS), or session 
(F(5,110)=1.74 NS). The group x word type interaction was not significant 
(F(1,22)=0.61, NS). 
Figure 10-2 shows the comprehension scores for both invisible (gone) and visible 
displacements (spin). This figure shows the relationship between stage of object concept 
development and word comprehension. For children with DS there appears to be an 
improvement in comprehension of the invisible displacement word but not the visible 
displacement word between stage V and VI. This result is similar to that obtained by 
Tomasello and Farrar (1986) for normally developing children. However, for the NDS 
group, a more general improvement is observed for both invisible and visible 
displacement words. 
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Figure 10-2: Mean correct comprehension responses for DS and NDS groups by sensorimotor stage (V & VI) and word type. 
A four way analysis of variance (group x word type x object permanence stage x session) 
revealed a significant effect only for object permanence stage F(1,21)=27.0, p<0.001. 
The main effect of word type was not significant F(1,21)=0.01, NS. Furthermore the 
predicted interaction, word type x stage, was not significant F(1,21) =1.91, NS. Given 
the small sample size and the trends in the Down's Syndrome group, the power of the 
current analysis was compared to that in Tomasello and Farrar's (1986) study. For the 
data presented in this study, rl2 = 0.10, and power = 0.60 i. e. the probability of a type II 
error (3= 0.30. In contrast, for Tomasello and Farrar's data r12 = 0.17, and power =0.84 
i. e. the probability of a type II error (3= 0.06 (calculated from Cohen, 1988). Thus, the 
effect sizes in the present study are smaller than the effects obtained by Tomasello and 
Farrar. Furthermore, this result indicates the need for a larger sample size if effects are to 
be detected. 
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Tomasello and Farrar used liberal criteria in the assessment of comprehension and 
production responses (Tomasello, personal communication) such that a child was credited 
with a correct score even if the correct response was not exclusively given in response to 
the appropriate question. Our analysis adopted a more conservative approach in which the 
child was required to respond with an appropriate action produced exclusively in response 
to the appropriate question. The results for the NDS group in the current sample were 
compared with those presented by Tomasello and Farrar using `liberal' criteria for 
0 demonstration of comprehension. 
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Figure 10-3 shows our results for the NDS group according to liberal criteria with results 
from Tomasello and Farrar shown for comparison. 
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Figure 10-3: Mean comprehension scores for NDS group by word type and sensorimotor 
stage (liberal scoring criteria). Data from Tomasello & Farrar (1986) is shown for 
comparison' 
The y axis in this figure is based on mean comprehension scores per group per session 
(i. e. max. 24). This data from the Tomasello and Farrar study has been pro-rated 
(according to the number of participants) to facilitate direct comparison. 
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A three way analysis of variance (study x sensorimotor stage x word type) was carried 
out using weighted means and standard errors reported by Tomasello and Farrar. This 
analysis revealed an interaction of study x stage (F(1,23) = 6.90, p<0.05 reflecting the 
less dramatic stage effect in our NDS sample. No further interactions between study and 
other factors reached significance. This analysis suggest that the pattern of our findings in 
relation to the stage x word-type interaction does not differ from the results of Tomasello 
and Farrar. 
Tomasello and Farrar claim suggest that performance at stage VI of object permanence 
should be a conceptual prerequisite for acquisition of `gone' but that `spin' could be 
acquired at an earlier stage. This implies that children below stage VI of object 
permanence should not be able to comprehend the invisible displacement word. Figure 
10-4 shows the number of children reaching criteria for action word comprehension at 
stage V. While children in the NDS group conform to Tomasello and Farrar's prediction, 
two children in the DS group appear to have acquired `gone' prior to attainment of stage 
VI. 
Figure 10-5, shown for comparison, represents the number of children reaching criteria 
for action word comprehension at stage VI of object permanence performance. At this 
stage, Tomasello and Farrar imply that children should be in possession of the necessary 
prerequisites and should be able to acquire both `gone' and `spin'. The majority (3/5) 
children in the DS group and half of the children in the NDS group reached criteria for 
comprehension of `gone'. 
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10.3.1.1 Action words: production 
Children rarely produced the correct responses to the elicited production questions. Only 
4 responses to the 144 elicited production questions were scored as correct: 3 responses 
in the NDS group, and I response in the DS group. These low frequencies are consistent 
with Tomasello and Farrar's data. However, children did produce spontaneous, non- 
imitative, utterances of the target action words `deke' and `dop'. Figure 10-6 shows the 
frequency of spontaneous (non-imitative) utterances by group and object permanence 
stage. There appears to be an improvement in utterance frequency corresponding to the 
transition from stage V to stage VI. For children with DS the increase is in utterances of 
the invisible displacement word, `gone'. For the NDS group, the increase in utterances is 
much greater for the visible displacement word, `spin'. The trends shown in spontaneous 
non-imitative utterances indicate an improvement with sensorimotor development similar 
to that which is apparent in the comprehension data (Figure 10-2). Furthermore, for the 
DS group, the improvement in spontaneous production of action words follows the 
pattern observed in comprehension. 
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Figure 10-6: Mean frequency of spontaneous non-imitative utterances of 
target words relating to visible and invisible displacement 
A four way analysis of variance (group x object permanence stage x word type x session) 
was carried out. The main effects of group, stage, word type and session were non 
significant (F(1,20)= 1.95, NS; F(1,20)=2.51, NS; F(5,100)=0.67, NS; F(1,20)=0.43, 
NS respectively). There were no significant interaction effects. 
10.3.1.2 Contemporaneous language development 
The naturalistic levels of relational word production for `spin' and `gone' were assessed 
using the MacArthur CDI. While `gone' is a standard item in the inventory, `spin' was 
specifically included in the inventory for the purposes of this study. 
Figure 10-7 and Figure 10-8 show the number of children producing the words `gone' 
and `spin' according to parental report at the time of testing. In contrast to the findings of 
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Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986), `gone' appears in children's vocabulary before stage VI. 
There does however appear to be an increase in production of `gone' corresponding to the 
transition from stage V to stage VI of object permanence. While `spin' is certainly a lower 
frequency word in children's, as in adult's vocabularies, two children in the NDS group 
at stage VI acquired the spin word. When asked about the context of children's 
production of `spin', two parents reported that children's production reflected a routine 
game, `spin me'. The results for the spin word are particularly informative in that children 
across both groups showed a similar pattern in the comprehension of the visible 
displacement during lexical training. 
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10.3.2 Object permanence, performance stability, and relational 
verb learning 
The second aim (II) of this study was to evaluate the potential effects of instability in 
sensorimotor performance on corresponding linguistic features. Tomasello and Farrar's 
(1986) claim focuses on stage VI object permanence as a prerequisite for acquisition of 
relational words referring to invisible displacement. In order to elucidate whether the 
stability of children's performance on stage VI object permanence tasks would influence 
their acquisition of action words, children were divided into 4 groups according to the 
stability of their performance on the task corresponding to stage VI. Object permanence 
was assessed on three occasions. Children were therefore categorised according to their 
mean score on this task over the three testing sessions. The resulting mean scores of 0, 
0.33,0.67,1.0, represent success on 0,1,2, and 3 occasions respectively. Table 10-6 
shows the number of children in each group while Table 10-7 shows the developmental 
ages of these groups. 
Passes 0123 
Stage VI Score 0.00 0.33 0.67 1.0 
DS 5 2 2 3 
NDS 3324 
Table 10-6: Number of children in groups by 
stability index 
Stage VI Score 0.00 0.33 0.67 1.0 
DS 13.6 21.0 16.5 23.3 
(2.1) (71 ) (0.7) (4.6) 
NDS 14.7 18.0 19.5 22.5 
(2.9) (2.0) (3.5) (3.7) 
Table 10-7: Developmental ages by stability index 
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Figure 10-9 and Figure 10-10 illustrate the relationship between stage VI performance and 
the acquisition of relational words. Both figures appear to show an increase in 
comprehension corresponding to increasing stability of object permanence performance 
with unstable performance resulting in intermediate scores on the word learning task. 
A three way analysis of variance (group x stage VI x word-type) showed no main effect 
of group on word learning F(1,16)= 0.46, NS. However, the effect of stage VI 
performance was significant, F(3,16) = 3.36, p<0.05, suggesting a general improvement 
in word comprehension with increasing stable performance on the stage VI task. The 
interaction Stage VI x word type was not significant F(3,16)=0.3, NS. The three way 
interaction was not significant F(3,16)=0.3, NS. 
The improvement in comprehension of `gone', corresponding to improved performance 
of stage VI task, is reflected in the correlations between stage VI sensorimotor score and 
comprehension scores for action words shown in Table 10-8. 
Gone Spin 
DS 0.63 * 0.39 
NDS 0.53 0.56 
Table 10-8: Correlations between comprehension 
scores and sensorimotor scores (stage VI) *p<0.05 
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Table 10-9 and Table 10-10 show the relationship between stability on stage VI Object 
Permanence tasks and attainment of criteria for comprehension (as described previously in 
section 10.3.1). Once again instability in performance on the sensorimotor task appears to 
result in intermediate performance on word acquisition. If stable performance on object 
permanence tasks was a necessary prerequisite for comprehension of gone then children 
performing correctly on only one or two of the three task administrations would fail to 
reach comprehension criteria. In the DS group, 3 children out of a total of 4 reached 
comprehension criteria despite instability in their cognitive performance. In the NDS 
group, 2 children out of a total of 5 reached comprehension criteria despite such 
instability. 
Stage VI Score 0.00 0.33 0.67 1.0 
Gone 
Spin 
1/5 (20%) 
2/5 (40%) 
1/2 (50%) 
2/2 (100%) 
2/2 (100%) 
2/2 (100%) 
3/3 (100%) 
2/3 (67%) 
Table 10-9: Proportion of children comprehending 
stability index: DS group 
words by 
Stage VI Score 0 0.33 0.67 1.0 
Gone 1/3 (33%) 1/3 (33%) 1/2 (50%) 3/4(75%) 
Spin 0/3 (0%) 2/3 (67%) 1/2(50%) 3/4 (75%) 
Table 10-10: Proportion of children comprehending words by 
stability index: NDS group 
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10.3.3 Sensorimotor development and word learning 
The final aim (III) of this empirical study was to investigate the general relationship 
between sensorimotor and linguistic performance beyond the specific claims made by 
Tomasello and Farrar (1986). In this section sensorimotor development as indicated by 
object permanence and means-ends performance is addressed in relation to acquisition of 
lexical reference to actions and objects. 
10.3.3.1 Action comprehension, means-ends and object permanence 
Analysis so far has focused on the theoretical relationship between action word 
comprehension and object permanence performance in particular. Table 10-11 shows the 
correlation between action word comprehension scores and scores on both object 
permanence and means-ends scales for the DS and NDS groups. 
Scale OP ME 
Group DS NDS DS NDS 
Word Gone 0.70 * 0.57 * 0.68 * 0.63 
Spin 0.33 0.44 0.36 0.34 
Table 10-11: Correlation coefficients between word comprehension 
scores and sensorimotor scale scores for DS and NDS groups (* p<O. 05) 
Children with and without Down's Syndrome show a strong relationship between 
sensorimotor performance and action word learning. While overall, the relationship 
between sensorimotor performance and acquisition of `gone' is a strong one, the 
relationship is not restricted to the object permanence scale. In contrast, the relationship 
between sensorimotor performance and acquisition of the control word `spin' appears to 
be weaker in general and is non-significant in all cases. 
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Correlation coefficients between sensorimotor development and invisible displacement, 
`gone' word learning, are shown in Table 10-12. In this case the relationship between 
sensorimotor development and acquisition of `spin' has been partialled out. The purpose 
of this partial correlation is to account for the, potentially artefactual, effect of general 
cognitive development on lexical acquisition, responsible for acquisition of `spin', and to 
isolate cognitive prerequisites specifically pertinent to the acquisition of `gone'. According 
to Tomasello and Farrar (1986), and Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986), acquisition of `gone' 
should be correlated with object permanence performance but the acquisition of spin is not 
necessarily related to the same conceptual basis. 
Scale OP ME 
Group DS NDS DS NDS 
Gone 0.65 * 0.43 0.61 * 0.57 
Table 10-12: Correlation coefficients for `gone' word comprehension 
and sensorimotor scale scores for DS and NDS groups (* p<0.05) - 
correlation with `spin' word partialled out 
Table 10-12 shows a significant positive correlation between means-ends and object 
permanence performance and acquisition of the invisible displacement term for children 
with Down's Syndrome (DS). The correlations for children without Down's Syndrome 
(NDS) are smaller and did not reach significance. 
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10.3.3.2 Object words: comprehension 
The most general claim regarding links between object permanence and lexical acquisition 
is that object permanence should be a prerequisite for lexical reference to objects. The 
relationship between object permanence and lexical acquisition during training will now 
be investigated. 
Scores for comprehension of object names were assessed by asking children to point to 
the correct object when labelled by the experimenter. There were two objects and the 
maximum score for object word comprehension was 12. Figure 10-11 shows object 
comprehension scores for each group according to stage of object concept development. 
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Figure 10-11: Comprehension scores for object words by group and by 
cognitive stage (maximum 12) 
A three way analysis of variance (group x stage x session) was carried out on object 
comprehension scores. The main effects of group, stage and session were not significant 
(F(1,20)=2.74; F(1,20)=3.49; F(1,20)=0.72). There were no significant interaction 
effects. 
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10.3.3.3 Object words: elicited production 
Table 10-13 shows the scores for elicited production of object names by performance on 
the object permanence scales. It is apparent that production scores are higher in the NDS 
group and there is a marginal stage dependent improvement across both groups. 
OP Stage V VI 
DS 0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (0.5) 
NDS 0.3 (0.7) 0.7 (0.9) 
Table 10-13: Score per session for elicited production of object 
words (max. score =2) 
A three way (group x session x OP stage) was carried out on scores for the elicited 
production of object names. The main effect of group F(1,20)=5.28, p<0.05 reflects the 
higher production scores in the NDS group. Main effect of object permanence stage 
(F(1,20) = 3.53) and session (F(1,20)=2.26) were not significant. None of the 
interactions was significant. 
10.3.3.4 Object words: spontaneous production 
Table 10-14 shows the mean frequency of spontaneous utterances of object names in the 
DS and NDS groups. The spontaneous utterances follow a similar pattern to that of the 
elicited measure, with children in the NDS group producing more frequent utterances. 
Furthermore, there appears to be a general stage effect in object word production across 
both groups. 
OP Stage v vi 
DS 0.6 (1.2) 11.4 (16.8) 
NDS 6.0 (9.0) 17.4 (16.2) 
Table 10-14: Mean frequency (per child) of spontaneous (non- 
imitative) object word utterances by object permanence stage 
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A two-way ANOVA (group x stage) showed a significant effect for sensorimotor stage 
F(1,20)= 5.09 p<0.05. This effect shows an increase of spontaneous non-imitative 
production of object words from stages V to VI which closely parallels object word 
comprehension. The group effect and the group x stage interaction were not significant 
(F(1,20)=1.33, NS; F(1,20)= 0.06, NS). 
10.3.3.5 Sensorimotor development and contemporaneous lexical 
development 
This final analysis examines the relationship between object permanence development and 
lexical reference as measured by the MacArthur CDI. Table 10-15 shows the number of 
words comprehended and produced by children as measured by the CDI. In contrast to 
the age equivalent scores presented earlier in Table 10-5 these raw scores avoid 
introducing additional noise to the data. There are clear effects in terms of group and 
sensorimotor stage. 
Group Measure Object Permanence Stage 
V VI 
DS Comprehension 149 (58) 191 (83) 
Production 17 (14) 67(74) 
NDS Comprehension 190 (64) 268 (30) 
Production 30 (32) 171 (111) 
Table 10-15: Productive vocabulary size in words by sensorimotor stage (s. d. ): DS and 
NDS groups 
A two way analysis of variance (group x stage) was carried out separately for 
comprehension and production scores. There was a main effect of object permanence 
stage for comprehension (F(1,20)=5.91, p<0.05) and for production (F(1,20)=12.05, 
p<0.01). These main effects indicate an increase in the children's vocabularies 
corresponding to the stage transition. Furthermore, the main effects of group were 
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significant for comprehension (F(1,20)=5.61, p<0.05) and for production 
(F(1,20)=4.48, p<0.05) reflecting lower comprehension and production scores in the DS 
group. There were no significant interactions in either analysis. 
Crucially however, when these data were reanalysed with developmental age as a 
covariate, all main effects were no longer significant. Thus, it would appear that any 
effect of sensorimotor development on lexical comprehension and production could be 
attributed to the effect of general development rather than object permanence in particular. 
10.4 Discussion 
10.4.1 Object permanence and relational words 
The first and primary aim of this empirical study was to investigate the claim that the 
acquisition and use of relational words, such as `spin' and `gone', might be linked to 
object permanence development. Tomasello and Farrar claimed that stage VI object 
permanence is a conceptual prerequisite for acquisition of a relational word referring to the 
invisible displacement of an object. The trends in comprehension scores for children with 
Down's Syndrome support Tomasello and Farrar's claim which suggests that the 
transition from stage V to stage VI should facilitate learning of an invisible displacement 
term. However, analysis of the data did not reveal any significant effects of object 
permanence development on word learning performance. Furthermore, the trends in the 
comprehension scores for the NDS group reveal, if anything, a general effect of object 
permanence development on acquisition of both visible and invisible displacement words. 
Despite the lack of significant results our data do not appear to be in conflict with the 
findings of Tomasello and Farrar as an analysis of variance comparing the two studies 
demonstrated. The smaller effect sizes found in the present study may be due to the wider 
chronological age range used in our NDS group when compared to the control group used 
by Tomasello and Farrar (1986). The wider age range for our NDS children was 
necessary for matching to the developmental ages of the infants with DS and thus 
illustrates a methodological problem which is inherent in the matching procedure. The 
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effects of a wider age range in our NDS group may have resulted in a lack of specificity 
with respect to developmental differences between children in the stage V and stage VI 
group. Furthermore, some children in the stage VI group may have been at, or beyond, 
this stage for some time. The problems with failing to isolate object permanence 
development as an independent variable may have introduced confounding developmental 
variables which influence general word learning and reduce effect size. Furthermore, 
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986) claim that one of the mechanisms behind cognitive specificity 
may be the salience of conceptual transitions. Such transitions are presumably less salient 
over time and hence children who reached stage VI well before taking part in this study 
may not have had the same impetus to learn an invisible displacement word. However, 
while this issue may have arisen as a implicit consequence of our matching procedure, the 
more `typical' results in the DS group illustrate the value of using a group with atypical 
developmental profile as a means of isolating particular cognitive variables. Such 
variables may, necessarily, be confounded in typically developing children. 
The number of children reaching a criterion level of comprehension shows a similar 
pattern to that observed in raw comprehension scores. However, if we are to make a 
strong claim for stage VI object permanence as a prerequisite for learning of `gone' then 
we require all children at stage V to fail to learn the word. Inspection of the number of 
children reaching criteria reveals a pattern which is more problematic for Tomasello and 
Farrar's claim. While no children in the NDS group at stage V reached criteria for 
comprehension of `gone', two children with Down's Syndrome did reach the criteria for 
comprehension of `gone'. This finding is counter to both Tomasello and Farrar's 
prerequisites claim, and Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1986) claim for cognitive specificity. 
However, the finding that children with Down's Syndrome may acquire conceptually 
laden lexical terms prior to the corresponding conceptual achievement is supported by 
Hassan and Messer (1995). 
The pattern of spontaneous non-imitative production of relational words again reveals a 
similar pattern, across stage and word type, to that seen in the children's comprehension 
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scores. However, it would appear that children with Down's Syndrome showed lower 
levels of production overall, albeit non significant. This result is consistent with studies 
showing a discrepancy between comprehension production in children with Down's 
Syndrome (Fowler, Gelman & Gleitman, 1994; Rondal, 1996). 
Parental reports on the actual words used by the children showed similar results i. e. 
children at stage VI appear more likely to be producing the word `gone `than children at 
stage V. The control displacement word, `spin', was not produced to a great extent at 
either stage. Given that children use the word `gone' in a variety of different ways and not 
exclusively as a relational verb the evidence for a production `gone' at stage V is, alone, 
inadequate evidence against a claim for conceptual prerequisites. 
In summary, the trends of lexical acquisition observed in children with Down's 
Syndrome were not inconsistent with Tomasello and Farrar's findings but failed to reach 
significance. The only suggestion that children with Down's Syndrome may show an 
exceptional pattern is indicated by apparent comprehension of an invisible displacement 
word prior to attainment of stage VI. However, such a conclusion rests on the assumption 
that assessment of object permanence is a reliable measure of conceptual status. The 
results described in chapter 8 suggested no more instability in the Down's Syndrome 
group than in children without Down's Syndrome. However, when investigating links 
between conceptual and linguistic development it is clearly important for theoretical and 
methodological reasons to establish the relationship between our findings and potential 
instability in performance. 
10.4.2 Relational words and stability 
The second aim of this empirical study was to ascertain the extent to which stability in 
object permanence performance was a necessary condition for acquisition of an invisible 
displacement term. An analysis of comprehension scores against a measure of stability in 
stage VI object permanence performance was carried out to examine the possibility that 
instability in performance on object permanence tasks might have consequences for 
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relational word acquisition. The results show a general trend toward higher 
comprehension scores with increasing stability of performance. In addition, it appears that 
those with stability scores of 0.33 and 0.67 (i. e. correct performance on 1/3 and 2/3 
occasions respectively) may yet achieve a reasonable degree of action word 
comprehension. Given that the stage VI task would be difficult to pass by chance it may 
be that children passing on only 1/3 of occasions do have the conceptual prerequisites for 
relational word acquisition but simply perform unreliably on the task designed to assess 
their underlying competencies. 
These data which relate the stability of performance to comprehension illustrate a 
methodological problem which may not be evident in studies using single testing sessions 
to ascertain developmental status. The results of this study illustrate that correct 
performance on one occasion may indicate sufficient conceptual understanding for lexical 
acquisition but such performance may not be reliable. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
Hassan and Messer (1995) used repeated longitudinal developmental assessments to 
ascertain conceptual status, it may be that the precocious emergence of lexical reference 
observed in children with Down's Syndrome may reflect performance instability on 
conceptual assessments. On a theoretical note, the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that instability in performance does not impede corresponding lexical 
acquisition. If there are strong conceptual prerequisites then in this case it would appear 
that instability is a performance problem rather than a problem of conceptual competence. 
10.4.3 General relationship between sensorimotor and linguistic 
development 
The final aim of the present study was to investigate the general claim that lexical 
acquisition is specifically related to sensorimotor development and to object permanence 
in particular. Tomasello and Farrar (1986) make the claim that object permanence is a 
cognitive prerequisite for acquisition of `gone' as a relational verb but their training study 
did not assess children's performance on other sensorimotor scales. More general claims 
focus on the relationship between object permanence and lexical reference to objects 
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(Brown, 1983; Bloom, 1983). However, there is also evidence that lexical advances are 
more strongly related to means-ends performance than to object permanence (Curcio, 
1978; Mundy, Seibert & Hogan, 1984; Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camioni, & Volterra, 
1979). 
The results for both DS and NDS groups indicate that, in terms of relational words, the 
acquisition of `gone' is strongly related to both object permanence and means-ends 
performance. Furthermore, acquisition of `spin' does not appear to be as strongly 
dependent on these sensorimotor measures. These results, taken together, while 
supporting Tomasello and Farrar's claim, suggest that the acquisition of relational words 
referring to invisible displacement may be related to sensorimotor development in general 
rather than object permanence in particular. The claim that sensorimotor development may 
be particularly important to the acquisition of `gone' rather than `spin' is illustrated by the 
partial correlation coefficient controlling for the `spin' comprehension scores. Thus the 
acquisition of `gone' may be dependent on sensorimotor development to a greater extent 
than relational words in general. 
The comprehension and elicited production of novel object names also appeared to be 
related to the development of object permanence. Furthermore, as was the case with 
relational verb acquisition, production of object names followed a similar pattern to 
underlying comprehension. However the only significant effect in relation to object names 
was that children with Down's Syndrome showed lower levels of elicited production in 
general. 
The final analysis addressed the relationship between object permanence and lexical 
acquisition as reported by parents who completed the MacArthur CDI. While not 
surprisingly measures of the children's vocabularies in terms of comprehension and 
production were related to sensorimotor measures, this effect was accounted for by 
differences in developmental age. 
Thus the relationship between lexical acquisition and sensorimotor development in 
children with and without Down's Syndrome appears to be a general sensorimotor and 
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developmental effect rather than a case for cognitive prerequisites. However, there is an 
indication that relational words referring to invisible displacement are more strongly 
related to object permanence than other areas of sensorimotor development. These results 
are therefore broadly supportive of Tomasello and Farrar's (1986) prerequisites claim. 
10.4.4 General discussion: representation in linguistic and 
cognitive domains 
Tomasello and Farrar (1986) claim that the relationship between sensorimotor 
development in the transition stage V to stage VI is a cognitive prerequisite for 
development of relational verbs labelling invisible displacements, e. g. `gone'. The results 
from the present study do not preclude the existence of such a relationship in children 
with Down's Syndrome. Tomasello and Farrar argue that this relationship may be 
extended to other conceptual prerequisites in the cognitive domain. Furthermore, those 
who advocate theories of `semantic bootstrapping' take the view that it is through 
conceptual and semantic understanding that children acquire early syntactic morphology. 
A number of recent accounts of early lexical acquisition claim that this period is 
particularly important and may exert a causal influence on later syntactic development 
(Tomasello, 1992; Bates et al., 1988/1991; Anisfeld, 1984). Furthermore, the acquisition 
of relational verbs may be significant in respect of later syntax development. 
The relationship between acquisition of relational words and sensorimotor development is 
a particularly important issue with respect to understanding the linguistic deficit in 
children with Down's Syndrome. The lack of significance in the current results suggests 
the need for both a larger sample size and a longitudinal tracking of sensorimotor 
performance to isolate, in particular, transitions in object permanence development. Of 
particular importance to children with Down's Syndrome is the issue of stability in 
conceptual development. It is argued here that stability in object permanence performance 
does not appear to be a prerequisite for acquisition of relational terms. Furthermore, this 
implies that performance instability is a performance effect rather than a problem at the 
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conceptual level2. In the current study, and a study by Hassan and Messer (1995), 
children with Down's Syndrome appear to exhibit precocious lexical reference prior to the 
corresponding conceptual transitions. However, these results may be due to anomalies in 
conceptual performance rather than linguistic anomalies. In the following chapter we 
investigate the development of object permanence in representational terms and consider 
potential anomalies within the Down's Syndrome population. 
Z Despite this finding, it may be that a motivation based performance 
deficit could become a 
conceptual deficit via a failure to reinforce newly learned skills (Wishart, 1993a) 
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11.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the extent to which lexical and conceptual development 
share a common representational basis. Establishing links between measures of lexical 
and conceptual development presupposes that conceptual measures are both reliable and 
valid measures of underlying representations. The issue of reliability was addressed in 
chapter 8, in the current chapter, the validity of object permanence as a reflection of 
conceptual representation is examined. 
This chapter describes two experiments, each investigating the role of imitation in the 
cognitive task performance of young infants with Down's Syndrome. Piaget suggested 
that during the sensorimotor stage, children's representational capacity was insufficient to 
facilitate `representative' imitation or that involving representations. However, recent 
research has shown that typically developing children may be able to carry out deferred 
imitation tasks, which require the capacity to hold representations in memory, as young as 
14 months (Meltzoff, 1985). Rast & Meltzoff (1995) have also shown that children with 
Down's Syndrome may have relatively strong imitation skills with respect to their 
developmental level and particularly with respect to object concept development. The 
capacity for imitation during the sensorimotor period has a number of theoretical 
implications for representational development in children with Down's Syndrome. 
Meltzoff and Gopnik (1989) argue that in typically developing children, imitation skills, 
and particularly deferred imitation, are not thought to be fully developed until acquisition 
of stage VI of sensorimotor development. This conservative position stems from a 
Piagetian view of development that it is not until stage VI that children have the 
representational capacity required for deferred imitation (Piaget, 1951/1967). However, a 
growing body of research demonstrates that infants as young as 14 months can produce 
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acts of deferred imitation. Furthermore, these children do not solve stage VI object 
permanence tasks until around 18 months. This evidence is counter to the Piagetian view 
of representation as a coherent domain general process spanning both imitation and object 
permanence. Meltzoff and Gopnik conclude that imitation and high level object 
permanence, while they both provide evidence for representation, may reflect the 
emergence of discrete representational systems. The existence of a unitary representational 
system is fundamental to Piagetian view of representational development. If it is 
necessary to posit a separate representational system to account for early imitation skills 
then a similar reassessment of representation may be required in the object permanence 
domain 
Traditional explanations of children's failure on object permanence tasks centre upon the 
inadequacy of children's spatial, temporal, and object representations in the strictly 
Piagetian case. However, standard object permanence tasks necessarily confound the 
assessment of two discrete skills, or possibly representational systems. Object 
permanence tasks require firstly, the ability to maintain a representation of a hidden 
object, and secondly, the ability to plan and carry out the appropriate means of retrieval. 
Many researchers have shown that a child's knowledge of an object's location, and their 
knowledge of retrieving it, is not borne out explicitly in their retrieval action (e. g. 
Diamond, 1991; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). Children's failure on standard object 
permanence tasks can therefore be explained as a consequence of limitations in memory or 
attentional capacity rather than a representational failure per se (e. g. Diamond, Cruttenden 
& Niederman, 1994). 
A wealth of research activity has been devoted to understanding children's failure on 
object permanence tasks and this has not been matched by accounts of children's 
successes (Fischer & Jennings, 1981). Fundamental to the Piagetian view of successful 
search is that it is driven by a representation of the hidden object. Furthermore, Piaget 
believed that there was a unitary representational basis underlying successful search 
behaviour. The validity of object permanence as a circumscribed representational system 
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is central to Piaget's view of representational development in general. However in this 
chapter it is argued that children's solutions to object permanence tasks could be driven by 
a number of different representations which are not necessarily based on a hidden object. 
In particular, there is evidence to suggest that children can use cues which are associated 
with the hiding action rather than with a representation of the object's location. 
Objects are hidden by hand in the vast majority of object permanence tasks detailed in the 
psychological literature. Despite this, little attention has been given to the possibility that 
knowledge of the hiding action, rather than object location, could provide a solution. 
Fischer and Jennings (1981) suggest that a child's understanding of the experimenteras 
an independentagent may provide children with a cue to an object's location. They do not 
imply that this agency cue is used in the absence of an object representation, but in 
addition to it. Essentially, Fischer and Jennings claim that children's behaviour is driven 
by dual representations, both an object representation, and a broadly social representation 
of the hiding action. 
Meltzoff and Gopnik (1989) also claim that representational development is not a unitary 
process but comprises both `empirical' and `hypothetical' representations. `Empirical 
representations' are representations of what was seen, whilst `hypothetical 
representations' implicate the use of deductive reasoning in their construction. Empirical 
representations are sufficient for both deferred imitation and low-level object permanence 
tasks. In contrast, stage VI object permanence tasks (involving invisible displacement of 
objects) require the use of hypothetical representations. According to Rast and Meltzoff it 
is possible to draw fundamental distinctions between the demands of object permanence 
tasks and those of deferred imitation. Firstly, deferred imitation requires remembering 
another person's actions whilst object permanence requires remembering the location of 
an object. Secondly, high level object permanence tasks require deductions to be made of 
the basis of a represented action whilst for deferred imitation the representation itself is 
sufficient. These distinctions allow Meltzoff and Gopnik to attribute deferred imitation in 
14 month olds, prior to stage VI object permanence, to the existence of empirical 
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representations. Hypothetical representations, which emerge later, allow children to solve 
stage VI object permanence tasks. 
Thus, the representational `dualism' proposed by Fischer and Jennings (1981) and 
Meltzoff and Gopnik (1989) allows for the possibility of discontinuity between 
representational systems. Arguably such discontinuity may become amplified in children 
from atypical populations. Regardless of the particular model which we accept, both 
Fischer and Jennings, and Meltzoff and Gopnik, are claiming that there are distinct 
representational systems which may be implicated in performance on object permanence 
tasks. Whilst Fischer and Jennings suggest that the use of social or agency cues respects 
the Piagetian course of development and emerges around 18 months, in contrast, Meltzoff 
and Gopnik claim that the deferred imitation and its broadly social representational system 
is available as young as 14 months. The existence of a representational system which 
facilitates deferred imitation may therefore be implicated in children's performance on 
object permanence tasks well before the stage VI transition suggested by Fischer and 
Jennings. Thus it may be possible for children to use an agency cue to support 
performance in the face of inadequate object representations. Alternatively, children might 
use empirical representations, to imitate the hiding action, whilst unable to draw 
hypothetical deductions about the object's location. 
The systems of representation proposed by Fischer and Jennings are certainly different 
from the systems proposed by Meltzoff and Gopnik, both in function and in 
development. However, there appears to be a broad agreement that some form of social- 
empirical representation may be distinguished from the object-hypothetical system. In this 
chapter, the terms `imitative representation' and `object representation' will be used to 
draw the distinction between these representational systems encoding the child's 
knowledge of the social and object components of the object permanence task 
respectively. 
The existence of more than one representational system leads to the possibility of an 
atypical representational profile, i. e. strengths and weaknesses in representational 
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development. Such a possibility is arguably more likely in atypical populations. Children 
with Down's Syndrome do have particular strengths, such as sequential visual short-term 
memory (Pueschel, Gallagher, Zartler & Pezullo, 1987) particularly when related to hand 
movements (Hodapp, Leckman, Dykens, Sparrow, & Zelinsky, 1992) which are 
consistent with the use of `empirical' or imitative representations. Social and imitative 
strengths are also often cited as characteristic of children with Down's Syndrome (Gibbs 
& Thorpe, 1982; Sigman & Ungerer, 1984; Beeghly, Weiss-Perry & Cicchetti, 1990) 
and such findings may reflect the use of empirical representations. Rast and Meltzoff 
(1995), in support of this atypical representational profile, report the relatively advanced 
performance of children with Down's Syndrome on deferred imitation tasks relative to 
object permanence. In an empirical study, children with Down's Syndrome were able to 
carry out deferred imitation well before attainment of stage VI. The authors argue that 
children with Down's Syndrome have a developmental profile which is broadly advanced 
in the social domain, and hence in imitation. 
There are a number of methodological problems with the empirical evidence supporting 
Rast and Meltzoff's claims (see Wishart, 1997). Most significantly, the discrepancy 
between deferred imitation and object permanence is also observed in typically developing 
children. Despite this, and in the absence of a control group, Rast and Meltzoff claim that 
the discrepancy is a characteristic of children with Down's Syndrome. Furthermore, the 
tasks used by Rast and Meltzoff to compare children's performance on object permanence 
and imitation domains were driven by the Piagetian view of the representational demands 
of the tasks. More recent views of representation and performance on object permanence 
tasks focus on the memory and attention limitations to children's search performance 
(Diamond et al., 1994; Bjork & Cummings, 1984). The comparison of deferred imitation 
and object permanence tasks must account for task specific factors such as these if the 
representational distinctions are to be isolated. These methodological issues were 
discussed at length in chapter 5. 
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Despite these methodological problems, there is some evidence for anomalies in the task 
performance of children with Down's Syndrome which may reflect atypical 
representational development. It has been argued that imitative representations may be 
deployed in solving object permanence tasks. The use of broadly imitative, empirical or 
social strategies may therefore by applied by children with Down's Syndrome to solving 
object permanence tasks. If the development of children with Down's Syndrome is 
atypical in this respect then one would expect to find corresponding anomalies within 
performance on object permanence tasks in addition to discrepancies between object 
permanence and imitation. 
In support of this hypothesis, there is some evidence that children with Down's 
Syndrome perform in an anomalous or atypical manner when performing object 
permanence tasks (Morss, 1983; Wishart, 1993; Rast & Meltzoff, 1995). Specifically, 
differences have been observed in children's strategies for solving tasks and in the error 
patterns which suggest a distortion in the typical developmental progression (Wishart, 
1993; Morss, 1983). However, such anomalies might be resolved if one considers the 
use of imitative solutions. In more general terms, the view that children with Down's 
Syndrome solve tasks by imitation rather than explicit knowledge of the objects location 
may also explain the lower levels of engagement, or `dampening of epistemic' curiosity 
which some authors report (Rast & Meltzoff, 1993; Wishart & Duffy, 1990). 
In summary, it appears that the validity of object permanence as a coherent 
representational system is threatened by the suggestion of a dual representational system. 
Furthermore, the atypical profile observed in children with Down's Syndrome may affect 
the typical balance between such dual representations and have implications for 
performance on cognitive tasks. Differences in search patterns have been observed in 
children with Down's syndrome which may reflect the use of imitative strategies 
in 
preference to strategies based on knowledge of an object's location (Wishart, 1993; 
Morss, 1983). 
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The hypothesis which forms the basis for the following empirical studies is that children 
with Down's Syndrome have a particular capacity for imitation which may be deployed as 
a means of solving cognitive tasks in other domains, such as object permanence. 
Furthermore the use of imitation as a strategy for solving tasks may provide an 
explanation for children's performance and the characteristic lack of engagement. 
11.1.1 Aims 
The general aim of these experiments is to investigate the representational basis of object 
permanence and determine the extent to which children with Down's Syndrome show a 
preference for one representational system. There were two specific hypotheses: 
I children with Down's Syndrome will perform better on imitation tasks than 
children without Down's syndrome matched for object permanence skill. 
(imitative representations are strongerthan object representations); 
II children with Down's Syndrome use an imitative strategy in object search tasks 
and will perform poorly on object permanence tasks if imitation of the hiding 
action is explicitly prevented. (the use of imitative representations is implicit in the 
object search behaviour of children with Down's Syndrome). 
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11.2 Study 3: A representational comparison of object 
permanence and imitation 
This experimental study was intended to investigate the links between children's 
performance on object permanence tasks and performance on a comparable imitation task. 
The requirement that the tasks should be comparable is intended to address problems 
inherent in contrasting the representational demands of object permanence and deferred 
imitation tasks. The tasks used by Rast and Meltzoff to compare children's performance 
on object permanence and imitation domains confound the representational system (OP 
vs. Imitation) with task specific factors such as memory and spatial components. The 
tasks in this experiment are designed to involve similar spatial and memory components 
for both imitation and object permanence and thereby isolate the representational basis for 
performance. 
11.2.1 Method 
11.2.1.1 Participants 
The participants for this experiment were 18 children with Down's Syndrome (9 girls, 9 
boys) and 18 children without Down's Syndrome (9 girls, 9 boys). Participants with 
Down's syndrome were recruited from parental support groups and local pre-school 
services, whilst typically developing children were recruited though local toddler groups. 
Developmental ages, assessed using the BSID II, and chronological ages are shown in 
Table 11-1. 
Mean Chronological Age (s. d. ) Mean Developmental Age (s. d. ) 
DS (N=18) 25.9 (9.3) 14.8 (4.5) 
NDS(N=18) 12.8 (3.2) 12.8 (3.5) 
Table 11-1: Chronological and developmental ages of participants 
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11.2.1.2 Materials 
A rectangular table (dimensions 0.92m x 0.61m) with detachable legs was fitted with a 
concealed buzzer and switch so that the buzzer could be operated covertly. The buzzer 
was a `trumpet sounder' type emitting a frequency of 450 Hz with a sound level of 75 dB 
at lm from the source. Two circular wells coloured blue and green were used as loci for 
the hiding and imitation procedure. The wells were placed 50 cm apart on a rectangular 
tray. During the procedure the tray could be moved along the length of the table. 
Three toy objects were used in the hiding procedure, each small enough to fit within the 
palm of an adult's hand; a small yellow ball, a toy car and a small toy sheep. 
11.2.1.3 Procedure 
Children were seen at home in the presence of their mother at a time prearranged to be 
suitable for both parent and child. The table was placed in the centre of the room and a 
video camera was placed behind the experimenter to record the activity of the child at the 
opposite end of the table, this seating arrangement is detailed in 
Figure 11-1. Children were either seated on their parent's lap, on a chair, or on the floor. 
The height of the table was adjusted so that children were easily able to reach objects 
when placed 30 cm from the edge of the table. A Sony Handycam Hi-8 video camera was 
233 
Figure 11-1: Seating of experimenter and purtrripuut 
during experiment 
Studies 3&4: Object Permanence & Imitation 
mounted on a tripod at one end of the table so as to record the child's activity. At the start 
of each session, the experimenter played with the child using a familiar toy for 5 minutes. 
Children were not permitted to play with the test materials during this familiarisation 
period. 
Children were tested under two conditions, an imitation condition and a search condition. 
The order of presentation was counterbalanced between participants within groups. In the 
search condition an object was hidden in one of the wells in full view but out of reach of 
the child. In the imitation condition, without a object, the experimenter made hand 
movements equivalent to the hiding of an object and a buzzer was sounded for 1 second 
as the hand entered the well. The purpose of the buzzer was to draw attention to the 
`hiding action' in common with other studies which used hand tapping for this purpose 
(Munakata, McClelland, Johnson & Siegler, 1994; Appel & Gratch, 1984) 
After a three second delay, the tray supporting the wells was pushed to within the child's 
reach. Children selecting the correct well were allowed to play with the object for 5-10 
seconds in the search condition or were rewarded with a contingent 1 second `buzz' in the 
imitation condition. However, if children selected the incorrect well, the tray and the 
wells, were removed from the child's reach. Children who failed to respond after 5 
seconds were offered encouragement such as `you do it', or `you find it', according to the 
condition. If, after a further 10 seconds, there was still no response the wells were 
removed from the child's reach. 
Each condition comprised a maximum of 20 trials. For the search condition, the first 10 
trials involved visible displacements whilst the second 10 trials were invisible 
displacements. For visible displacements the object was held in the experimenter's 
fingertips whilst being hidden such that the child could see the object entering the well; 
during invisible displacements the object was hidden in the experimenter's hand prior to 
being placed in the well and could therefore not be seen to enter the well. For the imitation 
condition, this distinction is quite clearly redundant and invisible displacements were 
equivalent to visible displacements. Trials were a mixture of `switch' trials in which the 
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hiding location was switched following successful search and `non-switch' trials in which 
hiding took place at the same location following successful search. Furthermore for a 
switch trial in the visible condition, hiding took place at a different well, whilst in the 
invisible displacement condition, the wells themselves were transposed following hiding 
(Wishart & Bower, 1985). In terms of difficulty it is reasonable to suppose that switch 
trials will be more difficult than non-switch trials and that invisible displacements should 
be more difficult than visible displacements. Indeed, such an order is implicit in Piagetian 
theory. A schematic diagram of the trials in order of difficulty is shown in Table 11-2. 
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Trial Type of Switch / Non-Switch Stage of 
Displacement sensorimotor (of location A-B relative 
(OP only) to previous trial) 
development 
Locatim Location 
AB 
Trial I Visible NA IV 
Trial 2 Visible Non-Switch IV 
Trial 3 Visible Switch V 
Location Location 
A B 
Trial 1 Invisible NA Late IV 
Trial 2a /M Invisible Non-Switch Late V 
Trial 3 /M. - ,M Invisible Switch (Wells VI 
Transposed) 
Table 11-2: Schematic diagram of trial types in order of difficulty 
Switch trials were integrated into the procedure in the following manner according to the 
child's performance. If the child made two successful responses to the first location (A), 
hiding and imitation movements were switched to the second location (B), reverting back 
to location A only after two successive correct responses at B. Ten trials for which the 
child performed without error would therefore follow the pattern AABBAABBAA, i. e. 4 
switch trials and 6 non-switch trials. For children who failed to search, or searched 
incorrectly, fewer than 4 switch trials would necessarily be presented. However, if the 
child failed to search correctly on any two successive occasions within the first 5 trials, a 
switch to the second location was made by default on the 6th trial (i. e. AAAAABBBBB). 
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This default procedure ensured that, regardless of the child's performance, at least one 
switch trial was included in the paradigm 
This procedure was adapted from Diamond et al. (1994) who used the two location 
AABBAA paradigm to combine measures of search at a single location (Stage IV) and the 
AAB paradigm (Stage V). Our procedure extends this paradigm to include invisible 
displacements (early Stage VI) and transposition of locations (late Stage VI), as used by 
Wishart and Bower (1995). 
For both imitation and search conditions, trials were repeated if the child looked away or 
was distracted so as not to witness the action. For search trials in which the object no 
longer captured the child's attention, the object was replaced with a novel toy. For 
theoretical reasons this was only done during non-switch trials as the conceptual basis for 
a switch is that the same object can be found at a different location (Rast & Meltzoff, 
1995). 
During procedures of this kind, children rapidly lose interest and occasionally become 
distressed if they are repeatedly unsuccessful. To prevent undue distress and maintain the 
child's interest for the subsequent condition, testing was curtailed if the child failed on 
more than 5 of the first 10 trials. The number of trials presented for each condition was 
either 10 or 20 depending on the child's performance. 
11.2.1.4 Treatment of Results 
The video tapes of each session were coded by the experimenter who recorded the 
following information for each trial: the experimental condition (search vs. imitation), trial 
type (switch vs. non-switch), hiding condition (visible vs. invisible), `hiding' location (A 
vs. B) and child's response location (A, B, both, or no search). A correct response was 
defined as a response to the same location as the hiding act. The maximum number of 
correct responses was 20 for both search and imitation conditions. In cases where 
children competed only 10 trials for a particular condition their maximum score would be 
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10. Analyses were carried out on both raw scores and percentage scores. The percentage 
scores represent the number of correct responses as a proportion of trials administered. 
Children were allowed a maximum of 15 seconds to respond under both imitation and 
object search conditions. Given the close association between the representational and 
short-term memory demands of these tasks, it was felt important to include some analysis 
of the response times under each condition. Response times were recorded by the 
experimenter from the video tape of each session using a stopwatch. Times were recorded 
from the moment the experimenter completed a hiding action to the time the child initiated 
a response. These data thereby give an indication of the length of time a child would have 
to maintain a representation of the experimenter's action and/or the object's location. 
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11.2.2 Results 
The object permanence performance of the each group was checked to ensure adequate 
similarity in performance. For the purposes of this study, the number or percentage of 
correct responses is regarded as a adequate measure of competence on the task. The 
procedure clearly deviates from the strictly defined criteria for assigning children to 
sensorimotor stages but maintains a similar progression in task difficulty. Children were 
categorised according to the stages of sensorimotor development shown in Table 11-3. 
This classification was used for descriptive purposes and was based on the difficult task 
which each child passed (e. g. invisible displacement [switch trial] . stage VI). 
< Stage IV Stage IV Stage V Stage VI 
DS 1 7 2 8 
NDS 1539 
Table 11-3: Classifications of object permanence stages for 
DS and NDS groups 
Figure 11-2 shows the number of correct responses in object permanence and imitation 
conditions by group. The mean number of trials administered is shown for each 
combination of group and condition. 
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Figure 11-2: Correct responses in object permanence (OP) and imitation conditions 
A three-way analysis of variance was carried out on the raw scores by condition 
(Imitation vs. OP), order of presentation (OP/I vs. I/OP) and by group (NDS vs. DS). 
The analysis revealed a significant effect of condition (F(1,32)=22.1, p<0.001) while the 
group effect was not significant (F(1,32)=0.85). The interaction group x condition was 
significant (F(1,32)=4.35, p<0.05). A t-test carried on total scores by group was not 
significant for OP score (t(35)= 0.50 p>0.05). Children with Down's Syndrome 
performed better on the imitation task than the children without Down's Syndrome but a t- 
test just failed to reach significance for imitation scores (t(35)= 1.99, p=0.05). The effect 
of order was not significant, (F(1,32)=0.78, NS) nor did it interact with either condition 
or the condition x group interaction. 
Table 11-4 shows the number of trials (either 10 or 20) completed by children in each 
group and in each condition. The proportion of children performing 20 trials in the OP 
condition is similar in both groups. However, in the imitation condition, far fewer 
children in the NDS group performed the full 20 trials. The reason for this was that a 
greater proportion of children in the NDS group failed to pass 5 trials in the first 10 for 
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the imitation condition. Whilst this result evidently reflects poorer performance in the 
imitation condition it suggests that an analysis of raw scores may inflate discrepancies 
between the two groups. 
Condition OP Imitation 
Group DS NDS DS NDS 
10 Trials 466 13 
20 Trials 14 12 12 5 
Table 11-4: Number of children by number of trials performed by condition 
The above analysis on raw scores was carried out both for reasons of simplicity and ease 
of interpretation. However, there are a number of possible anomalies in the data which 
were not addressed in the simple analysis. First, testing was curtailed if children failed to 
score more that 50% on the first ten trials. The different number of trials by condition and 
group could therefore be responsible for the significant effects reported. Second, the 
number of switch trials administered was also dependent on performance. A switch trial 
necessitated correct performance at one location on two successive trials. Therefore, 
children responding incorrectly would necessarily be presented with fewer switch trials. 
A third potential problem with our data is that the children, whilst matched for 
developmental age, were not perfectly matched for object permanence. The results 
presented above could reflect group differences in object permanence development. 
These issues were each addressed in a subsequent analysis. The raw scores for switch 
and non-switch trials were separately converted to proportions of trials presented. Figure 
11-3 shows the proportion of correct responses as a percentage of trials administered 
under each condition. The mean of these proportional measures was subsequently used as 
a dependent variable in an analysis of variance. The stage of object permanence was 
included as a covariate in the analysis to account for any systematic differences in object 
permanence level. 
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Figure 11-3: OP and imitation scores (correct responses as a proportion of trials 
administered) by group (DS and NDS) 
A three way analysis of variance (condition x group x order) was carried out on the 
proportion of correct responses as detailed above. The object permanence stage was 
included as a covariate in the analysis. This analysis, shown in Table 11-5 and Table 11- 
6, reflects a similar pattern to the simple analysis previously described. 
SS DF MS F Sig. of F 
Within + Residual 1.10 31 0.04 
Regression 2.26 1 2.26 63.95 0.001 
Group 0.08 1 0.08 2.16 0.152 
Order 0.00 1 0.00 0.06 0.805 
Group x Order 0.06 1 0.06 1.60 0.215 
Table 11-5: Analysis of variance (between-subjects effects) 
242 
OP Imitation 
Studies 3&4: Object Permanence & Imitation 
SS DF MS F Sig. of F 
Within + Residual 0.98 32 0.03 
OP/Imitation 0.80 1 0.80 25.99 0.001 
Group x OP/Imitation 0.16 1 0.16 5.18 0.03 
Order x OP/Imitation 0.00 1 0.00 0.06 0.808 
Group x Order x 0.00 1 0.00 0.08 0.773 
OP/Imitation 
Table 11-6: Analysis of variance (within-subjects effects) 
The results of these two analyses confirm that children in the DS group performed better 
in the imitation condition than children in the NDS group. The two groups performed 
similarly well in the object permanence condition. 
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Correlations between total scores on OP and imitation were calculated for both groups and 
are shown in Table 11-7. Children in the DS group showed a strong and significant 
correlation between OP and imitation scores. In contrast, the correlations between OP and 
imitation scores for the NDS group were both weak and non significant. Once again it is 
possible that the different number of trials presented across conditions and groups might 
have affected the correlation coefficients. Partial correlations which control for the number 
of trials presented in each condition are therefore also shown in Table 11-7. Surprisingly, 
these partial correlations are weaker in the NDS group suggesting that failures by default 
did not lead to an artificially low correlation in this case. 
DS (N=18) NDS (N=18) 
Correlation 0.85*** 0.32 
(Imitation * OP Scores) 
Partial Correlation 0.85*** 0.10 
(by Number of missing trials) 
Table 11-7: Correlations between OP and imitation scores 
DS & NDS groups (***p<0.001) 
The strong correlation coefficients in the DS group therefore indicate a close relationship 
between performance on the object permanence and imitation tasks. Furthermore, this 
difference does not appear to be due to differences is the number of trials administered. 
11.2.2.1 Error rates and response times 
The aim of this study was to investigate children's performance on object permanence and 
imitation tasks. Furthermore, the design of the study was intended to maximise the 
contrast in representational terms and minimise any task specific cognitive demands. 
Limitations in memory and inhibition of prepotent responses are thought to be 
fundamental to performance on object permanence tasks (Diamond et al., 1994; Bjork & 
Cummings, 1984). It was therefore considered important to investigate the timing and 
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error types which characterise children's responses across the experimental conditions. 
The purpose of the following analyses was to establish the degree to which discrepancies 
in performance are representational as opposed to more general cognitive limitations. 
The first analysis focuses on mean response times in each condition. As discussed in the 
method, a three second minimum response time was ensured by delaying presentation of 
the materials to the child. Any additional response time is therefore dependent on the 
child. The mean response times (by child) are shown in Table 11-8 according to response 
type (correct vs. incorrect) and group (DS vs. NDS). These times include the 3 second 
delay imposed explicitly in the procedure. 
Condition OP Imitation 
Group DS NDS DS NDS 
Correct 4.13 (1.36) 4.99 (1.78) 4.21 (0.90) 5.10 (2.20) 
Incorrect 5.17 (2.15) 5.18 (1.74) 4.54 (1.55) 5.03 (2.00) 
Table 11-8: Mean response times for correct and incorrect responses by 
condition and group (s. d. ) 
A three-way analysis of variance (group x response type x condition) was carried out on 
response times. It was necessary to exclude 11 cases where responses timings were not 
available across all conditions (due to non-correct responses). These excluded cases were 
children who were 100% successful or unsuccessful within a particular condition or cases 
where failures were entirely characterised by a failure to respond. The resulting analysis 
carried out on 25 cases revealed non significant effects for group (F(1,23)=0.07), 
condition (F 1,23)=0.38), and response type (F(1,23)=1.83). The interactions were non 
significant in all cases. 
These results suggest that incorrect responses in either condition or group may not be 
attributed to the length of response time and the consequent cognitive limitations which 
such anomalies might suggest. 
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Error types were subsequently categorised according to the response type; either choosing 
the incorrect well, both wells simultaneously, or failing to respond within a 15 second 
time limit. The mean proportion of error types by group and condition is shown in Table 
11-9. Two children who made no errors within a particular condition were excluded from 
this analysis. From the table, it is clear that the error patterns differ between groups. One 
of the most striking anomalies is that children in the DS group show a greater proportion 
of incorrect responses directed at both wells. 
Condition OP Imitation 
Group DS NDS DS NDS 
IncorrectWell 47.3 (34.1) 61.2 (35.5) 37.9 (30.89) 38.8 (34.6) 
Both Wells 23.4 (29.3) 5.3 (12.6) 27.8 (33.3) 7.8 (18.6) 
No Response 29.3 (34.8) 33.5 (34.7) 34.3 (30.6) 53.4 (36.4) 
Table 11-9: Percentage error rates by error type 
A three way analysis of variance (error type x condition x group) was carried out on the 
proportion of error types for 69 cases. Only within subject effects are meaningful when 
comparing proportions in this way. The effect of error type was significant 
(F(2,130)=11.4, p<0.001) as was the interaction of group x error type (F(2,130)=3.26 
p<0.05). The interactions of condition x error type (F(2,130)=2.47) and the three way 
interaction group x condition x error type (F(2,130)=0.58) were not significant. 
These results suggest that the pattern of errors is dependent on the group variable. 
Bonferoni adjusted t-tests were carried between groups for each response type. T-tests for 
`incorrect well' and `no response' were not significant (t(1,67)=0.85; t(1,67)=0.1). 
However, the t-test carried out on the proportion of `both well' error was significant 
(t(1,67)=2.17, p<0.05), reflecting a greater proportion of this error type in the DS group. 
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The lack of an interaction between error type and condition, and the non-significant three 
way interaction suggest that differences between the conditions cannot be attributed to 
anomalous errors. The two analyses performed on children's error rates suggest that the 
effects reported in our previous analyses are not caused by anomalous performance 
factors reflected in error rates. 
11.2.3 Discussion 
This study addressed the issue of a dissociation between imitative and object 
representations in children with Down's Syndrome. Rast and Meltzoff's comparison of 
deferred imitation and standard search tasks failed to control for task specific information 
processing demands. Performance on deferred imitation tasks prior to performance on a 
stage VI search task is certainly evidence against Piaget's view of representational 
development. However, as with a number of Piagetian tasks, manipulation of the 
information processing requirements might result in improved performance in younger 
children. Rast and Meltzoff's data could therefore be dismissed as an artefact of the 
memory and information processing demands of the different tasks. If one is to claim that 
discrete representational systems are implicated in imitation and object permanence tasks 
then the information processing demands of the particular tasks must be controlled for. 
The results of the present study support the general findings of Rast and Meltzoff (1995). 
Children with Down's Syndrome appear to perform better on an imitation task than on 
object permanence tasks when spatial, motor and memory demands are comparable. Rast 
and Meltzoff's study failed to include a control group, and could not therefore make 
specific claims about children with Down's Syndrome but only about a general capacity 
for deferred imitation during the sensorimotor period. The results of the present study 
also demonstrate that children with Down's syndrome appear to have a relative strength in 
imitation tasks when compared to children without Down's Syndrome matched for object 
permanence. 
247 
Studies 3&4: Object Permanence & Imitation 
In representational terms, the capacity for imitation may implicate a discrete 
representational system from that typically involved in object permanence tasks. The 
relative strength of children with Down's Syndrome on the imitation task may therefore 
reflect a capacity for imitative representations in excess of object representations. In the 
introduction to this chapter it was suggested that a strategic use of imitation may be of 
service in solving object permanence tasks. The current findings in relation to imitation 
suggest that children with Down's Syndrome can, in contrast to typically developing 
children, `search' when no object is hidden. High correlations between imitation and 
object permanence tasks suggests a possible link between these tasks in children with 
Down's Syndrome. Furthermore, the analysis of error types made by children with 
Down's Syndrome suggests the use of an atypical strategy in both imitation and object 
permanence tasks. This atypical strategy may reflect the predominant use of imitative 
representations in both search and imitation. 
In contrast, the performance of typically developing children on object permanence tasks 
does not implicate imitation. Object permanence and imitation tasks were only weakly 
correlated in the NDS sample. Furthermore the errors made by typically developing 
children on object permanence tasks suggests conformity to the standard representational 
account of failure (Morss, 1983). Other research also suggests that typically developing 
children do not search on a purely imitative basis when no object is hidden (Appel & 
Gratch, 1984). Bertenthal and Fischer (1983) discount such a possibility as `obviously' 
untenable - `the child would not search under, or 
behind the screens if a hidden object 
was not involved in the procedure'. 
The tendency for children with Down's syndrome to respond imitatively when no object 
is hidden therefore has a number of implications for performance on the standard object 
permanence task. The corollary of children's imitative strength could be that children with 
Down's Syndrome are not especially motivated by object retrieval or `epistemic 
curiosity'. Furthermore, the representational components of imitation with respect to 
spatial and memory requirements could facilitate solution of object permanence tasks in 
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the absence of explicit knowledge of object location. The next experiment sets out to 
investigate the possibility that correct solutions to object permanence in children with 
Down's Syndrome might rely on imitative representations rather than object 
representations. 
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11.3 Study 4: The use of imitative representations in object 
permanence tasks 
11.3.1 Introduction 
This experiment was designed to ascertain how children with Down's Syndrome would 
perform on an object permanence task which explicitly prevents imitation as compared to 
a standard OP task. 
In our 'non-standard' version of object permanence tasks the means of retrieval differs 
from means of hiding. Objects are hidden by dropping them through holes in the base of 
plastic cups. The holes are too small to allow retrieval of the objects by reversing this 
procedure. The children are required to use a lever in order to indirectly retrieve the object 
from beneath a cup. The lever is used only by the child following an initial demonstration 
by the experimenter. In such a task, the child cannot use empirical strategies for retrieval 
as the means of retrieval differs substantial from the means of hiding. It is hoped that this 
procedure will allow us to investigate different strands of development in terms of both 
object representation and search behaviour. 
11.3.2 Method 
11.3.2.1 Participants 
The participants for this experiment were 18 children with Down's Syndrome (8 girls, 10 
boys) and 18 children without Down's Syndrome (6 girls, 12 boys). Participants with 
Down's Syndrome were recruited from parental support groups and local pre-school 
services, whilst typically developing children were recruited though local toddler groups. 
Some children had taken part in previous studies, see chapter 7. 
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Developmental ages, assessed using the BSID II, and chronological ages are shown in 
Table 11-10. 
Mean Chronological Age (s. d. ) Mean Developmental Age (s. d. ) 
DS (N=18) 23.0 (8.0) 13.5 (4.5) 
NDS (N=18) 13.0 (4.0) 12.9 (4.5) 
Table 11-10: Chronological and developmental ages of participants 
11.3.2.2 Materials 
Three cup and lever devices were constructed as shown in Figure 11-4. The cups were in 
three bright colours, red, yellow and blue, each with white spots. The apparatus was 
designed such that a small ball could be dropped through the transparent tubing into the 
cup but could only be retrieved by use of the lever. Once the lever was pressed by the 
child, the ball would roll from the bottom of the cup along the base of the apparatus and 
could then easily be retrieved. These cup and lever devices will hitherto be referred to as 
`levers'. 
Figure 11-4: Cup and lever assembly as used in study 4 
A second set of free-standing cups and tubes, without levers, were produced in order to 
control for the effects of the means of hiding on retrieval success. 
The toy objects were used in the standard tasks each small enough to fit within the palm 
of an adult's hand; three coloured foam balls, a toy car and a small toy sheep. 
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11.3.2.3 Procedure 
Children were seen at home in the presence of their mother at a time prearranged to be 
suitable for both parent and child. Children were either seated on their parent's lap or on 
the floor directly opposite the experimenter. This seating arrangement is detailed in Figure 
11-5. At the start of each session, the experimenter would play with the child using a 
familiar toy for a maximum of 5 minutes. Following this period, children were presented 
with each of the test materials; a coloured cloth cover, a `cup', and the lever apparatus. 
When the lever apparatus was introduced, a small toy was attached to the top of the `cup' 
and the experimenter modelled the action of pressing the lever, `making the bunny jump'. 
Children were then encouraged to press the lever up to three times, `you make the bunny 
jump'. All children were able to do this. 
0 
0 Figure 11-5: Seating arrangement for 
study 4 (experimenter (E), child (C), 
and three lever devices shown) 
Children were tested under three conditions; the standard condition (standard), the lever 
condition (lever) and the cup condition (cup). Children were tested under all conditions 
within a single testing session lasting up to 40 minutes. The three conditions were 
presented in an order which was counterbalanced between participants. 
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The standard testing condition was adapted from the Uzgiris and Hunt (1975) object 
permanence scale as used in study 2. Items 4,8,10,13,14, and 15 were selected from 
the standard scale and details of these items are given in Appendix B. 
The hiding tasks for the lever condition were intended to match the demands of the 
standard scale with the additional means end requirements of pressing the lever to effect 
retrieval of the object. The scale was the same as in the standard condition with levers 
used in place of covers. In order to facilitate invisible displacements, the transparent tubes 
were covered with small opaque funnels so that the object could be placed into the cups 
invisibly after being concealed in the experimenter's hand. The testing procedure for the 
`cup' condition was identical to that of the lever condition. 
For each condition, an object was hidden according to the protocol and children were 
allowed to search. Four trials were presented for each scale item in each of the three 
conditions. Children searching at the correct location were allowed to play with the found 
object for 5 to 10 seconds. 
For all conditions, trials were repeated if the child looked away or was distracted so as not 
to witness the action. For search trials in which the object no longer captured the child's 
attention, the object was replaced with a novel toy. For the lever condition a number of 
different coloured balls were used to introduce novelty. For theoretical reasons the hidden 
object was only changed during non-switch trials (cf. Rast & Meltzoff, 1995). 
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11.3.3 Results 
The groups of children were classified by sensorimotor stage on the basis of performance 
on the standard object permanence tasks. Once again this classification is used for 
descriptive purposes only. These classifications are shown in Table 11-11 and are based 
on 3/4 correct trials at each level of the standard tasks (see Appendix B). The groups are 
not perfectly matched in terms of object permanence level, but if anything the children in 
the DS group are more advanced. However, the current hypothesis is that children with 
Down's Syndrome would perform worse than the NDS group when imitation is 
prevented. The fact that children with Down's Syndrome may be relatively advanced in 
object permanence is conservative with respect to this hypothesised difference. 
< Stage IV Stage IV Stage V Stage VI 
DS 123 12 
NDS 0269 
Table 11-11: Classification of participants by group and by 
object permanence stage 
Given the additional means-ends demands of the lever condition it is important to 
establish that this fact alone could not account for performance differences between 
conditions. All children were required during pre-testing to operate the lever successfully. 
During testing on the lever condition, 16/18 children in the DS group and 17/18 children 
in the NDS group operated the lever for the first item on the scale on at least two trials. 
Thus it is clear that the majority of children in both groups are able to effect a means-ends 
solution on this task. 
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The percentage of correct retrievals in each group and for each condition is shown in 
Figure 11-6. Given that the number of trials is the same in each condition, performance in 
expressed as a percentage of trials administered. Whilst children in the DS group are 
relatively advanced in terms of the standard and cup versions of the object permanence 
scale, they perform worse than the NDS group in the lever condition. The lever condition 
prevents solutions by imitation and this result, if significant, supports the current 
hypothesis. 
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Figure 11-6: Correct search responses by condition and by group. 
A three way analysis of variance (group x condition x order) was carried out on the 
number of correct responses under each of the three conditions, for the two groups (DS 
and NDS). Order of presentation was included as a factor in the analysis and 
developmental age was included as a covariate. The effect of group was not significant 
(F(1,23)=0.02). The effect of condition was significant (F(2,48)=13.18, p<0.001) as 
was the interaction between condition and group (F(2,48)=4.87, p<0.05). There were no 
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significant effects involving order of presentation of the conditions. Dunnett's test was 
used for pairwise comparisons between experimental, lever and cup conditions, and the 
standard condition as a control (Dunnett, 1964). For children with Down's Syndrome 
there were significantly fewer correct responses in the lever condition than in the control 
condition (Dunnett's t X, ever - 
Xs = 6.22, p<0.05). There was no significant 
difference in the number of correct responses in the two control conditions (Xc - U PS 
XS,. d., d = 1.78, NS). For the NDS group the number of correct responses in either of the 
experimental conditions was not significantly different from the standard condition (X, eyer 
- XS = 1.44, NS, Xcý ,- 
Xs, 
ý,,, a, d = -0.61, 
NS). 
Table 11-12 shows the correlation coefficients between scores on the standard OP task 
and on the lever task. Only the correlation for the NDS group, of 0.77, reached 
significance. 
DS NDS 
Correlation 0.40 0.77** 
Table 11-12: Correlations between scores on lever condition and standard object 
permanence scale(** p<0.001) 
In the previous experiment, it was argued that a high correlation between scores in each 
condition may indicate use of a similar strategy in both. In the current experiment the 
hypothesis suggests that children in the NDS group are using the same representational 
basis to effect a solution in all conditions. In contrast, children in the DS group are 
hypothesised to use an imitative strategy on the standard task which is prevented in the 
lever task. 
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11.3.4 Discussion 
In reference to our hypothesis it appears that children with Down's Syndrome perform 
significantly worse on an object permanence task which explicitly prevents them solving 
by imitation. In contrast, children with Down's Syndrome perform at a similar level to 
children in the NDS group on a standard object permanence task. This pattern of results 
suggests that the strategy which children with Down's Syndrome use to effect a solution 
on the standard object permanence scale does not lead to a solution in the lever task. 
A strong relationship between performance on the standard and lever versions of the 
object permanence tasks would suggest a close correspondence between the demands of 
the tasks, representational and otherwise. Performance on the standard and the lever tasks 
is highly correlated in the NDS group but not in the DS group. This pattern of results may 
reflect the fact that children with Down's Syndrome approach the object permanence task 
with an imitative strategy which fails to provide a solution to the lever task. 
In representational terms it is argued that children with Down's Syndrome solve object 
permanence tasks using imitative representations which reproduce the hiding action of the 
experimenter. Imitation of hiding actions results in successful retrieval in the standard task 
but not in the lever task. In contrast, children in the NDS group may use object 
representations to determine their search behaviour. A representation of the object's 
location drives a mean-ends solution in both conditions. Thus children in the NDS group 
would appear to be constructing an appropriate mean-ends solution on the basis of the 
object's location whilst children with Down's Syndrome simply reproduce the hiding 
action. 
In order to claim that the prevention of imitation reduces performance on the lever task we 
must first discount the possibility that the lever task introduces extraneous cognitive 
demands. One possibility is that the lever task increases the means-ends demands of the 
task and it is these demands which affect the performance of children with Down's 
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Syndrome. However, the vast majority of children in both groups were able to perform 
the single location lever task and would therefore appear capable of a mean-ends solution. 
The means-ends demand would therefore seem unlikely to be the critical factor 
responsible for a deterioration in performance on the lever task. The failure of children 
with Down's Syndrome is arguably therefore a failure to use an appropriate retrieval 
strategy which is within their repertoire. 
What remains to be explained is the reason for children with Down's Syndrome using an 
imitative rather than an object based strategy. There are a number of potential explanations 
for children's recourse to imitation. Imitative responses may place fewer demands on 
limited cognitive resources in children with Down's Syndrome. Alternatively, imitative 
representations may be stronger in children with Down's Syndrome than in typically 
developing children. In either case, it appears that the use of imitative strategies may be 
prevalent in the performance of children with Down's Syndrome on object permanence 
tasks. 
11.4 General Discussion 
The first study in this chapter, study 3, demonstrated that children with Down's 
Syndrome have a relative strength in imitative performance relative to performance 
children without Down's Syndrome matched on a standard object permanence task. In 
addition, children with Down's Syndrome also appear to spontaneously imitate hand 
movements in a task designed to mimic the spatial and memory demands of an object 
permanence task (cf. Appel & Gratch, 1984). The second study in this chapter, study 
four, demonstrated that children with Down's Syndrome may solve standard object 
permanence tasks by imitation and the prevention of imitation results in a corresponding 
decrement in performance. 
It is suggested therefore that imitation is a stronger feature of the cognitive style of infants 
with Down's Syndrome than of typically developing infants. However, it is vital to retain 
a distinction between explanations of competence and those of motivation. An alternative 
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view of the pattern of results presented in this chapter is that children with Down's 
Syndrome are fulfilling different motivational constraints which prefer a different set of 
solutions to tasks. Therefore, children with Down's Syndrome may be motivated to 
imitate whilst typically developing children are not. Thus it would be premature to 
conclude that children with Down's Syndrome cannot solve tasks other than by imitation, 
instead they may merely prefer an imitative solution. 
If imitation does prove to be a relative strength for children with Down's Syndrome it 
may change children's performance on a number of tasks. How could a preference for 
imitation arise? As was argued above, an imitative solution may be less cognitively taxing 
and therefore represent a more efficient way of deploying limited cognitive capacity. 
Alternatively, in representational terms, the salience of the imitative representation in the 
representational repertoire of children with Down's Syndrome may be forced to compete 
with the explicit representation of the object's location. 
Munakata et al. (1994) argue that representations may be viewed as gradualistic and 
stronger representations may drive more cognitively demanding solutions in terms of 
means-ends behaviour. If we view this proposal in the context of the present results it 
could be argued that the imitative representations are sufficiently strong to drive a retrieval 
action whilst object representations are correspondingly insufficient. Thus, when then 
object permanence demands are increased, the object representation is correspondingly 
weakened and unable to effect a retrieval. In such cases children with Down's Syndrome 
may override object representations with imitative representations. 
In a standard object permanence task, hand movements provide cues to the object's 
location, and in this case, both imitative and object-oriented solutions coincide. In our 
modified lever task, imitative and object-oriented solutions may compete in driving 
mutually exclusive actions. In such a situation children with Down's Syndrome perform 
especially poorly. Perhaps the existence of competition rather than the explicit absence of 
object representation may be the cause of failure. It may be important to establish how 
children with Down's syndrome develop explicit representations of objects as proposed 
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by Piaget. One way of ascertaining the representational status of the child with respect to 
object permanence would be to assess object permanence in the absence of hand 
movement cues which provide imitative solutions. Such tasks are relatively common, for 
example those used by Butterworth (1975) and Harris (1974), or dishabituation tasks 
such as those used by Spelke (1990) and Baillargeon and DeVos (1991). 
Irrespective of the nature of object representation in children with Down's Syndrome, the 
results of these studies suggest a preference for imitation in solving tasks. The results are 
also consistent with reports of aberrant error patterns and task difficulty which may also 
be explained in terms of a problem solving approach driven by imitation. Wishart and 
Duffy (1990) report reversals in the standard ordinal difficulty scale and Morss (1983) 
suggests that search errors in children with Down's syndrome are atypical. The use of the 
cues provided by hand movements may explain why children with Down's Syndrome 
show differences between modifications of object permanence tasks which have no effect 
on the performance of typically developing children. In particular, children with Down's 
Syndrome appear to distinguish between hidings involving hand movements and those 
which do not. Hidings involving hand movements are not necessarily easier for children 
with Down's Syndrome (e. g. Wishart, 1993) but clearly involve a different set of task 
demands from those hidings which are not `cued' by hand movements. The tasks used by 
Wishart (1993) are not directly comparable in terms of hand movement cues but illustrate 
the existence of additional influences on task performance in the Down's Syndrome 
population. The data from our first study confirms the existence of an atypical error 
pattern in children with Down's Syndrome. Furthermore, the suggestion that performance 
on object permanence tasks may not be driven exclusively by the representation of a 
hidden object may explain lower levels of engagement in such tasks (Wishart & Duffy, 
1990; Morss, 1983; Rast & Meltzoff, 1995). 
In summary, the current studies suggest that tasks involving imitation appear to be easier 
for children with Down's Syndrome than tasks which demand explicit representations of 
an object's location. Children with Down's Syndrome may therefore be using a 
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qualitatively different strategy to achieve success on a standard object permanence task. 
This finding casts doubt on assessment practices which use traditional object permanence 
tasks as a reflection of object concept development. The evidence for imitative 
representations in addition to object representations is contrary to the unitary view of 
representational development as proposed by Piaget. Furthermore the suggestion of 
representational dualism within the object permanence domain support the theoretical 
views espoused by Fischer and Jennings (1981) and Meltzoff and Gopnik (1989) in 
relation to representational development. Imitation may represent a particular 
representational strength for children with Down's Syndrome which may be applicable to 
a number of other cognitive domains. Before considering the wider developmental 
implications and mechanisms behind this imitative strength it will be necessary to 
establish the general use of imitation in relation to other domains. The particular 
motivational, attentional constraints which prevail in object permanence tasks may not 
allow generalisations to children's spontaneous representational activity. In the following 
chapter, the issue of imitative representation is addressed in relation to the general, 
spontaneous representational acts implicated in symbolic play. 
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Study 5: Symbolic Play and Imitation in Children with 
Down's Syndrome 
12.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the role of imitative representations in performance on 
object permanence tasks. Children with Down's Syndrome in contrast to typically 
developing children, appear to use imitative representations in performing such tasks. At 
the end of the previous chapter it was concluded that the development and use of imitative 
representations may be a relative strength in children with Down's Syndrome. In order to 
substantiate this claim it is necessary to demonstrate that the use of imitative 
representations characterises performance across a broad range of tasks. The current 
chapter addresses the use of imitative representations in play. The contrast between object 
permanence tasks and play is particularly striking in terms of task and motivational 
demands and is therefore a crucial area in which to demonstrate the generalisation of our 
representational claim. Furthermore, the contrast between play and imitation as distinct 
developmental processes, introduced in chapters 5 and 6, is particularly informative with 
respect to representational development in children with Down's Syndrome. 
Play and imitation fulfil complementary developmental roles and broadly characterise the 
Piagetian processes of accommodation and assimilation. An adequate balance between 
these processes is central to Piagetian view of development. Whether we characterise the 
representational duality as that of `empirical - hypothetical', as Meltzoff and Gopnik 
(1989) suggest, or between assimilation and accommodation according to Piaget, there 
may be a discrepancy between these representational processes in children with Down's 
Syndrome. The relative strength of the `imitative' representational form, if confirmed in 
children with Down's Syndrome, should be evident in children's play as in all other 
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domains. The present study investigates the role of imitative representations in the pretend 
play acts of children with Down's Syndrome. 
A number of studies report that children with Down's Syndrome develop symbolic play 
in the same sequential manner as that observed in typically developing children (Krakow 
& Kopp, 1983; Beeghly, Weiss-Perry & Cicchetti, 1990). Furthermore, the proportion of 
time spent engaged in spontaneous symbolic play appears to be similar in children with 
and without Down's Syndrome. However, close examination of the quality of play acts in 
children with Down's Syndrome reveals a number of differences in play quality. For 
example, Krakow and Kopp (1983) characterise the play of children with Down's 
Syndrome as `rigid, stereotypical and repetitive'. Beeghly et al. (1990) found evidence 
that children with Down's Syndrome produce fewer object substitutions, or symbolic 
acts, than typically developing children. A number of other studies also suggest an 
increased tendency towards repetition of symbolic acts without elaboration (Riguet, 
Taylor, Benaroya, & Klein 1981; Beeghly et al., 1990). 
Explanations of the differing quality of play focus on differences in both attention and 
motivation in children with Down's Syndrome. Krakow and Kopp suggest that children 
with Down's Syndrome may not be aware of, or are unable to take advantage of, the 
object and social resources available. According to Krakow and Kopp, such differences 
reflect excessive focus on one stimulus, either social or toy, during play. There is 
substantial evidence to suggest that children may selectively attend to social stimuli in 
preference to toys during dyadic play (Gunn, Berry & Andrews, 1982; Berger & 
Cunningham, 1981; Kasari, Mundy, Yirmiya & Sigman, 1990; Landry & Chapieski, 
1990) although this bias appears to depend on the relative salience of object and social 
stimuli (Ruskin, Mundy, Kasari & Sigman, 1994). 
Many explanations of the development of children with Down's Syndrome appeal to 
reduced motivation as a cause for deficits. Symbolic play is no exception in this respect 
and a number of studies show a reduction in `mastery motivation' in children with 
Down's Syndrome (Gunn, 1982; Gunn et al. 1981; Berry, Gunn & Andrews, 1984; 
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Ruskin et al., 1994). The lower motivation may therefore explain the lack of flexible and 
elaborate symbolic play in spontaneous situations. 
Pretend play is considered to be an important index of children's cognitive development 
and underlying representational capacity (Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1991; Fein, 1981) 
There is a strong case for differences in motivation and attention in children with Down's 
Syndrome which may in turn lead to differences in the quality of symbolic play. 
However, it is equally possible that differences in representational status are primarily 
responsible for differences in play quality with differences in motivation and attention 
reflecting these representational discrepancies. The use of imitative representations in 
object permanence tasks was linked to- motivational and performance anomalies in the 
context of object permanence tasks. In terms of play, a tendency to rely on imitative 
representations may also reduce the intrinsic motivation to play. Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992/1995) claims the reverse causal link between representation and motivation citing 
the importance of achieving behavioural mastery in establishing an explicit 
representational basis for action. Irrespective of the causal connection between 
representational, motivational and attention based accounts of performance, it is clear that 
such accounts are not mutually exclusive. However, the current chapter will focus on the 
representational account of pretend play and associated discrepancies between children 
with Down's Syndrome and typically developing children. 
The studies in chapter 11 demonstrated that a weakness in object representations could be 
supplemented by imitation thus implying a duality in underlying representational 
components. In this chapter it is argued that symbolic play reflects a similar duality in 
representational terms, a capacity to acquire representations through imitation and a 
complementary capacity to deploy representations in play. Just as children's search 
behaviour may be distinguished when driven by object or imitative representations, in 
symbolic play, a distinction may be drawn between imitative and `play representations'. 
The term `play representation' is used here to refer to the knowledge which the child maps 
onto objects and events during symbolic play. The term is used in preference to symbolic 
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representations` which have distinct theoretical connotations in relation to play. The 
distinction between imitative and play representations will now be discussed 
Piaget argued that imitation and play during the sensorimotor period characterise opposing 
processes of accommodation and assimilation respectively (Piaget, 1951/1967). 
Accommodation, and imitation, are processes by which children incorporate new 
information into their representational schemes. In contrast, assimilation, and play, 
represent the application of existing schemes in new contexts and to novel objects. Thus, 
during the sensorimotor period, imitation represents the input to the child's schema whilst 
play represents the output generated by internal schema. While imitation necessitates some 
output on the part of the child, Piaget argued that this output is not representational during 
the sensorimotor stage. With the onset of representational thought, the distinction between 
play and imitation becomes increasingly complex. At this stage, both imitation and play 
comprise representational output. However, Piaget argued that the distinction between the 
`pure forms' of imitation and play remains. Piaget refers to the imitation process as 
heavily context bound and dependent on-the use of familiar objects. The process of play, 
in contrast expresses representation in new situations and adopts novel objects. Here, 
play and imitation are referred to in their extreme, pure forms. Piaget suggested that 
`play', as a typical behaviour, is characterised by complementary processes of 
assimilation, pure play, and accommodation, pure imitation. 
Thus the distinction which is drawn in this chapter between play representation and 
imitative representation may be seen as corresponding to the Piagetian processes of 
assimilation and accommodation. Children's play acts may therefore be characterised by a 
balance of both imitative and play representations. Contemporary views of play 
development draw a clear distinction between symbolic and functional play. 
Developmental trends in play result in the increasing tendency to play symbolically and a 
corresponding reduction in functional play. According to Leslie (1987), symbolic play 
reflects a reduction in the reliance on real or lifelike objects in play. Children are therefore 
' Symbolic play is often regarded as 'meta-representational' (e. g. Perner, 1991) 
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deemed to be playing `symbolically' when using one object to represent another. 
Huttenlocher and Higgins (1978) define symbolic play in terms of a capacity for play 
which could not be learned or copied directly from adults. In terms of imitative and play 
representations, the increasing use of object substitutions and reduced reliance on adult 
models may reflect a developmental shift in play representation towards symbolic play 
representations, and away from functional representations. Furthermore, there may be a 
corresponding decline in imitative representations akin to the decline in empirical 
representations proposed by Meltzoff and Gopnik (1989). While the claim for 
representational duality in play may be controversial, this distinction allows us to discuss 
potential anomalies in representational development. 
It is thus argued that pretend play under normal circumstances impinges on two 
representational systems, a stored representation of the real action which is essentially 
imitative, and a more abstract representation of the meaning of the play act, the play 
representation. The child's response to an adult model thus involves bringing together 
these two representations. If for example, a child is seen to brush dolly's teeth, she has 
brought together a representation of an event they have witnessed, essentially imitative, 
and used a play representation to generate a meaningful reconstruction of the event in a 
novel context. The relative contribution of imitative representations thereby reflects the 
child's faithful adherence to the adult model. Conversely the contribution of play 
representation frees the child from a context bound reproduction of the adult's model to 
express abstract knowledge of the act with new materials and in new contexts. 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that children with Down's Syndrome have a 
tendency to rely on imitative representations. When extended to play the use of imitative 
representations would suggest a number of anomalies in play quality. Consistent with 
reliance on imitation, there are a number of anomalies in the play of children with Down's 
Syndrome such as rigidity and repetition (Krakow & Kopp, 1983; Beeghly, Weiss-Perry 
& Cicchetti, 1990). However, in order to demonstrate empirically the relative strength of 
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imitative as opposed to play representations we need to establish a framework whereby 
the use of such representations may be discriminated. 
In the case of functional play, one would expect the two representational systems to 
converge and support each other in some way. As Piaget argues, albeit with different 
terminology, intelligent action necessarily comprises a `harmonious combination' of these 
processes. Thus when an adult brushes the doll's hair, this routine can be reproduced by 
the child via direct imitation but also conforms to the child's play representations 
comprising knowledge of the act's meaning. However, if an adult models a counter- 
functional act, such as brushing a toy lorry, then one would expect a degree of conflict 
between imitative representations and the play representations which comprise meaning. 
Counter-functional play involves the use of a functional object in such a way that betrays 
its functional role e. g. the use of a spoon to `brush' dolly's hair. The child's reproduction 
of a counter-functional act in response. to an adult model gives an indication of prior 
representations of the object's functional role. Thereby, a tendency to imitate a counter- 
functional model suggests the relative strength of imitative representations in contrast to 
play representations. 
The comparison between these two measures may indicate the relative strength of the 
child's representations and consequent need to attribute meaning to play acts. It is 
assumed therefore that children have two underlying competing responses, the first to 
produce a model which is consistent with the functional properties of the object, i. e. 
meaning, and a second response which is inconsistent with meaning but conforms to the 
model observed. In order for competing responses to exist, children must have existing 
play representations comprising knowledge of the object's functional properties. For 
example, if the adult models `brushing'. a doll's hair with a spoon then the child must 
have an existing functional representation of the spoon. Furthermore, this framework 
implies that children are restricted to functional representations. While play 
representations in young children are thought to be functional, older children may be able 
to attribute meaning to a range of seemingly abstract acts. 
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The framework established here provides us with an empirical tool to distinguish imitative 
representations and play representations. However, this distinction implies two provisos. 
First, it is important to demonstrate that the counter-functional model does conflict with 
the child's existing knowledge. Second, the framework for representational conflict may 
only be valid in young children who are predominantly restricted to functional play. 
Given these qualifications, this framework may distinguish between the representational 
basis for play used by children with Down's Syndrome and typically developing children. 
The anomalies observed in the pretend play of children with Down's Syndrome may 
reflect the use of imitative representations which has been demonstrated in relation to 
object permanence. 
12.1.1 Aim 
The aim of the present study is to investigate the propensity for imitation of counter- 
functional play acts in children with Down's Syndrome and in typically developing 
children. This study aims, firstly, to establish that both groups, DS and NDS, are 
restricted to functional play and can demonstrate functional representations of play 
objects. Secondly, the aim is to investigate the claim that children with Down's Syndrome 
will be more likely to imitate a counter-functional model of play than typically developing 
children. 
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12.2 Method 
12.2.1 Participants 
The participants in this experiment were 18 children with Down's Syndrome (9 female, 9 
male) matched for developmental age with 18 children without Down's Syndrome (9 
female, 9 male). The BSID 11 was administered to assess the children's developmental 
ages for the purpose of matching. Testing for all children began at item 78 of the scales 
and was terminated either at item 148 or when the child had failed 10 consecutive items. 
Developmental and chronological ages for the two groups are shown in Table 12-1. 
DS n=18 NDS n=18 
DA months (s. d. ) 20.1 (7.5) 20.2 (8.1) 
CA months (s. d. ) 37.7 (14.2) 20.1 (7.8) 
Table 12-1: Developmental ages and chronological 
ages of participants 
To investigate the possibility of a global discrepancy between play and cognitive 
development an independent measure of pretend play was obtained. The test of pretend 
play (Lewis & Boucher, 1997) , or 
ToPP, was used as an assessment of children's ability 
to produce decontextualised play. The whole test comprises 4 sections of which only the 
first three were administered. 
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Scores on the ToPP and age equivalent scores for the two groups are shown in Table 12- 
2. The number of object substitutions (i. e. frequency with which one object was 
substituted with another) was also scored from the test data for each child in order to 
compare the frequency of such substitutions in the two groups. 
DS NDS 
TOPP Score (Sections I-III) (s. d. ) 4.83 (2.15) 4.50 (1.86) 
Frequency of Substitution (s. d. ) (Max. 17) 1.4(l. 5) 1.9 (1.7) 
Age Equivalent months (s. d. ) 19.0 (4.2) 18.3 (3.6) 
Table 12-2: Scores, frequency of object substitutions, and age-equivalent scores 
on the Test of Pretend Play (TOPP) 
Developmental trends in functional play suggest a decreasing reliance on similarity of play 
objects to functional objects (Ungerer, Zelazo, Kearsley & O'Leary, 1981). This process, 
which Piaget referred to as `decontextualisation', reflects the fact that children are 
increasingly able to attribute properties to non-functional junk objects or indeed objects 
with a counter-functional role. Given our empirical requirement that children should be 
restricted to functional representations of objects, it was important to include this measure 
of symbolic play as a second check on our matching procedure. The age equivalent scores 
on the ToPP indicate no apparent discrepancy in symbolic play with respect to 
developmental age in either group. Furthermore, as Ungerer et al. (1981) report, 
children's play between 18 and 22 months comprises a low frequency of object 
substitution thus satisfying the requirement that play is largely dependent on the functional 
use of objects. The minimal frequency of object substitutions from our sample 
is apparent 
in Table 12-2. 
12.2.2 Pilot testing of play materials 
Extensive pilot testing was carried out with 22 typically developing children aged 14 
months to 35 months (mean 23 months) to ensure a reasonable degree of spontaneous 
functional play with a set of test materials. During pilot testing, eight toy items were 
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presented to children in the following order; a spoon, a hairbrush, a small flannel, a 
baby's bottle, a bath, a potty, a mirror, and a toothbrush. Two `target' toys, a toy lorry 
and a doll, were also made available to the child. The purpose of pilot testing was to 
confirm that each toy item would elicit functional play with a small doll as opposed to the 
counter-functional pairing with the toy lorry. The two target toys, doll and lorry, were 
placed within the child's reach and the eight toy items were presented sequentially to the 
child. Following this `spontaneous' condition, the items were presented to the child in 
sequence following counter-functional modelling by the experimenter. The experimenter 
modelled the act of `brushing the lorry's hair' prior to presenting the brush item to the 
child. This condition was included to gauge children's imitation of a counter-functional 
model. 
The first priority was to assess the frequency of children's functional play in the 
spontaneous condition. Children's play acts with each item were categorised as either 
functional or counter-functional under each condition. Figure 12-1 shows the percentage 
of children who engaged in functional play with each toy item in the spontaneous 
condition. 
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Figure 12-1: Proportion of children engaging in doll directed 
(functional) play in spontaneous condition (pilot testing) 
The number of functional and counter-functional acts under each condition was also 
analysed in a two-way analysis of variance (target x condition). The main effect of 
condition was not significant (F(1,23)=2.63), nor was the main effect of target 
(F(1,23)=0.00, NS). However, the interaction was significant (F(1,23)=18.23, 
p<0.001), indicating a shift toward counter-functional play following a counter-functional 
model by the experimenter. These data were also analysed in order to determine the effect 
size pertinent to our hypothesis. The experimental hypothesis essentially predicts that 
children with Down's Syndrome are more likely to be influenced by the experimenter's 
model than children in the NDS group. Thus a difference between DS and NDS groups in 
the strength of the play type x condition interaction is predicted. The two-way interaction 
in the pilot data was taken as the best' estimate of the size of the predicted three-way 
(group x play-type x condition) interaction in our experimental data. The effect size was 
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71 2 (partial) = 0.44. Thus, a smaller sample size of 18 per group would give a power of 
0.98 (at (x=0.05) according to data from Cohen (1988). 
12.2.3 Apparatus 
On the basis of pilot testing, the following items were selected for the current study: a 
spoon, a hairbrush, a small flannel, a baby's drinking bottle, a toy bath, and a 
toothbrush. Only one item, a mirror, was rejected from the pilot set due to its failure to 
elicit frequent functional play in more than 10% of children. A second item, the toy potty, 
was rejected on the grounds that it was unlikely to elicit functional play in young children 
who may not have been aware of its functional properties. Functional awareness would 
therefore have been confounded with the chronological age differences between our two 
groups if this item was included. 
Two additional toy items, a toy comb and a small toy cup, were selected to complete a set 
of eight. It was presumed that these additional items, being similar in function to the pilot 
items, brush and bottle, would elicit a reasonable level of functional play. All items were 
the appropriate size for a doll of height 35 cm. Toy targets for children's play were a doll 
(height 35 cm) and a toy lorry (length 32 cm). 
12.2.4 Procedure 
All children were tested at home with one parent present. A video camera was placed in 
one corner of the room in order to record the child's activity during the experiment 
The experimental procedure began with an assessment of children's spontaneous 
functional play, referred to as the `spontaneous' condition. Parents were requested not to 
prompt their children's play in a directive manner such as `give dolly a drink' but to offer 
general encouragement. The target toys, the lorry and doll, were placed in front of the 
child approximately 0.5 metres apart and at a distance of 0.5 metres from the child. 
Children were presented with the functional toy items in the following order: a spoon, a 
hairbrush, a small flannel, a baby's drinking bottle, a toy bath, a comb, a cup, and a 
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toothbrush. Items were placed between the two target toys and only one item was present 
at any one time. Children who failed to pick up the functional toy item spontaneously 
were encouraged by the experimenterwho pointed at the item and said, `what's this' or 
`look'. Children who failed to produce any play with the functional item (either self or 
target directed) within 15 seconds were encouraged to look at the target toys by the 
experimenter who held target toys 0.5 metres apart and then replaced them in front of the 
child (see Figure 12-2). After 30 seconds the child was presented with the next item from 
the series. Testing continued in this manner with each of the eight toy items. 
Figure 12-2: Position of child and experimenter with target items (lorry and doll shown) 
A second experimental condition, `modelled', involved the experimenter modelling a 
counter-functional play act for two to three seconds, waiting for two to three seconds, and 
then presenting the child with the toy item. Counter-functional play involved the toy item 
being paired with the lorry target as opposed to the doll as target. The experimenter would 
for example, place the toy drinking bottle at the front of the lorry and tip up the bottle as if 
to give the lorry a drink. Children were encouraged to watch the modelled acts by the 
experimenter saying, `look at this', or, `watch me' but the nature of the act, e. g. 
`drinking', was not verbalised. After the presentation of a counter-functional model, the 
toy item was placed between the targets as in the previous condition and children were 
offered encouragement in a manner identical to this condition. This procedure was 
repeated for each of the eight toy items. 
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It is important to note that the order of the spontaneous and modelled conditions were not 
counterbalanced. Prior exposure to a modelled counter-functional act may have primed 
such an act in the subsequent condition and for this reason the spontaneous condition 
preceded the modelled condition. 
12.2.5 Treatment of results 
Video recordings of all experimental sessions were coded by the experimenter. Children's 
play was categorised according to the target of the play act which could be either the lorry, 
or the doll. Children occasionally produced a sequence of more than one identifiable play 
act within the 30 second period allocated to each item. All identifiable play acts were 
recorded in order up to a maximum of two sequential acts e. g. lorry as first target , doll as 
second target . Play acts were also coded as either 
`accurate' or `inaccurate'. In the case of 
functional acts, with the doll as target, accuracy was categorised according to the child's 
conformity with the functional properties of the toy item e. g. hairbrush used on the doll's 
hair rather than its face. In the case of counter-functional acts, with the lorry as target, 
accuracy reflected correspondence to the experimenter's model. It is important to note 
that, in the spontaneous condition, children would not have seen the experimenters 
model, and accuracy is to some extent arbitrary in this case. 
Video recordings of 10 play sessions (28% of our total sample) were judged by a second 
rater, a psychology graduate. Cohen's Kappa was used to calculate chance corrected 
agreement on nominal play categories. For judgements of first play act, kappa x= 0.73, 
for first and second play acts in sequence, x= 0.67. For judgements of accuracy, x= 
0.65. 
12.3 Results 
The number of first play acts classified as either doll, lorry, or self- directed are shown in 
Figure 12-3, for the spontaneous condition and Figure 12-4, for the modelled condition. 
Play acts represented here indicate only the first act produced irrespective of subsequent 
play acts. While functional, doll-directed play is clearly more frequent in the spontaneous 
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condition, lorry-directed, counter-functional play is most frequent in the modelled 
condition. 
A three-way analysis of variance (target x group x condition) was carried out. The 
analysis reported a non significant main effect of group (F(1,34)=3.24) indicating a 
similar frequency of play acts in the DS and NDS groups. The main effect of target was 
significant (F(1,34)=14.34, p<0.001) indicating that the children produced fewer lorry- 
directed than doll-directed acts. The main effect of condition was not significant 
(F(1,34)=3.78, NS) indicating a similar frequency of play acts across both conditions. 
The group x target interaction was not significant (F(1,34)=0.18) suggesting that there 
were no general differences in the distribution of target-directed acts between the two 
groups. Furthermore, the group x condition interaction was not significant 
(F(1,34)=0.06) indicating no group dependent difference in frequency of play acts 
between the spontaneous and modelled conditions. 
As predicted, and consistent with our pilot results, the two-way target x condition 
interaction was significant (F(1,34) = 62.8, p<0.001) reflecting a difference in the 
distribution of target choice in spontaneous and modelled conditions. The current 
hypothesis suggests that children with Down's Syndrome should show an increased 
tendency to imitate a counter-functional act and such an effect is reflected in the three way 
interaction group x target x condition. The interaction was significant F(1,34)=5.10 
p<0.05 and suggests that the change in the distribution of play acts with respect to 
condition was group dependent. 
Pairwise Bonferoni adjusted t-tests between conditions confirm a significant decrease in 
functional, doll-directed play in the modelled condition in both groups (t(17)=5.86 
p=0.001 for the DS group, and t(17)=3.79 p=0.001 for the NDS group). Both groups 
show a corresponding significant increase in counter-functional play in the modelled 
condition (t(17)=6.27 p=0.001 for the DS group and t(17)=3.79 p=0.01 for the NDS 
group). 
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It was important to establish the extent to which individual children maintained a level of 
functional play across the two conditions. Correlation coefficients were therefore 
calculated between the number of functional acts which each child produces in each of the 
spontaneous and modelled conditions. The greater tendency for children in the NDS 
group to maintain functional play in the modelled condition (i. e. choose the doll) is 
reflected in the correlation between functional acts across the two conditions r=0.55 
p<0.05. The tendency for children in the DS group to exhibit correspondingly fewer 
functional acts in the modelled condition is reflected in the smaller correlation for the DS 
group, r=0.34, NS. 
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Table 12-3 shows the accuracy of play acts as a percentage of total acts produced within 
each condition and category. The data suggests that the most accurate acts in general are 
those which reflect imitation of the counter-functional act (lorry) in the modelled 
condition. In terms of the functional acts, the degree of accuracy is relatively high in both 
groups. 
Condition Target DS NDS 
Spontaneous Doll' 63 (34) 71(34) 
Modelled Doll 65 (31) 66(45) 
Modelled Lorry 85 (26) 81(32) 
Table 12-3: Percentage accuracy of target acts in spontaneous and 
modelled conditions (s. d. ) 
In summary, group effects show a relative shift towards counter-functional play in the 
modelled condition, more markedly so in the Down's Syndrome group. Imitation of a 
counter functional models appeared to be accurate and was a stronger feature of 
performance in the DS group compared to the NDS group. However, the experimental 
hypothesis, when strictly interpreted, demands that individual children within the Down's 
Syndrome group should be more likely to shift from a functional play act (in the 
spontaneous condition) to a counter-functional play act (in the modelled condition) with a 
particular toy item. 
' The accuracy of lorry directed acts in the spontaneous condition are to a certain extent 
arbitrary as children had not yet been exposed to the counter-functional model 
(correspondence to this model determined accuracy). These results have therefore been 
excluded to avoid confusion. 
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Table 12-4 shows the frequency with which children's acts with individual items showed 
consistency or inconsistency across conditions. 
Spontaneous condition Modelledcondition DS NDS 
functional no play 1.4 (1.3) 1.2 (1.8) 
functional functional 1.4 (1.8) 1.6 (2.7) 
functional counter-functional 2.8 (2.5) 1.2 (1.8) 
Table 12-4: Changes in play act between spontaneous and modelled 
conditions, DS and NDS groups(flrst play act only) 
A two-way analysis of variance (group x shift-type) was carried out on the number of 
shifts made between conditions. The main effects of group (F(1,34)=2.62) and shift type 
(F(1,34)=0.74) were not significant. The group x shift-type interaction was not 
significant (F(2,68)=1.93). Thus, there is no significant difference between the DS and 
NDS groups with respect to the type of shift made. However, it would appear that 
children with Down's Syndrome produce relatively more specific shifts from functional to 
counter-functional play as a t-test confirmed t(18)=2.22 p<0.05. 
The results thus far indicate a consistent change in relative frequency of play acts under 
the spontaneous and modelled conditions. Furthermore, the shift towards counter- 
functional acts under conditions of counter-functional modelling is consistently and 
significantly stronger in the children with Down's Syndrome. However, given that 
children often produced multiple play acts, the first act may have indicated an imitative 
`reflex', independent of play representations. 
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A further analysis of second and subsequent play acts was carried out to examine play 
acts following such imitation. The cumulative frequency of play acts from both first and 
second acts is shown in Table 12-5. 
Condition DS NDS 
Spontaneous Doll 5.9 (2.4) 4.3 (2.5) 
Lorry 0.6 (0.6) 0.5 (0.7) 
Modelled Doll 2.3 (2.5) 2.1 (2.8) 
Lorry 3.9 (2.1) 2.3(2.2) 
Table 12-5: Cumulative frequency of target acts in spontaneous and 
modelled conditions (i. e. including second and subsequent acts)(s. d. in 
parentheses) 
The results show a striking similarity to our previous results (Figure 12-3 & Figure 12-4) 
despite the inclusion of second acts. The relatively small change reflects the infrequency 
with which children made two target directed acts in sequence with a single toy item. A 
three-way analysis of variance confirmed the same pattern of significant results as our 
previous analysis. Notably, the three-way interaction group x target x condition remained 
significant F(1,34)=4.56, p<0.05. 
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12.4 Discussion 
The results presented in this chapter suggest that, under spontaneous play conditions, 
children with Down's Syndrome show a similarly high frequency of functional play as 
children without Down's Syndrome. This broad similarity in proportion of functional 
play acts is consistent with other empirical studies (McConkey, 1985; Beeghly, Weiss- 
Perry & Cicchetti, 1990). In contrast, in response to a counter-functional model, children 
with Down's Syndrome produced a counter functional response more often than typically 
developing children. 
The first analysis included only the first target directed act which children produced with 
each toy item. If a child produced two target directed acts only the first would contribute 
to the analysis. It cannot be concluded from this analyses that imitation of a counter- 
functional act is in competition with a functional response merely that imitation is the 
preferable first response. Such a pattern is often observed in typically developing 
children's performance on two location (AAB) object permanence tasks. In this case, a 
prepotent impulsive reach to location A (based on a representation of a previously 
successful action) is followed by a second reach (based on a representation of the hidden 
object) to location B. In the case of the object permanence task such a pattern is indicative 
of a failure to inhibit the prepotent response (Diamond & Gilbert, 1989). 
It is possible therefore that the imitative response which is seen predominantly in the DS 
group does not impinge on play representations. This possibility was addressed directly 
by considering acts directed at each target in sequence. If imitation is simply an impulsive 
reaction to the adult model, and does not interfere with underlying functional 
representations, then it should not impair subsequent functional play. The similar pattern 
of results which emerged despite inclusion of all target related play indicates the rarity 
with which children combined both functional and counter-functional acts with the same 
play object. The apparent mutual exclusivity of functional and counter functional play 
indicated responses are in direct competition rather than being independently activated. 
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The strict interpretation of this argument for `mutual exclusivity' in representations 
requires that individual children, while possessing a functional representation for a 
particular item, imitate a counter-functional model. While group trends suggest such a 
process, this does not necessarily reflect representational shifts within children. Our final 
analysis addressed this issue and compared each child's play with each item in the 
spontaneous condition with the child's play for the same item in the modelled condition. 
The fact that children with Down's Syndrome showed more frequent shifts from 
functional to counter-functional play suggests that representations gain exclusive control 
over the child's action. In the modelled condition, the play of children with Down's 
Syndrome is driven by imitative representations. 
It was suggested in the introduction to this chapter that the response to the counter- 
functional model is mediated by competition between an imitative representation and a 
play representation. In the modelled condition children hold an imitative representation of 
the experimenter's model and a play representation which was expressed in the 
spontaneous condition. The functional play representation evident in the spontaneous 
condition must therefore compete with a representation of the experimenter's action. The 
modelled action is counter-functional and given that our sample are developmentally 
inclined towards respecting the functional properties of objects, the model should be in 
conflict with their play representations. Typically developing children respond to the 
modelled condition with a reduction in functional play and a corresponding shift towards 
imitation of the counter-functional act. However, in children with Down's Syndrome this 
shift is significantly more dramatic. Our interpretation of these results is that children with 
Down's Syndrome have a general tendency to imitate which is exerted in preference to 
deploying functional representation. The corollary of this conclusion is that play 
representations in children with Down's Syndrome are weaker than in typically 
developing children and are therefore more easily supplanted by imitation. 
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Before elaborating on the implications of this conclusion there are a number of crucial 
objections to the current claims about which need to be addressed. There are a number of 
potential problems with our line of argument: 
a) Functional play is not representational and therefore there is no representational 
violation in imitation ofa counter functional act. 
It is argued in this chapter that functional play, while not requiring the same level of 
representation as symbolic play proper, does require some form of representation. 
Leslie's (1987) distinction between functional play and symbolic play was couched in 
terms of requirements for secondary representation. Play with a functional object may not 
require a secondary representation which is radically different to the primary 
representation - as when pretending a banana is a telephone. However, functional play 
does require some representation of the functional properties of the object within a 
primary representation. The requirement that only symbolic acts, as opposed to functional 
play, may be regarded as representational may be over conservative (Jarrold, 1997). 
Support for continuity in representational basis for functional and symbolic play comes 
from evidence that children with autism show a deficit in both symbolic and functional 
play (Lewis & Boucher, 1988; Sigmari & Ungerer, 1984; Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 
1996) 
One of the principal difficulties in empirical studies of representation is classifying the 
criteria for behaviour which is `representational'. In the case of symbolic play the 
distinction between representational play and simple manipulative play is complex and 
often subjective. While one child may place a stick in ajar in order to represent `stirring a 
cup of tea' another child may be interested solely in the manipulation of the objects in a 
similar manner. However, functional play acts, while not strictly symbolic are unlikely to 
reflect simple chance manipulations. The high levels of accuracy with which children 
reproduced both functional and counter-functional acts does not support an argument for 
chance manipulation. The representational status of functional play is certainly weaker but 
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even functional acts must require children to encode knowledge of an object's properties 
in relation to their actions. 
Functional play objects such as a doll and hairbrush have clear `representational' 
propertied and clearly definable functions. The child's tendency to produce functional 
play with a functional object therefore reflects the child's conceptual representations of its 
use. 
A second point which relates to the distinction between symbolic and functional play is 
that many of the studies which report the lower quality and repetitive nature of play in 
children with Down's Syndrome are based on functional rather than symbolic play 
(Beeghly, Weiss-Perry & Cicchetti, 1989; Krakow & Kopp, 1983). Despite referring to 
`symbolic play' it appears that Krakow and Kopp's (1983) study is pointing to 
differences in play with functional objects. 
b) The ability of children with Down's Syndrome to imitate a counter functional act 
indicates the ability to perform object substitution. i. e. use one object as though it were 
another. The relative frequency of counter-functional play in children with Down's 
Syndrome therefore indicatesa relatively advanced representationalsystem. 
Piaget referred to the child's growing ability to play symbolically with objects which are 
not realistic as decontextualisation. The act of feeding a lorry could be seen as indicative 
of decontextualisation. However, the ability to decontextualise objects from clear 
functional properties in a counter-functional way is arguably more advanced than the use 
of junk objects, with no clear functional role, as if they were something else (Jarrold, 
Boucher, & Smith, 1994). The argument for advanced play in the DS group is not 
supported by results of the ToPP symbolic play test which show performance closely 
matched to the NDS group. Furthermore, results from the ToPP showed only minimal 
evidence for decontextualised symbolic play in either group. 
I use the term representational here in its loose sense. i. e. a mini hairbrush is a 
representation of a real hairbrush but does not necessarily have representational status for 
the child (c. f. Perner, 1991). 
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c) Children with Down's Syndrome prefer to imitate 
The argument that children with Down's Syndrome simply prefer imitation, enjoy 
imitation, or are more highly motivated to imitate is, at first inspection, problematic for 
our interpretation. However, we can equally argue that typically developing children 
`prefer to play' as both arguments are simple tautologies. As we noted in our introduction 
there is a broad consistency between representational, motivational, and social 
explanations for behaviour. According to White (1969) and Harter (1974) children are 
motivated to display underlying competence in particular areas. This could equally well be 
translated as a motivation to develop and deploy knowledge at the representational level. 
Play, in particular, is widely held as an example of children simply playing for the sake of 
it and appears to be sensitive to children's motivational status (Hrncir, Speller & West, 
1985; Yarrow, Morgan, Jennings, Harmon & Gaiter, 1982). 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992/1995) argues for the importance of behavioural mastery in 
strengthening the explicit basis for representation. To answer the initial objection that 
children with Down's Syndrome prefer imitation to functional play one could argue that it 
is precisely because children with Down's Syndrome prefer imitation that play 
representations become weaker. Conversely one could equally argue that a weakness in 
symbolic representation is the cause of the motivational preference for imitation. 
The results presented in this chapter suggest a preference for imitation of counter- 
functional acts in children with Down's Syndrome which disregards and interferes with 
children's representations of the object's functional role. In terms of our experimental 
procedure, imitation and functional acts appear to have the same representational basis and 
therefore compete for exclusive control of the child's action. The results show that when 
faced with such competing tendencies, children with Down's Syndrome appear to prefer 
the imitative response over a response " based on functional play representations. It is 
argued that this pattern of performance reflects a pattern of representational strengths and 
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weakness, a relative strength in imitative representations and relative weakness in 
functional play representations. 
The existence of representational dualism was referred to in the introduction to this 
chapter. It was argued that pretend play, either functional or symbolic, may require a 
combination of imitative and play representations. Certainly, imitative representations 
must play a role in the acquisition of models for pretence (see Rogers & Pennington, 
1991). However, it is argued that the tendency for children with Down's Syndrome to 
override existing functional play representations with novel imitative representations 
suggests a fundamental relative weakness of play representations. Meltzoff and Gopnik 
(1989) argue that empirical representations (including imitation) are superseded by 
hypothetical representations around 18 months in typically developing children but this 
period may be delayed in children with Down's Syndrome. There are a number of 
theoretical reasons to believe that a tendency to imitate may be counterproductive to 
development. The Piagetian view of accommodation without assimilation suggests that 
the child continually incorporates new schemes but without understanding or integrating 
existing schemes. Karmiloff-Smith's view of representational development also suggests 
the need to achieve behavioural mastery if representations are to be consolidated and 
integrated. 
12.4.1 Summary 
The ease with which existing representations are supplanted by 
imitation reflects an 
underlying weakness and a lack of integration of functional representations 
in children 
with Down's Syndrome. This relative weakness of a functional representational 
basis for 
play may explain the inability of children with Down's Syndrome to generate elaborate 
and creative play acts. The anomalies reported by 
Krakow and Kopp (1983) regarding the 
rigid, stereotypical play of children with Down's 
Syndrome may also reflect a weaker 
representational basis. 
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Furthermore it is argued that the primacy of imitative representations over play 
representation may reflect both a cause and a consequence of weaknesses in play. The 
tendency to accumulate new representations, rather than strengthen and elaborate existing 
representations could result in a failure to reinforce existing representations. Karmiloff- 
Smith's model of `representational redescription' views the achievement of behavioural 
mastery as synonymous with the development of stronger representations via a transition 
to explicit forms. Therefore, a failure to achieve behavioural mastery necessarily results in 
weaker, implicit representations. Furthermore, we suggest that this weakness is 
exaggerated by a tendency to play by imitation rather than for mastery of play itself. This 
distinction is clearly characterised by Piaget's view of `pure play', as assimilation, and 
`pure imitation', as accommodation. The primacy of accommodation over assimilation is 
seen as counterproductive to development and results in the accumulation of experience 
without integration or reinforcement. 
In the following chapter the results of the preceding empirical studies are reviewed with 
reference to development in children with and without Down's Syndrome. The 
contribution of these studies to an understanding of typical representational development 
is summarised. Furthermore, it is argued that anomalies in the representational 
development of children with Down's Syndrome may require focused intervention to 
ameliorate counterproductive learning strategies. 
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General Discussion 
This thesis set out to investigate representational development in children with Down's 
Syndrome. While many domains of development such as language and play development 
are circumscribed for the purposes of empirical study, such domains may be linked at the 
representational level. A focus on representation has therefore allowed us to identify those 
facets of development which should be closely linked in theoretical terms. Many meta- 
developmental theories suggest a modular or global nature to representational 
development and specify the processes which drive representational development (Piaget, 
1953/1970; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992/1995; Fodor, 1983; 1989). Models of development in 
children with Down's Syndrome imply that similar structural constraints should apply to 
those implicated in typical development. The empirical work in this thesis has therefore 
focused on hypothesised cross-domain links derived from theoretical approaches to, and 
empirical studies of, typically developing children. Furthermore we have attempted to 
identify those links which appear anomalous or vulnerable in the light of evidence from 
the developmental profile of children with Down's Syndrome. 
This chapter attempts to draw together the results from our empirical studies and 
considers the nature of representational development in children with Down's Syndrome. 
Furthermore we attempt to relate the developmental characteristics of representation in 
infants with Down's Syndrome to developmental theory. Finally we consider how 
interventions may benefit from a greater understanding of representational processes in 
children with Down's Syndrome. 
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13.1 Review of studies reported in this thesis 
In our first empirical chapter, chapter 8, we investigated the stability of cognitive 
performance in children with Down's Syndrome in comparison to a group of typically 
developing children matched for developmental age. This study, in contrast to other 
studies, included a control group and the data suggest a comparable level of stability in 
children with Down's Syndrome and in typically developing children. However, there is 
a suggestion in the data that the pattern of instability in children with Down's Syndrome 
may be different to that of typically developing children. It appears that children with 
Down's Syndrome show less reliability on those items which, as a group, these children 
find relatively easy. 
Chapter 9 investigated the relationship between the motor development of children with 
Down's Syndrome and performance on object permanence tasks requiring sophisticated 
spatial representation. The finding that some children appear to perform two location 
search tasks prior to self-generated locomotion suggest that motor development does not 
necessarily limit spatial representation in children with Down's Syndrome. However, it 
remains a possibility that performance on object permanence tasks is not a reliable 
indicator of a child's spatial representation and subsequent studies addressed this 
question. 
In chapter 10 the relationship between conceptual and linguistic development in children 
with Down's Syndrome was investigated. The general finding that linguistic reference 
tends to lag behind cognitive development in children with Down's Syndrome is not 
supported by these data. Again this result may be explained by results from the following 
studies which suggest that performance on object permanence tasks may not reflect the 
same conceptual understanding as indicated in typically developing children. 
In chapter 11 it was argued that, given the apparent strengths and weaknesses in their 
developmental profile, it would be surprising if strategies adopted by children with 
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Down's Syndrome in solving object permanence tasks corresponded to those adopted by 
typically developing children. Furthermore, evidence for lower motivation and 
engagement in object permanence tasks coupled with anomalous error patterns suggests 
that children with Down's Syndrome may differ in their approach to tasks in general 
(Wishart, 1993a; 1993b; Wishart & Duffy, 1990; Morss, 1993). Given the strength of 
development in the social domain, it was proposed that children with Down's Syndrome 
may use imitation as a strategy to solve object permanence tasks. 
In study 3, children with Down's Syndrome were found to be in advance of typically 
developing children in imitation relative to object permanence. In study 4, the lever study, 
children with Down's Syndrome, in contrast to typically developing children, were found 
to be impaired on a task which precluded a solution by imitation. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that children with Down's Syndrome use their 
imitation as a strategy for solving object permanence tasks. Furthermore, the use of 
imitation in this context may reflect a `lower level' of conceptual engagement in object 
permanence tasks. 
The final study, study 5 (Chapter 12), extends the findings with respect to object 
permanence to the domain of symbolic play. Although children with Down's Syndrome 
were found to produce a similar number of functional play acts to typically developing 
children under spontaneous conditions, they were more likely to imitate the 
experimenter's counter-functional model. It is argued that the apparent ease with which 
children with Down's Syndrome accept a counter-functional model suggests an 
underlying weakness in functional representations which underpin emerging symbolic 
play. 
In summary, these experiments were designed to address particular developmental 
anomalies which have emerged in studies of children with Down's Syndrome. These 
anomalies suggest discrepancies between the structural organisation apparent in typically 
developing children and that which governs the development of children with Down's 
Syndrome. The atypical nature of development in children with Down's Syndrome 
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therefore serves to illustrate that there are alternative ontogenetic pathways (cf. Cicchetti & 
Beeghly, 1990). However, it appears that, given the slower pace of development in 
children with Down's Syndrome relative to typically developing children, the path which 
these children follow is far from ideal. 
In the following section the implication of the current findings are discussed with respect 
to both children with Down's Syndrome and theoretical approaches to development. 
Furthermore, the implications for intervention and further research will also be discussed. 
13.2 Representational development and learning in 
children with Down's Syndrome 
The performance of children with Down's Syndrome on object permanence tasks and 
symbolic play suggests the adoption of a developmental style which is distinct from 
typically developing children. It is important to consider how such a style could arise and 
consider its developmental implications. This section begins by re-examining models of 
development within the Down's Syndrome population and subsequently focuses on the 
theoretical implications for representational development in general. 
13.2.1 Delay vs. difference controversy revisited 
This thesis began with a discussion of models of development in children with Down's 
Syndrome. Many models take a global perspective and so necessarily reflect the general 
coherence and broadly typical organisation which characterises children with Down's 
Syndrome (Cicchetti & Beeghly, 1990). The `delay vs. difference' controversy which 
outlines the distinction between a global and specific delay is widely held to be a 
misnomer (Zigler & Balla, 1982). Even those advocating a delay view must account for 
this delay by positing some differences in the learning process. Some models, while 
specifying a circumscribed deficit, are nonetheless inclined to reflect a generalised 
slowing down of developmental processes in children with Down's Syndrome (Wishart, 
1996a; 1996b; Nadel, 1996; Krakow & Kopp; 1983). 
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Despite the tendency to characterise development in children with Down's Syndrome as 
globally delayed, a number of studies have investigated the pattern of learning in children 
with Down's Syndrome, in contrast to assessing absolute levels of performance (Wishart, 
1996a; 1996b; Krakow & Kopp, 1983). Despite a developmental progression which is 
similar in terms of sequence and structure to that of typically developing children, there do 
appear to be a number of differences in the style with which children with Down's 
Syndrome acquire, consolidate and demonstrate new skills. These differences may 
explain the slower developmental progression which typifies development in children 
with Down's Syndrome. The results presented in this thesis are broadly consistent with 
findings which suggest a reduced mastery motivation, an avoidant learning style, failure 
to consolidate learned skills, or a dampening of episteniic curiosity (Gunn, Berry, & 
Andrews, 1994; MacTurk, Hunter, McCarthy, Vietze, & McQuiston, 1985; Wishart, 
1996a; Rast & Meltzoff, 1995). However, it is suggested here that such qualities are 
related to representational development. 
13.2.2 Representational development 
On close inspection it appears that the representational basis which guides the 
performance of children with Down's Syndrome on a number of tasks may be far from 
typical. Children with Down's Syndrome may have strengths and weaknesses in their 
developmental profile which corresponds to an atypical representational profile. While 
development within linguistic and cognitive domains is often seen as deficient and 
consequently receives attention from empirical studies, the relative social strength, as it 
applies to task performance, is rarely considered (see Hodapp, 1996, for a discussion of 
strengths and weaknesses). However, some authors have begun to recognise the ways in 
which social `strengths' may impinge upon, or indeed impede, the learning process 
(Wishart, 1993a; Rast & Meltzoff, 1995). For example, children may deploy `party 
tricks' or stereotypical social routines in order to avoid difficult tasks (Pitcairn & Wishart, 
1994). The studies described in this thesis suggest that there may be a fundamental 
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conflict between skills within the social domain and developmental progress within other 
domains. 
The lack of attention which has been paid to the relative social strength in children with 
Down's Syndrome stands in contrast to studies of children with autism where a social 
deficit is seen as having a causal influence on development within a number of domains 
(Hobson, 1993; Rogers & Pennington, 1991). Conversely, one could argue that, given 
the pervasive nature of a social dimension across a range of apparently `cognitive' tasks, 
the relative strength of children with Down's Syndrome in the social domain may disguise 
underlying weakness. 
The relative strength of social development of children with Down's Syndrome may 
interfere with underlying developmental processes via an excessive use of imitative 
representations during infancy. Whilst imitation forms only a limited part of what is 
broadly characterised as a social strength, imitation itself is regarded as relatively well 
developed in children with Down's Syndrome (e. g. Hodapp, Leckman, Dykens, 
Sparrow, Zelinsky & Ort, 1992). Furthermore, imitation may be a causal influence on the 
perceived sociability of these children (Ruff & Rothbart, 1996; Gibbs & Thorpe, 1983). 
It appears that children with Down's Syndrome use strategies based on imitative 
representations in contrast to the strategies which characterise the performance of typically 
developing children. The strength of imitation often results in a successful outcome on 
standard tasks such as object permanence or within symbolic play. However, the use of 
imitative strategies is reflected in the pattern and quality of performance within these 
domains. A tendency towards imitation in search may impede the generation of 
hypotheses concerning the object's location. When forced to generate hypotheses in order 
to search, or search solely on the basis of the object's location, children with Down's 
Syndrome appear characteristically impaired. Furthermore, the tendency to imitate rather 
than generate acts from existing representations was also observed in our study of 
symbolic play in children with Down's Syndrome. The tendency to imitate is not merely 
an isolated representational strength but may reflect the corresponding weakness of other 
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representations. A weakness in underlying symbolic representations may therefore be 
reflected in the poor quality of spontaneous symbolic play in children with Down's 
Syndrome. 
13.2.2.1 Strengths and weaknesses in representational development 
Imitation clearly has an important role in typical development but its relative strength and 
exaggerated strategic use in children with Down's Syndrome may be counterproductive to 
learning and to general representational development. In this section, it is argued on 
theoretical grounds that imitative representations may contribute to the weakness of other 
representational systems. 
To adopt Piagetian terminology, imitation is an extension of accommodation, while play 
is a characteristic of extended assimilation. Assimilation, according to Piaget, results in 
the integration of existing schemes with other schemes acquired in isolation. Assimilation 
entails the interpretation of new situations on the basis of existing representations and 
results in the ability to comprehend such situations. Without assimilation, pure 
accommodation leads to poor comprehension and integration of freshly acquired schemes. 
Children with Down's Syndrome may therefore tend to accommodate new schemes 
without the corresponding assimilation process. This developmental processing bias is 
one way in which a representational weakness could arise. 
Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) view of representational development is termed representational 
redescription. According to Karmiloff-Smith, representations are strengthened via the 
achievement of behavioural mastery within a particular microdomain. Karmiloff-Smith 
describes domains as circumscribed areas of knowledge such as physics, or language, 
whilst microdomains comprise facets of knowledge within these domains such as gravity 
or definite articles. Once the child has achieved behavioural mastery of a particular 
microdomain, the representations reach a state of stability and the process of 
representation is driven endogenously in response to this success. The process of 
representational redescription results in the transformation of representations from implicit 
to explicit forms. The strength of explicit representations is reflected in the integration 
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with other sub-domains and domains of development. The process of redescription 
results in the transformation of a circumscribed representation and a corresponding 
proliferation throughout other domains. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues that children with Down's Syndrome may show a 
characteristic failure to develop sufficient behavioural mastery to facilitate representational 
redescription. Karmiloff-Smith describes a nine-year-old boy with Down's Syndrome, 
M. G., who appeared to have to relearn tasks such as beam balancing and drawing a 
house on each occasion he approached them. Such inconsistency in performance, 
although not eaident in our study, may result in a failure of representational redescription. 
Karmiloff-Smith argues that children with Down's Syndrome appear to relearn tasks 
afresh each time, suggesting a failure to achieve a consistent level of mastery. Many of the 
characteristics of play in children with Down's Syndrome suggest a similar failure. The 
reduced mastery motivation indicated by repetitive stereotyped play is reminiscent of 
Karmiloff-Smith's description of someone beginning to play a piano piece prior to 
achieving mastery. The achievement of mastery is fundamental to representational 
redescription, a process which results in the linking of knowledge across subdomains, 
strengthening and integrating that knowledge. 
Many authors point to the motivational characteristics of Down's Syndrome as a potential 
cause of the reduced rate of development in the population. The extent to which a 
representational account of development in children with Down's Syndrome is plausible 
depends to some extent on its concordance with motivational accounts. Karmiloff-Smith's 
model serves to illustrate how motivational and representational explanations of Down's 
Syndrome may be equivalent. The evidence for representational anomalies in children 
with Down's Syndrome will now be considered with respect to studies which suggest 
differences at the motivational level. 
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13.2.2.2 Representation, imitation and motivation 
Karmiloff-Smith's model allows us to view a motivational deficit as a causal element in a 
failure to strengthen representations. However, the underlying weakness of 
representations could conversely be seen as causing a reduced level of engagement in task 
performance. The question that remains to be addressed is how might relatively weak 
representations affect children's performance. 
Munakata, McClelland, Johnson and Siegler (1994) introduce the possibility of a 
`gradualistic' approach to the representations which drive children's search behaviour. 
Weaker representations are able only to facilitate recoveries which have moderate means- 
ends planning demands. Conversely, the existence of stronger representations facilitates 
more complex retrievals. There is evidence to suggest that the underlying weakness of 
representations in children with Down's Syndrome may influence performance in just this 
way. Wishart (1995) describes a child who demonstrated failure on an object permanence 
task when searching for chocolate buttons placed flat side down on the table. The child's 
difficulty with picking up the chocolate was seen as the cause of this failure, and was 
remedied by placing the buttons upside down to allow the child to pick them up. One 
could equally view this example as an illustration of weak representations failing to drive 
what initially may have been a complex retrieval process. Furthermore Wishart (1993b) 
describes the recovery of children's search success in response to chocolate, after a string 
of failures with an inedible hidden object. While this result is intuitively viewed in 
motivational terms, one could argue that hiding chocolate increases the representational 
salience of the hidden `object'. In our own study, the pressing of the lever to recover the 
hidden ball, was possible for all but one child (in the DS group) when there was only one 
location. However, the task proved to be too complex for children with Down's 
Syndrome in the three location condition. The problem is not simply that the means-ends 
task was too complex but that it was too complex to be driven by a correspondingly 
weaker representation of the object's location. 
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Other, more general accounts of the motivational deficit in children with Down's 
Syndrome suggest a reduced level of mastery motivation or causality pleasure (Gunn, 
Berry, & Andrews, 1981; 1982; Ruskin, Mundy, Kasari & Sigman, 1994). Furthermore, 
the complexity of children's play appears linked to the enjoyment which they appear to get 
from it (Jennings, Harmon, Morgan, Gaiter & Yarrow, 1979). The mastery motivation 
account suggests that children who are highly motivated tend to derive a great deal of 
pleasure from their successes. One could argue that the lower engagement with tasks and 
reduced motivation reflects the underlying weakness of children's representations. The 
weakness in representational basis may result in correspondingly reduced contingent 
affect when this representation is expressed. Thus, a child combing a doll's hair will 
derive more pleasure from this activity if it is based on a relatively strong representation. 
The reduced affect which characterises task performance in children with Down's 
Syndrome (e. g. Dunst, 1981) may reflect the weakness of representations which are 
expressed. 
Rast and Meltzoff (1995) refer to a `dampening of epistemic curiosity' in children with 
Down's Syndrome which results in anomalous behaviour on object permanence tasks. It 
is argued here that it may not be the curiosity which is dampened but the epistemology. 
Thus the child's knowledge of the objects location is weakened, via a weaker 
representation, and this results in reduced motivation to retrieve the object. Clearly, 
accounts citing either a motivational or a representational basis for task performance are 
closely related. The purpose of the preceding discussion is to illustrate that a 
representational account of development is broadly consistent with empirical evidence for 
reduced motivation in children with Down's Syndrome. These accounts therefore make 
similar empirical predictions but may differ both in aetiology and implications for 
intervention. 
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13.2.3 Consequences for intervention 
It has been argued in this thesis that children with Down's Syndrome may perform tasks 
using a different set of skills than typically developing children matched for 
developmental age. Therefore, while children with Down's Syndrome may appear to have 
reached a similar end-point to typically developing children, the processes by which 
children arrive at this end point may differ between the groups. 
It is argued that children with Down's Syndrome may be solving tasks according to a 
different developmental protocol using a different representational basis. The relative 
strength of imitative representations in children with Down's Syndrome may supersede 
the representational structures which are used by typically developing children in solving 
tasks. Furthermore, it has been argued that the habitual reliance on imitative 
representations may serve to further reinforce the relative weakness of other 
representational structures. The empirical evidence from cross-sectional studies in this 
thesis supports the relative strength of imitative representations at particular points in time. 
However, it is argued that these data indicate that imitation may be a causal pathological 
process in the representational development of children with Down's Syndrome. 
While many intervention strategies seek to emphasise and use children's strengths or 
assets (Gibson, 1996) it may be that the spontaneous use of such assets is the very feature 
which is impeding development in children with Down's Syndrome. According to 
Karmiloff-Smith, the process by which representations are strengthened is driven by the 
achievement of behavioural mastery. If behavioural mastery in particular domains is 
prevented by the primacy of imitation, then perhaps the balance could be redressed in 
intervention. 
Encouraging children to exercise their weaknesses in intervention may lead to the 
achievement of behavioural mastery and therefore correct any imbalances in 
representational development. In practical terms such intervention may entail redesigning 
toys and educational materials so that play necessitates mastery within the weaker 
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domains. Furthermore, tools for developmental assessment also need to reflect children's 
ability to perform a particular task but account for differences in the methods and learning 
styles that children might deploy. It would appear, for example, that object permanence 
tasks administered in the standard procedure may overestimate the cognitive abilities of 
children with Down's Syndrome. A more reliable assessment of object permanence may 
therefore be obtained using tasks, such as the lever task used in study 4, which prevent 
imitative solutions. The empirical studies detailed here emphasise the need to account not 
only for success or failure but the means with which children succeed on tasks. Therefore 
the success of intervention should be measured not only in terms of success on standard 
tasks but in terms of the adoption of a particular approach in achieving such a solution. 
However, there is a clear paradox here, since the encouragement of routines which 
highlight children's weaknesses is all the more likely to expose children to failure. Any 
radical redesigning must therefore take account of the sensitivity of children's motivation 
and start at a level of performance which is within the child's threshold. 
Despite some suggestions which are clearly different to those prescribed to address 
motivational difficulties, some approaches are common to both accounts. Wishart (1991) 
argues that children with Down's Syndrome need encouragement to reinforce newly 
learned skills. Any encouragement which results in the achievement of mastery rather than 
a one off success is certainly to be recommended. If we accept the converse of Munakata 
et al. 's (1994) findings, increasing the means-ends load at which success is achieved may 
strengthen the underlying representation. For example, if we take the case of the lever 
task, once the child has solved the single lever condition at all levels, one might require 
the child to press two levers simultaneously to retrieve the hidden object. The strength of 
children's representations could be similarly be periodically checked by increasing the 
means-ends or information processing load. Thus by increasing the information 
processing or means-ends skill required to solve a particular task may in itself strengthen 
the representation on which the solution is based. 
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The data presented in this thesis are based on cross sectional studies and it is suggested 
that the relative imitative strength observed in children with Down's Syndrome might 
reflect socio-cognitive processing biases which differs from typically developing children. 
However, longitudinal research is necessary to establish the extent to which 
`imitativeness' is a genuine developmental trait which has causal implications for 
representational development in other domains. In particular, a training study could 
establish the extent to which experience of non-imitative solutions may have benefits for 
performance on object permanence tasks. Further research is also needed to examine the 
extent to which imitation may be prevalent in other domains of development beyond 
symbolic play and object permanence. Furthermore, the extent to which imitativeness may 
be characteristic of children with Down's Syndrome also needs to be established through 
studies of other atypical populations. 
13.3 Conclusions 
The results of our empirical studies suggest a degree of coherence in the structural 
relationship between linguistic and cognitive domains in children with Down's 
Syndrome. However, it appears that children with Down's Syndrome may exploit their 
relative strengths in imitation in performing cognitive tasks. Children with Down's 
Syndrome appear to have a capacity for imitation which may be deployed to solve object 
permanence tasks. Furthermore, the relative strength of representations which drive 
imitative performance may overshadow weaker representations such as memory for an 
object's location during search or an object's functional properties during play. 
Results of studies in this thesis support a gradualistic and domain specific view of 
representational development in children with and without Down's Syndrome. Children 
with Down's Syndrome appear to have relatively strong social representations which 
facilitate imitation while representations of objects and functional properties in play are 
relatively weak. 
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In general terms, it appears that children with Down's Syndrome, when faced with 
standard developmental tasks, may use strategies which are qualitatively different from 
typically developing children. These findings cast doubt on traditional methods for 
matching of children with Down's Syndrome to control groups. Furthermore, the 
differences in the cognitive-developmental process may have implications for 
intervention. 
From the point of view of intervention, we suggest that the relative strength in social 
representation may be a causal influence on weakness within other domains. This may 
have consequences for intervention strategies in children with Down's Syndrome. 
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Ethical issues 
Al Recruitment of participants: briefing (deception), 
consent, and right to withdraw. 
The recruitment of participants is often regarded as an important methodological issue as 
the way in which a sample is obtained may have consequences for empirical validity. In 
this section recruitment of participants is considered as an issue of consent. Parents giving 
proxy consent for their children's participation may not be fully aware of their rights and 
may be coerced at the recruitment stage. Under particular circumstances, parents may feel 
that they are duty-bound to give consent and may be unaware of a number of their rights 
(Harth & Thong, 1995). The status of this research in being sponsored by the Down's 
Syndrome Association was considered to be potentially coercive to parents of children 
with Down's Syndrome who may have felt they had a duty to participate. The way in 
which parents were briefed as to the nature of the research, and their rights as 
participants, is therefore particularly important and forms an integral part of obtaining 
consent. 
Children with Down's Syndrome were recruited largely through contact with local 
parental support groups. Initial contact was made with a group leader and in each case a 
prearranged visit was made to a group meeting. During the meeting the purpose and goals 
of the research were outlined and those interested in participating were given specific 
details of the relevant project. Specific reference was made to the fact that the research 
was intended to investigate the development of children with Down's Syndrome but was 
not intended to be of benefit to individual children (see BPS code of conduct p. 2, section 
3.3). Recruitment of typically developing children was made though local parent and 
toddler groups. The group leader was contacted and an arrangement was made to visit the 
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group. The purpose and goals of the research were explained either to individual parents 
or to the group, depending upon the number of parents present 
After explaining the project, parents were given contact details for the researcher or where 
parents expressed enthusiasm, were asked to provide a contact telephone number. During 
a subsequent telephone conversation, the researcher answered any outstanding questions. 
If the parents expressed interest in the project at this stage, an arrangement was made to 
visit the parent and child at home. If however, parents did not express particular interest 
in the project, they were not subsequently contacted. Particular attention was paid to limit 
any coercion during group meetings or at toddler groups and it was emphasised that there 
would be no payments for participation. Parents who gave consent, but later appeared 
unwilling to participate were given additional opportunities to withdraw their consent. 
Due to the time consuming nature of the recruitment process, particularly that involving 
children with Down's Syndrome and typically developing children of specific 
chronological ages, parents and children often took part in more than one study. On each 
occasion, further consent for participation was requested from the parent. 
A. 2 Consent of Child 
Given the age of the children involved in these studies, it was not possible to obtain direct 
verbal consent to participate. Consent by proxy was therefore obtained from parents. 
However, distress during empirical procedures was taken as a serious expression of 
children's discontent and unwillingness to participate. Evidence suggests a longer latency 
and reduced intensity of affective expression in children with Down's Syndrome 
(Cicchetti & Beeghly, 1990). Any signs of distress therefore warrant particular attention 
within the Down's Syndrome population. During recruitment, parents were informed that 
it was expected that children would enjoy participating in the studies. It was also 
emphasised that if children became distressed during the procedure then testing would be 
curtailed. Parents were further reminded prior to the empirical procedure that they should 
inform the researcher at any stage if the child was becoming distressed. The purpose of 
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this reminder was not intended to serve as a substitute for the researcher's judgement but 
as supplementary to it. 
A. 3 Debriefing 
Debriefing of parents followed each visit. Parents were reassured that information 
acquired during the experiment, such as developmental ages and other performance 
measures, would be treated as `confidential'. Furthermore, parents were assured that 
children would not be identified by name in published research material (BPS code of 
conduct p. 10, section 7.1). Additional consent was requested for empirical studies 
involving the use of video tapes, particularly where pictures were intended for 
publication. 
Throughout the debriefing processes an effort was made to ensure that the parent 
understood the nature of the study. In studies where data collection was spread over 
several visits a full debriefing, including a statement of the particular empirical 
hypothesis, was reserved for the final visit. However, where parents made direct requests 
for specific information, this was supplied. Given the potential unreliability in assessment 
of developmental age, and undue weight which may be attached to its significance, 
parents were not routinely informed of the results obtained by their child. However, 
parents were asked for their opinions on their child's performance and the purpose of the 
developmental assessment was discussed. 
A letter giving written details of the purpose of the experiment and an outline of the results 
was sent to each parent that participated for each study. A reply form and freepost 
envelope was included for parents to indicate that they did not wish to be contacted for 
participation in further experiments. Of 91 participants in the empirical studies, only two 
refusals were received, on each occasion detailing personal reasons for not wishing to 
participate. 
Further debriefing was provided in the form of a regular newsletter to all those who 
participated in the empirical studies and to interested professionals. The newsletter gave 
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general details of the research project and contact details where parents could obtain more 
information. 
In debriefing, and indeed throughout contact with parents and children, particular 
attention was paid to BPS guidelines on the giving of advice. It is likely that parents of 
children with Down's Syndrome may be particularly sensitive to advice, however well 
meaning, and this may be given undue significance or treated as implicit criticism. Given 
the limited scope of the current work with children, and the concurrent involvement of 
qualified clinicians, advice was not routinely offered. Our experimental studies are 
concerned with the potential implications for intervention. However, at this stage such 
implications are speculative at best and cannot therefore form the basis for routine advice 
to parents. 
A. 4 Summary 
The ethical procedures adopted in this study comply with the guidelines proposed by the 
BPS (1991). Guidelines have been considered with particular reference to children with 
Down's Syndrome and to their parents. This group may be particularly vulnerable where 
issues of consent, coercion and debriefing are concerned. 
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Uzgiris & Hunt Scales 
B. 1 Means - ends Scale 
4. Letting go of an object in order to reach for another. 
8. Use of string horizontally to obtain an object. 
9. Use of a string vertically to obtain an object. 
10. Use of a stick to obtain an object. 
11. Placing a necklace in a bottle. 
12. Stacking a set of rings avoiding one solid ring. 
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B. 2 Object concept Scale 
4. Finding an object which is completely covered. 
8. Finding an object after successive visible displacements (3 screens A, B & C). 
(Reverse order of hiding between trials & switch screens around) 
10. Finding an object following one invisible displacement. 
(Object in container, container under A, container removed leaving object under cloth. ) 
13. Finding an object following one invisible displacement with three covers. 
(Object is hidden in container, container is placed under either A, B, or C; object is left 
under cover A, B, or C. Show empty container. 
Child must search at correct cloth. ) 
14. Finding an object following a series of invisible displacements. 
(Object hidden in hand, hand placed under A, then B, then C; object is left under C. 
Show empty hand. (no change of direction between trials). 
Child must search directly under C. ) 
15. Finding an object following a series of invisible displacements by searching in 
reverse order of hiding. 
(If correct search at C, 3 times on task 14, then repeat task 14 but leave object under A 
repeat task 14 once then task 15. 
Child must search systematically from last screen back to the first (i. e. C>B>A) ) 
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Methodological issues: performance consistency of 
BSID II test items 
Table C-1 and Table C-2 show details of items showing poor consistency (below 70%) 
for the DS and NDS groups respectively. Items identified as having poor consistency by 
Duffy (1990, p. 86-87) are indicated for comparison. 
Item Number Description DS (N) NDS (N) 
124 discriminates cube, key, book 58.3 10 41.7 11 
133 names five pictures 58.3 7 83.3 11 
85 Removes pellet from bottle 66.7 12 100.0 12 
95 Puts nine cubes in cup 66.7* 12 91.7 12 
114 uses 2-word utterance 66.7 12 75.0 11 
116 discriminates scribble from stroke 66.7* 10 58.3 11 
125 + matches pictures 66.7 to 66.7 11 
141 understands concept of one 66.7* 6 91.7 7 
Table C-I Items showing poor consistency in DS Group. (+ Item introduced in 
Bayley Scales Version Il, * Item identified as showing poor consistency by Duffy, 
1990) 
-3 
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Item Number Description NDS (N) DS (N) 
124 Discriminates Book, Cube, and Key 41.7 11 58.3 10 
118 + identifies object in photo 50.0 11 91.7 10 
123 build tower of six cubes 50.0 11 91.7 10 
132 + puts beads in tube 50.0 11 75.0 8 
116 Differentiates Scribble from Stroke 58.3 11 66.7 10 
129 + makes contingent utterance 58.3 1I 75.0 10 
120 completes reversed pink board 66.7 11 91.7 10 
125 + Matches Pictures 66.7 11 66.7 10 
131 + Attends to Story 66.7 11 75.0 9 
134 + displays verbal comprehension 66.7 11 75.0 8 
139 imitates horizontal and vertical strokes 66.7 7 75.0 6 
Table C-2 Items showing poor consistency in NDS Group. (+ Item introduced in Bayley 
Scales Version II, * Item identified as showing poor consistency by Duffy, 1990) 
Table C-3 and Table C-4 show details of items showing good consistency (over 90%) for 
the DS and NDS groups respectively. Items identified as having poor consistency by 
Duffy (1990, p. 86-87) are indicated for comparison. 
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Item Number Description DS (N) NDS (N) 
80 Removes Lid from Box 100.0* 9 100.0 8 
98 Places Pegs in 70 seconds 100.0 12 83.3 12 
101 Shows Shoes, Other Clothing, or 100.0* 12 83.3 12 
Object 
119 Places Pegs in 25 seconds 100.0* 10 75.0 11 
137 + Matches Four Colours 100.0 6 83.3 7 
142 + Produces Multiple-Word Utterances 100.0 5 83.3 7 
in Response to Picture Book 
143 + Recalls Geometric Forms 100.0 5 91.7 7 
144 + Discriminates Pictures 100.0 5 91.7 7 
146 + Counts (Number Names) 100.0 5 91.7 6 
148 + Uses Past Tense 100.0 5 100.0 5 
Table C-3 Items showing good consistency in DS Group. (+ Item introduced in 
Bayley Scales Version Ii, * Item identified as showing poor consistency by Duffy, 
1990) 
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Item Number Description NDS (N) DS (N) 
88 + Retrieves Toy (Clear Box 1) 100.0 12 75.0 12 
148 + Uses Past Tense 100.0 5 100.0 5 
78 Vocalises Four Different Vowel- 100.0 12 83.3 12 
Consonant Combinations 
79 Fingers Holes in Pegboard 100.0 12 83.3 12 
80 Removes Lid from Box 100.0 12 100.0 12 
81 Responds to Spoken Request 100.0 12 91.7 12 
85 Removes Pellet from Bottle 100.0 12 66.7 12 
86 Puts Three Cubes in Cup 100.0 12 83.3 12 
87 Places one Peg Repeatedly 100.0 12 83.3 12 
89 Puts Six Beads in Box 100.0 12 83.3 12 
90 Places one Piece in Blues Board 100.0 12 83.3 12 
92 Closes Round Container 100.0 12 83.3 12 
100 Uses Two Different Words 100.0 12 75.0 12 
Appropriately 
135 Builds Tower of Eight Cubes 100.0 11 91.7 8 
Table C-4 Items showing good consistency NDS Group. (+ Item introduced in 
Bayley Scales Version 11, * Item identified as showing poor consistency by Duffy, 
1990) 
Table C-5 details the stability of items identified as unstable by Duffy (1990). A number 
of items show wide variability in stability levels between our data and the stability levels 
found by Duffy. Data presented in this table and in Table C-3 and Table C-4 suggest only 
limited concordance in items identified as unstable by Duffy and those items identified in 
our present study. 
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Item Number Description DS NDS Duffy (1990) DS 
104 Uses Rod to Attain Toyt - - 16.6 
101 Shows Shoe, Other Clothing, or O bject 100.0 83.3 29.0 
89 Puts Six Beads in Box 83.3 100.0 40.0 
92 Closes Round Container 83.3 100.0 43.0 
103 Imitates Crayon Stroke 75.0 83.3 43.0 
87 Places one Peg Repeatedly 83.3 100.0 50.0 
96 Finds Toy under Reversed Cups 75.0 91.7 50.0 
97 Builds Tower of Two Cubes 91.7 83.3 50.0 
120 Completes Reversed Pink Board 91.7 66.7 50.0 
123 Builds Tower of Six Cubes 91.7 50.0 50.0 
141 Understands Concept of One 66.7 91.67 50.0 
83 Pats Toy in Imitation 91.7 83.3 57.0 
95 Puts Nine Cubes in Cup 66.7 91.7 57.0 
91 Scribbles Spontaneously 91.7 91.7 60.0 
94 Imitates Word 75.0 83.3 60.0 
80 Removes Lid from Box 100.0 100.0 66.6 
100 Uses Two Different Words 75.0 100.0 66.6 
Appropriately 
116 Differentiates Scribble from Stroke 66.67 58.33 66.6 
119 Places Pegs in 25 seconds 100.0 75.0 66.6 
135 Builds Tower of Eight Cubes 91.7 100.0 66.6 
Table C-5: Items Identified as Showing Poor Consistency by Duffy (1990) with 
corresponding consistency measures from the present study. 
Item 104 was omitted from all testing sessions as pilot testing showed the item to be 
unreliable. This item appears to require a table or some means of preventing a direct reach 
for the toy. Given that testing took place in children's homes and in a variety of different 
cicumstances, it was thought appropriate to omit this item. 
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Motor Development Questionnaire 
Peter Smith dob: 01.01.95 
When did Peter first begin to walk (taking 2-3 steps without support)? 
Age in months(if known): 
Date if known: 
When did Peter begin `cruising' (walking around using furniture for 
support) ? 
Age in months (if known): 
Date if known: 
When did Peter first begin to crawl (on hands and knees)? 
Age in months (if known): 
Date if known: 
When did Peter first begin to crawl (belly crawling)? 
Age in months (if known): 
Date if known: 
Did Peter use a babywalker? 
If yes, for how long? 
Yes No 
Did Peter have any Physiotherapy? 
If yes, for how long? 
Yes No 
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Analysis of Variance Tables from Studies 
E. 1 Chapter 8 
E. 1.1.1 p. 149 Regressions & improvements x group 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for TI using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 156.79 22 7.13 
GROUP 
. 02 
1 . 02 . 00 . 957 
Tests involving 'REGIMP' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 246.96 22 11.23 
REGIMP 88.02 1 88.02 7.84 . 
010 
GROUP BY REGIMP 2.52 1 2.52 . 22 . 640 
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E. 1.1.2 p. 141 Bayley Scales: group x session 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 12601.79 22 572.81 
GROUP 379.69 1 379.69 . 66 . 424 
Tests involving 'SESSION' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 420.46 22 19.11 
SESSION 77.52 1 77.52 4.06 . 
056 
GROUP BY SESSION 7.52 1 7.52 . 
39 
. 
537 
E. 1.1.3 p. 154 Bayley regressions x quartile 
Tests of Significance for REGS using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 72.01 132 . 
55 
QUART 8.73 3 2.91 5.34 . 002 
GP . 56 
1 . 56 1.03 . 
313 
QUART BY GP 9.59 3 3.20 5.86 . 
001 
(Model) 18.73 7 2.68 4.91 . 000 
(Total) 90.74 139 . 65 
R-Squared = . 206 
Adjusted R-Squared = . 
164 
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E. 1.1.4 p. 156 BRS x group (3 analyses) 
Tests of Significance for TOEF using SEQUENTIAL Sums of Squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 17.70 5 3.54 
GROUP 25.07 1 25.07 7.08 . 045 
SESSION 26.14 5 5.23 1.48 . 340 
GROUP * SESSION 63.08 5 12.62 3.56 . 095 
NAME WITHIN GROU 1448.93 120 12.07 3.41 . 084 
P* SESSION 
(Model) 1563.22 131 11.93 3.37 . 086 
(Total) 1580.92 136 11.62 
R-Squared = . 989 
Adjusted R-Squared = . 
695 
Tests of Significance for TERF using SEQUENTIAL Sums of Squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 60.80 5 12.16 
GROUP 36.10 1 36.10 2.97 . 146 
SESSION 111.66 5 22.33 1. B4 . 260 
GROUP * SESSION 550.89 5 110.18 9.06 . 015 
NAMENUMS WITHIN GROU 7528.43 120 62.74 5.16 . 036 
P* SESSION 
(Model) 8227.07 131 62.80 5.16 . 035 
(Total) 8287.87 136 60.94 
R-Squared = . 993 
Adjusted R-Squared = . 800 
Tests of Significance for TRS using SEQUENTIAL 
Sums of Squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 125.70 5 25.14 
GROUP 1.00 1 1.00 . 04 . 
850 
SESSION 190.33 5 38.07 1.51 . 
330 
GROUP * SESSION 927.52 5 185.50 7.38 . 023 
NAME WITHIN GROUP 11726.91 120 97.72 3.89 . 065 
* SESSION 
(Model) 12845.76 131 98.06 3.90 . 
064 
(Total) 12971.46 136 95.38 
R-Squared = . 990 
Adjusted R-Squared = . 736 
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E. 1.1.5 p. 152 OP Regressions x Group 
Sum of Mean 
Source of Variation Squares DF Square 
Main Effects . 
005 1 
. 005 
GROUP . 005 1 . 005 
Explained . 005 1 . 005 
Residual . 603 
22 
. 027 
Total . 608 
23 
. 026 
E. 1.1.6 p. 152 ME Regressions x Group 
Sum of Mean 
Source of Variation Squares DF Square 
Main Effects . 
002 1 . 002 
GROUP . 002 1 . 002 
Explained . 002 
1 
. 
002 
Residual . 265 22 . 012 
Total . 
267 23 . 012 
Sig 
F of F 
186 . 670 
186 . 670 
186 . 670 
Sig 
F of F 
. 178 . 677 
. 178 . 677 
. 
178 
. 
677 
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E. 2 Chapter 9: 
E. 2.1 Study 1 
E. 2.1.1 p. 176 Partial correlations: regression analysis 
Locomotor Chronological Developmental OP Score 
Experience Age Age 
Locomotor - R2= 0.93 R2=0.19 R2 = 0.40 
Experience F(l, 14)=197.4 F(l, l4)=3.19 F(l, 14)=9.23 
Chronological Age R2= 0.76 - R2 =0.68 R2 = 0.37 
F(1,5)=1.53 F(l, 14)=30.92 F(I, 14)=8.60* 
Developmental Age R2 = 0.28 R2 = 0.67 - R- = 0.36 
F(1,5)=12.8* F(1,5)=10.1 F(l, 14)=7.94* 
OP Score R2 = 0.04 R2 0.06 R2 = 0.20 - 
F(1,5)=0.20 F(1,5)=0.137 F(1,5)=0.12 
Table E-6: Regression coefficients and F Ratios analysis of variance(shaded: 37 
observations, unshaded: 17 observations) 
E. 2.1.2 p. 177 Regression analyses for whole group (n=37) 
Sum of Mean Sig 
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F 
Covariates 250.570 1 250.570 30.922 . 000 
DA 250.570 1 250.570 30.922 . 000 
Main Effects 565.706 21 26.938 3.324 . 012 
NAME 565.706 21 26.938 3.324 . 012 
Explained 2858.880 22 129.949 16.037 . 
000 
Residual 113.445 14 8.103 
Total 2972.325 36 82.565 
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OP-SC 
by NAME 
with DA 
UNIQUE sums of squares 
All effects entered simultaneously 
Sum of Mean 
Source of Variation Squares DF Square 
Covariates 7.300 1 7.300 
DA 7.300 1 7.300 
Main Effects 29.394 21 1.400 
NAME 29.394 21 1.400 
Explained 96.377 22 4.381 
Residual 12.866 14 . 919 
Total 109.243 36 3.035 
OP-SC 
by NAME 
with AGE 
UNIQUE sums of squares 
All effects entered simultaneously 
Sum of Mean 
Source of Variation Squares DF Square 
Covariates 7.674 1 7.674 
AGE 7.674 1 7.674 
Main Effects 34.451 21 1.641 
NAME 34.451 21 1.641 
Explained 96.751 22 4.398 
Residual 12.492 14 . 
892 
Total 109.243 36 3.035 
Sig 
F of F 
7.944 . 014 
7.944 . 014 
1.523 . 211 
1.523 . 211 
4.767 . 002 
Sig 
F of F 
8.601 . 
011 
8.601 . 011 
1.839 . 
122 
1.839 . 
122 
4.929 . 002 
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E. 2.1.3 p. 177 Regression analyses for non-locomotor group (n=17) 
OP-SC 
by NAME 
with AGE 
UNIQUE sums of squares 
All effects entered simultaneously 
Sum of Mean 
Source of Variation Squares DF Square 
Covariates . 
080 1 . 080 
AGE . 080 1 . 080 
Main Effects 9.581 10 . 958 
NAME 9.581 10 . 
958 
Explained 13.550 11 1.232 
Residual 2.920 5 . 
584 
Total 16.471 16 1.029 
OP-SC 
by NAME 
with DA 
UNIQUE sums of squares 
All effects entered simultaneously 
Sum of Mean 
Source of Variation Squares DF 
Square 
Covariates . 
123 1 . 123 
DA . 123 
1 . 123 
Main Effects 10.990 10 1.099 
M? ME 10.990 10 1.099 
Explained 13.593 11 1.236 
Residual 2.877 5 . 575 
Total 16.471 16 1.029 
Sig 
F of F 
. 137 . 727 
. 
137 
. 
727 
1.641 . 
305 
1.641 . 305 
2.109 . 212 
Sig 
F of F 
. 213 . 664 
. 213 . 664 
1.910 . 246 
1.910 . 246 
2.147 . 206 
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AGE 
by NAME 
with DA 
UNIQUE sums of squares 
All effects entered simultaneously 
Sum of Mean 
Source of Variation Squares DF Square 
Covariates 34.264 1 34.264 
DA 34.264 1 34.264 
Main Effects 127.512 10 12.751 
NAME 127.512 10 12.751 
Explained 478.171 11 43.470 
Residual 16.949 5 3.390 
Total 495.120 16 30.945 
17 cases were processed. 
0 cases (. 0 pct) were missing. 
E. 3 Chapter 10: 
E. 3.1 Study 2 
E. 3.1.1 p. 195 Action word comprehension: group x stage 
Tests of Significance for DA using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Sig 
F of F 
10.108 . 025 
10.108 . 025 
3.762 . 078 
3.762 . 078 
12.824 . 006 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 235.75 20 11.79 
GROUP 1.49 1 1.49 . 13 . 
726 
STAGEC_1 255.27 1 255.27 21.66 . 
000 
GROUP BY STAGEC 1 11.63 1 11.63 . 99 . 332 
(Model) 273.59 3 91.20 7.74 . 001 
(Total) 509.33 23 22.14 
R-Squared = . 537 
Adjusted R-Squared = . 468 
354 
Appendix E 
E. 3.1.2 p. 196 Action word comprehension: group x word x session 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using U NIQUE sums of squa res 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 53.44 22 2.43 
GROUP . 03 
1 
. 
03 
. 
01 
. 911 
Tests involving 'SESS' Within-Subject Effect. 
AVERAGED Tests of Sign ificance for MEAS. 1 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 50.85 110 . 46 
SESS 4.03 5 . 81 1.74 . 131 
GROUP BY SESS 2.36 5 . 47 1.02 . 408 
Tests involving 'WORDTYP' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T7 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 15.16 22 . 
69 
WORDTYP . 00 
1 . 00 . 01 . 944 
GROUP BY WORDTYP . 42 
1 . 42 . 61 . 443 
Tests involving 'SESS BY WORDTYP' Within-S ubject Effect. 
AVERAGED Tests of Significance for MEAS. 1 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 28.97 110 . 
26 
SESS BY WORDTYP 1.73 5 . 35 1.31 . 
265 
GROUP BY SESS BY WOR . 23 
5 . 05 . 17 . 
973 
DTYP 
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E. 3.1.3 p. 197 Action word comprehension: group x wordtype x op stage 
x session 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using SEQUENTIAL Sums of Squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 40.55 21 1.93 
STAGECON 12.69 1 12.69 6.57 . 018 
GROUP . 
23 1 . 23 . 12 . 735 
Tests involving 'WORDTYP' Within-Subject Ef fect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using SEQUENT IAL Sums of Squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 13.77 21 . 
66 
WORDTYP . 00 
1 . 00 . 01 . 943 
STAGECON BY WORDTYP 1.25 1 1.25 1.91 . 
182 
GROUP BY WORDTYP . 55 
1 . 55 . 84 . 369 
------------ 
E. 3. I. 4 p. 199 Action 
----- 
word co 
-------------------- 
mprehension: Tomasello & Farrar 
comparison analysis 
******Ana1ysi sof Vari ance- - design 1 
Tests of Significance for MEAN using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 4.24 23 0.26 
STAGE 8.90 1 8.90 48.40 ** 
STUDY 1.28 1 1.28 6.90 
WORD_TYP 3.18 2 1.59 8.60 ** 
STAGE BY STUDY 1.23 1 
1.23 25.70 ** 
STAGE BY WORD_TYP . 46 
2 . 
23 1.25 NS 
STUDY BY WORD TYP . 13 
2 . 
07 0.38 NS 
STAGE BY STUDY BY WO . 
34 2 . 
17 0.92 NS 
RD TYP 
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E. 3.1.5 p. 203 Action word production: wordtype x stage x group x 
session 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 25.11 20 1.26 
GROUP 2.45 1 2.45 1.95 . 177 
STAGECON 3.16 1 3.16 2.51 . 128 
GROUP BY STAGECON . 84 1 . 84 . 67 . 424 
GROUP BY STAGECON . 032 . 666 . 151 
Tests involving 'SES' Within-Subject Effect . 
AVERAGED Tests of Significance for MEAS. 1 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF Ms F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 40.24 100 . 40 
SES 1.35 5 . 27 . 67 . 645 
GROUP BY SES 2.21 5 . 44 1.10 . 365 
STAGECON BY SES 2.41 5 . 48 1.20 . 317 
GROUP BY STAGECON BY 2.81 5 . 
56 1.40 . 231 
SES 
Tests involving 'WORD' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T7 using UNIQUE sums of squar es 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 25.98 20 1.30 
WORD . 56 
1 . 56 . 
43 
. 
518 
GROUP BY WORD . 
59 1 
. 
59 
. 
46 
. 
507 
STAGECON BY WORD . 05 
1 . 
05 
. 
04 
. 
841 
GROUP BY STAGECON BY 1.11 1 1.11 . 
86 
. 
366 
WORD 
Tests involving 'SES BY WORD' Within-Subject Effect. 
AVERAGED Tests of Sign ificance for MEAS. 1 u sing UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS P Sig of 
F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 41.98 100 . 
42 
SES BY WORD 1.74 5 . 35 . 83 . 531 
GROUP BY SES BY WORD 1.60 5 . 
32 
. 
76 
. 
580 
STAGECON BY SES BY W 1.56 5 . 
31 
. 
74 
. 
593 
ORD 
GROUP BY STAGECON BY 1.77 5 . 
35 . 
84 
. 
522 
SES BY WORD 
357 
Appendix E 
E. 3.1.6 p. 205 Action word comprehension: group x stage-stability x 
wordtype 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 5.22 16 . 33 
GROUP 
. 15 
1 
. 15 . 46 . 510 
STAGECAT 3.29 3 1.10 3.36 . 045 
GROUP BY STAGECAT . 21 3 . 07 . 22 . 883 
Tests involving 'WORDTYPE' Within-S ubject E ffect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 2.27 16 
. 
14 
WORDTYPE . 
00 1 . 00 . 01 . 
926 
GROUP BY WORDTYPE . 
06 1 . 06 . 45 . 512 
STAGECAT BY WORDTYPE . 13 
3 . 04 . 
30 
. 
825 
GROUP BY STAGECAT BY . 
13 3 . 04 . 30 . 825 
WORDTYPE 
E. 3.1.7 p. 210 Object word comprehension scores: group x stagex session 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 17.42 20 . 
87 
GROUP 2.38 1 2.38 2.74 . 
114 
STAGECON 3.04 1 3.04 3.49 . 077 
GROUP BY STAGECON . 34 
1 . 
34 
. 
39 
. 
539 
Tests involving 'SESS' Within-Subject Effect. 
AVERAGED Tests of Significance for OBRT using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 70.59 100 . 
71 
SESS 2.54 5 . 
51 . 72 . 611 
GROUP BY SESS . 82 
5 . 16 . 23 . 948 
STAGECON BY SESS 2.00 5 . 
40 
. 
57 
. 
726 
GROUP BY STAGECON BY 
. 
58 5 . 
12 
. 
16 
. 
975 
SESS 
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E. 3.1.8 p. 211 Elicited production of object words: group x stage x 
session 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 21.23 20 1.06 
GROUP 5.60 1 5.60 5.28 . 033 
STAGECON 3.75 1 3.75 3.53 
. 
075 
GROUP BY STAGECON . 30 1 . 30 . 28 . 602 
----------------------------- 
Effect Size Measures and Observed Power at the . 
0500 Level 
Partial Noncen- 
Source of Variation ETA Sqd trality Power 
GROUP . 
209 5.276 . 587 
STAGECON . 150 
3.532 . 432 
GROUP BY STAGECON . 
014 . 281 . 063 
Tests involving 'SES' Within-Subject Effect. 
AVERAGED Tests of Significance for MEAS. 1 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 21.27 100 . 21 
SES 2.26 5 . 
45 2.13 
. 
068 
GROUP BY SES 1.90 5 . 
38 1.79 
. 122 
STAGECON BY SES 1.42 5 . 
28 1.33 
. 
256 
GROUP BY STAGECON BY 2.31 5 . 
46 2.17 
. 
064 
SES 
E. 3.1.9 p. 212 Spontaneous production of object words: group x stage 
Sum of Mean Sig 
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F 
Main Effects 27.594 2 13.797 3.456 . 051 
GROUP-1 5.316 1 5.316 1.332 . 262 
STAGEC 1 20.324 1 20.324 5.091 . 035 
2-Way Interactions . 024 1 . 
024 . 006 . 940 
GROUP 
-1 
STAGEC 1 . 024 
1 . 024 . 006 . 940 
Explained 27.594 3 9.198 2.304 . 108 
Residual 79.840 20 3.992 
Total 107.434 23 4.671 
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E. 3. I. I0 p. 212 MacArthur CDI scores : group x stage 
Tests of Significance for COMP using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 72398.68 20 3619.93 
GROUP-1 20315.22 1 20315.22 5.61 . 028 
STAGEC_1 21392.22 1 21392.22 5.91 . 
025 
GROUP 
-1 
BY STAGEC 1 1994.98 1 1994.98 . 55 . 466 
(Model) 46701.94 3 15567.31 4.30 . 017 
(Total) 119100.62 23 5178.29 
R-Squared = . 
392 
Adjusted R-Squared = . 
301 
Tests of Significance for PROD using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 89329.06 20 4466.45 
GROUP-1 20019.16 1 20019.16 4.48 . 047 
STAGEC_1 53808.29 1 53808.29 12.05 . 002 
GROUP 
-1 
BY STAGEC 1 12224.77 1 12224.77 2.74 . 114 
(Model) 90081.44 3 30027.15 6.72 . 003 
(Total) 179410.50 23 7800.46 
R-Squared = . 502 
Adjusted R-Squared = . 427 
Tests of Significance for COMP using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 55271.02 19 2909.00 
REGRESSION 17127.66 1 17127.66 5.89 . 
025 
GROUP-1 14942.87 1 14942.87 5.14 . 
035 
STAGEC_1 29.04 1 29.04 . 01 . 
921 
GROUP 
-1 
BY STAGEC 1 5609.28 1 5609.28 1.93 . 181 
(Model) 63829.61 4 15957.40 5.49 . 004 
(Total) 119100.62 23 5178.29 
R-Squared = . 536 
Adjusted R-Squared = . 
438 
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------------------------- 
Regression analysis for WITHIN+RESIDUAL error term 
--- Individual Univariate . 
9500 confidence intervals 
Dependent variable .. 
COMP 
COVARIATE B Beta Std. Err. t-Value Sig. of t 
BAYLEY 1 2.43048 . 
56739 1.002 2.426 . 
025 
COVARIATE Lower -95% CL- Upper 
BAYLEY 1 . 334 4.527 
-- ------- ----- ------- ---------------- 
Tests of Significance for PROD using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 67982.86 19 3578.05 
REGRESSION 21346.20 1 21346.20 5.97 . 025 
GROUP-1 14165.85 1 14165.85 3.96 . 
061 
STAGEC_1 2830.59 1 2830.59 . 79 . 385 
GROUP 
-1 
BY STAGEC 1 20313.01 1 20313.01 5.68 . 
028 
(Model) 111427.64 4 27856.91 7.79 . 001 
(Total) 179410.50 23 7800.46 
R-Squared = . 
621 
Adjusted R-Squared = . 
541 
-------------------------- 
Regression analysis for WITHIN+RESIDUAL error term 
---- ------- 
--- Individual Univariate . 
9500 conf idence interval s 
Dependent variable .. PROD 
COVARIATE B Beta Std. Err. t-Value Sig. of t 
BAYLEY 1 2.71334 . 
51609 1.111 2.443 . 025 
COVARIATE Lower -95% CL- Upper 
BAYLEY 1 . 388 
5.038 
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E. 4 Chapter 11 
E. 4.1 Study 3 
E. 4.1.1 p. 236 Condition x order x group 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 1696.67 32 53.02 
GROUP 44.81 1 44.81 . 85 . 365 
ORDER 41.41 1 41.41 . 78 . 383 
GROUP BY ORDER 19.13 1 19.13 . 36 . 552 
Tests involving 'OP_IMIT' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 447.24 32 13.98 
OP_IMIT 309.01 1 309.01 22.11 . 000 
GROUP BY OP_IMIT 60.81 1 60.81 4.35 . 
045 
ORDER BY OP_IMIT 4.79 1 4.79 . 
34 
. 
562 
GROUP BY ORDER BY OP 1.56 1 1.56 . 11 . 741 
IMIT 
E. 4.1.2 p. 238 Condition x order x group (proportion scores) 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 1.10 31 . 
04 
REGRESSION 2.26 1 2.26 63.95 . 000 
GROUP_2 . 08 
1 . 08 2.16 . 
152 
ORDER 2 . 00 
1 . 00 . 06 . 
805 
_ GROUP 
-2 
BY ORDER .2 . 
06 1 . 06 1.60 . 
215 
Tests involving 'OP_IMIT' Within-Su bject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL . 98 32 . 
03 
OP IMIT . 
80 1 . 80 
25.99 . 
000 
_ 
GROUP_2 BY OP_IMIT . 
16 1 . 
16 5.18 . 
030 
ORDER_2 BY OP_IMIT 
. 
00 1 . 
00 
. 
06 . 
808 
GROUP_2 BY ORDER_2 . 00 
1 . 00 . 
08 . 
773 
BY OP IMIT 
362 
Appendix E 
E. 4.1.3 p. 240 Response times: group x response x condition 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 85.23 23 3.71 
GROUP . 25 1 . 
25 
. 07 . 
799 
Tests involving 'CON' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 62.86 23 2.73 
CON 1.04 1 1.04 . 38 . 543 
GROUP BY CON . 63 
1 . 63 . 23 . 635 
Tests involving 'CORR' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T3 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 36.09 23 1.57 
CORR 2.87 1 2.87 1.83 . 
189 
GROUP BY CORR . 70 
1 . 70 . 
45 . 510 
Tests involving 'CON BY CORR' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T4 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF 
MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 25.45 23 1.11 
CON BY CORR . 
09 1 . 09 . 09 . 
772 
GROUP BY CON BY CORR . 
64 1 . 64 . 58 . 
455 
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E. 4.1.4 p. 241 Error x condition x group 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL . 
00 65 . 00 
GROUP-1 . 
00 1 . 00 
COND . 
00 1 . 
00 
GROUP 
-1 
BY COND . 
00 1 
. 
00 
---- ----------------- 
Tests involving 'ERRORTYP' Within- 
---- 
Subject 
------ 
Effect. 
--- --- 
AVERAGED Tests of Significance fo r MEAS. 1 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 190093.19 130 1462.26 
ERRORTYP 33344.43 2 16672.21 11.40 . 
000 
GROUP-1 BY ERRORTYP 9534.94 2 4767.47 3.26 . 042 
COND BY ERRORTYP 7228.02 2 3614.01 2.47 . 088 
GROUP-1 BY COND BY E 1702.51 2 851.25 . 
58 . 560 
RRORTYP 
----------- ------ ---- ------- -- ------- 
E. 4.2 Study 4 
E. 4.2.1 p. 249 Group x scale x order 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F 
Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 557.25 23 24.23 
REGRESSION 939.84 1 939.84 38.79 . 000 
ORDER 95.49 5 19.10 . 79 . 569 
GROUP . 54 
1 . 54 . 
02 . 882 
ORDER BY GROUP 56.62 5 11.32 . 47 . 
796 
------------------------------------- 
Regression analysis for WITHIN+RESIDUAL error term 
--- Individual Univariate . 
9500 confidence intervals 
Dependent variable .. 
TI 
COVARIATE B Beta Std. Err. t-Value Sig. of t Lower -95% 
TDA . 83346 . 80836 . 
134 6.228 . 
000 . 
557 
COVARIATE CL- Upper 
TDA 1.110 
Tests involving 'SCALE' Within-Subject Effect. 
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AVERAGED Tests of Significance for MEAS. 1 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 509.18 48 10.61 
SCALE 279.62 2 139.81 13.18 . 000 ORDER BY SCALE 80.66 10 8.07 
. 
76 
. 
665 
GROUP BY SCALE 103.23 2 51.61 4.87 . 012 
ORDER BY GROUP BY SC 93.87 10 9.39 . 88 . 
553 
ALE 
E. 5 Chapter 12: 
E. 5.1 Study 5 
E. 5.1. I p. 266 Pilot testing data: target x condition 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for T1 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 71.24 23 3.10 
CONSTANT 297.51 1 297.51 96.05 . 000 
Tests involving MODEL' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 40.16 23 1.75 
MODEL 4.59 1 4.59 2.63 . 118 
Tests involving 'PLAYTPE' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T3 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 150.74 23 6.55 
PLAYTPE 
. 
01 1 . 01 . 00 . 
969 
Tests involving 'MODEL BY PLAYTPE' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T4 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 66.24 23 2.88 
MODEL BY PLAYTPE 52.51 1 52.51 18.23 . 
000 
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E. 5.1.2 p. 269 Target directed play: target x group x condition 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 160.85 34 4.73 
GROUP 15.34 1 15.34 3.24 
. 
081 
Tests involving 'COND' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 33.01 34 
. 
97 
COND 3.67 1 3.67 3.78 
. 
060 
GROUP BY COND . 
06 1 
. 
06 
. 
06 
. 
801 
Tests involving 'TARGET' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T3 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 217.74 34 6.40 
TARGET 91.84 1 91.84 14.34 
. 
001 
GROUP BY TARGET 1.17 1 1.17 . 
18 
. 
671 
Tests involving 'COND BY TARGET' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T4 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 161.01 34 4.74 
COND BY TARGET 297.56 1 297.56 62.83 . 
000 
GROUP BY COND BY TAR 24.17 1 24.17 5.10 . 
030 
GET 
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Appendix E 
E. 5.1.3 p. 274 Second & subsequent acts group x target x condition 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 197.06 34 5.80 
GROUP 28.44 1 28.44 4.91 . 
034 
Tests involving 'TARGET' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 225.78 34 6.64 
TARGET 124.69 1 124.69 18.78 . 000 
GROUP BY TARGET . 03 
1 . 03 . 00 . 949 
Tests involving 'CONDITIO' Within-Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T3 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 44.11 34 1.30 
CONDITIO 1.36 1 1.36 1.05 . 313 
GROUP BY CONDITIO . 03 
1 . 03 . 02 . 885 
Tests involving 'TARGET BY CONDITIO' Within -Subject Effect. 
Tests of Significance for T4 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of 
F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 139.94 34 4.12 
TARGET BY CONDITIO 266.78 1 266.78 64.81 . 
000 
GROUP BY TARGET BY C 18.78 1 18.78 4.56 . 040 
ONDITIO 
E. 5.1.4 p. 273 Target swaps: group x shift-type 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Significance for Ti using UNIQUE sums of squa res 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 69.33 34 2.04 
GROUP 5.33 1 5.33 2.62 . 
115 
Tests involving 'SWAP' Within-Subject Effect. 
AVERAGED Tests of Sign ificance for MEAS. 1 using UNIQUE sums of squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 325.78 68 4.79 
SWAP 7.06 2 3.53 . 74 . 
483 
GROUP BY SWAP 18.50 2 9.25 1.93 . 153 
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